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Abstract. 
This thesis is about getting married and the making of manhoods in Sabon Zongo; a 
Muslim, Hausa enclave in Accra. I elaborate the normative rights and responsibilities 
of men within idealised relations of consumption, production and exchange, and how 
they are implicated in accepted and valued notions of manhood. Men achieve and 
articulate socially accepted and valued, productive and responsible manhoods 
through marriage by establishing a household of dependents. Irrespective of actual 
productive activities, women, children and unmarried 'youth' are said to be incapable 
of meeting their own consumption needs, and so dependent on male household 
heads, who produce and provide on their behalf. These dependencies are said to 
justify the status, prestige and authority of married men. Whilst marriage matters to 
men because it brings about an improvement in how they are socially evaluated, it is 
seldom easily achieved. Unmarried men must subordinate themselves to the authority 
of senior men, whose support is necessary if their marital aspirations are to be 
realised. Thus it is control over reproduction, rather than production and productive 
resources, which underpins male authority.  
However, idealised accounts of manhood, and the marital process through which it is 
achieved, often contradict what actually happens in practice. I explore men’s efforts to 
reconcile tensions between ideals and actualities. I examine marital pathways as sites 
of representation, in which men seek to influence the social evaluations made of them 
by others. I draw on Goffman (1956, 1974, 1980) and De Certeau (1984) to examine 
how men go about curating and choreographing the marital process, in particular the 
exchange of marriage goods, and how they seek to manage information for impression 
management. I show how a convincing performance requires the cooperation of 
others, including one’s notional dependents. This reveals a paradox of dependency; 
in that such cooperation is not only difficult for men to secure, but may involve 
compromises that call their very manhoods in to question. 
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GLOSSARY OF HAUSA TERMS 
In this glossary I have chosen to include only those Hausa language terms that 
appear frequently in the text. The definitions presented here should be treated as a 
guide. Fuller explanations are provided in-text where necessary. 
 
Ango  Groom 
Amarya  Bride/never married woman/virgin 
Arzikin Mutane  Wealth in people 
Aure  Wedding 
Babariga  
Long robe and shawl considered typical of Hausa 
men. 
Base  A semi-formal gathering space for men 
Baturi  White/wealthy/fortunate person 
Bazawara  Divorced woman 
Biki  Network of exchange relationships 
Budan Kay  
Celebration when well-wishers visit the home of a 
newly married husband and wife. 
Chop  Food, to Eat 
Gaysua/Goro  
Gift given by a groom’s senior male kin to those of the 
bride which formally initiates the marital process 
Gida  Compound/Extended kinship unit 
Girma  Respect/Bigness 
Hassada  Envy/Jealousy 
Iyali  
Conjugal unit of husband, wife and dependent 
children 
Karuwai  Prostitute/unmarried/independent woman 
Kayan Daki  Wedding gift given to the bride by her mother. 
Ƙosai  Patties or bean cakes made from fried beans 
Kuɗi  Money 
Lafiya  Health/well-being/order 
Laya  Talisman 
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Lefe  Gift given a bride by her groom. 
Maghrib  Early evening prayer 
Mata  Woman 
Mutumin  Man 
Mutumin Kirki(i)  Good Man 
Sadaki  Bridewealth 
Sallah  Prayer 
Saurayi (sing), 
Samari (pl)  Unmarried male youth 
Tallafi  Adoption 
Tro-tro  Minibus 
Tuwo  
Balls made from starch such as wheat, sorghum or 
rice typically consumed with soup. 
Yara  Daughter 
Yaro  Son 
Zongo  Predominantly Muslim residential area 
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Chapter One: The Puzzle 
1.1 Introduction: ‘Mutumin Kirki’ – The Concept of the Good Man in Hausa 
Abu leans his single foam mattress up against the wall and peels back one corner of 
the chequered linoleum that lines the floor of the small room he shares with two of his 
younger cousins. Underneath is a grubby white envelope. He picks up the envelope, 
opens it and shows me the money inside. Abu lives in Sabon Zongo, a Muslim Hausa 
enclave in urban Accra. Over the last couple of days Abu had been working for me as 
a research assistant, helping me get to know Zongo better and translating between 
English and Hausa when my own language skills failed me. I give Abu the money I 
had promised to pay him. He stuffs it inside the envelope, places it back under the 
linoleum and returns the mattress to its position on the floor. Though Abu had been 
appreciative of the chance to earn some extra money, he asked that I keep our 
transaction a secret. Abu was anxious about what others might think if they knew how 
much he had saved and what he was saving for.  
Alhaji Tanko’s flatscreen television takes pride of place in his living room. The 
armchairs we sit in facing each other are barely two metres apart, pressed up against 
the white washed walls of his living room. Nevertheless, his voice is calm and quiet 
and I struggle to hear what he’s saying over the sound of the television. Aside from his 
television, there is little about Alhaji Tanko’s modest chamber and hall to set it apart 
from the houses of other men of a similar age. Alhaji Tanko is in his late fifties and has 
six children. He is not a rich man, but he has married well and is the head of a 
reasonably well-thought of household. He oversees the property he and his brothers 
inherited from their father, but struggles to accommodate the unmarried sons and 
nephews too old to stay with their mothers. His son Abu is frustrated by this situation. 
He wants a room of his own, but must share with two of his younger cousins. 
With the television rumbling away, Alhaji Tanko tells me how Abu’s now deceased 
grandfather had come to Accra from rural Hausaland some eighty years ago. As a 
butcher he had easily found work and a place to stay at the well-established Hausa 
community at Sabon Zongo. He married the daughter of a local Hausa butcher, had 
several children and decided to settle permanently, building a small compound on land 
given to him by his father in law. 
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Abu hoped to achieve many of the things that his grandfather and father had achieved 
before him. At the time of fieldwork Abu was in his mid-twenties and his unmarried 
status had become something of a preoccupation. He was desperate to marry, escape 
his youth and enjoy the benefits of marriage, not least the status and respect accorded 
married men. However, getting married in Sabon Zongo is difficult. The marital process 
is a costly affair. Accommodation needs to be found, bride wealth must be paid and 
gifts must be given. Although it is a father’s obligation to meet many of the costs 
involved in the marital process, Alhaji Tanko had so far been unwilling to endorse his 
son’s plans. Alhaji Tanko claimed Abu was idle, immature and not yet responsible 
enough to carry the burden of dependent wives and children. Abu disagreed. 
Abu thought that if he made a substantial contribution towards his own marriage costs, 
his father might be convinced of his capacity to provide and set the wheels of the 
marital process in motion. However, like many young men in Sabon Zongo, Abu found 
income earning opportunities hard to come by. Most of the money he earnt came from 
running errands for the senior men in his family, or the occasional day spent driving a 
motorbike taxi borrowed from an older cousin when he wasn’t using it. Of the little he 
earnt, he saved as much as he could. Stashing it beneath the lino under his mattress.  
Like Abu’s grandfather, my own route to Sabon Zongo was via Hausaland. I had hoped 
to undertake research on men and masculinities in rural Kano, but the worsening 
security situation had curtailed my ambitions. My interest in all things Hausa had lead 
me to Deborah Pellow’s (2002) book about Sabon Zongo and I had become intrigued 
by this small Muslim Hausa enclave in urban Accra. It seemed like a suitable and far 
more secure place to undertake fieldwork and pursue my doctoral ambitions. 
My earliest encounter with the Hausa came by way of two readings during my 
undergraduate degree. The first was a short essay entitled ‘Mutumin-Kirkii’, The 
Concept of the Good Man in Hausa’ by Anthony Kirk-Greene (1974), a linguist, 
anthropologist and former colonial administrator in Nigerian Hausaland. In his lecture, 
Kirk-Greene sets out what the Hausa expect of a man if he is to be accorded social 
and moral standing. Kirk-Greene outlines mutumin kirkii – literally 'the good man' – in 
terms of social deportment: the behaviours that form the basis of social and moral 
evaluation. The second paper, by Frank Salamone, another distinguished scholar of 
Hausa culture and society, is entitled ‘The Arrow and the Bird: Proverbs in the Solution 
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of Hausa Conjugal-Conflicts’ (1976). Salamone describes how wives take revenge on 
philandering husbands by publicly mocking them through the use of proverbs. Where 
Kirk-Greene demonstrates what is expected if one is to be considered a good man, in 
Salamone’s account we see how difficult it can be to keep others convinced that one 
has met these expectations. 
As Goffman (1956, 1974, 1980) argues, an individual seldom exerts total control over 
the impressions that others have of him. Through Salamone’s account, we can 
observe how conjugality is often permeated by the anxieties that arise from such a 
lack of control. In the context of conjugality, the relationship between a man and his 
audience is particularly intimate, and the lines between ‘backstage’ and ‘front stage’ 
precarious. Dropping one’s guard, stepping out of character, forgetting or mistiming 
one’s lines have the potential to disrupt or discredit a performance. This 
precariousness is underlined by the relative ease with which a man’s spouse may 
bring backstage events to a wider audience and the relative authority that her accounts 
might enjoy. If a husband wishes to be positively evaluated by others he needs to 
secure his wife’s cooperation in favourable performances. The threat of withdrawing 
such cooperation can be a powerful bargaining chip for a wife in negotiating conjugal 
relations, as well as the source of considerable anxiety for a husband, who fears that 
his performances might be discredited. A potent example of such performance anxiety 
can be found in the importance of sexual proficiency to a Hausa man’s status, and his 
wife’s privileged position to account for it (Barkow 1974)1.  
This thesis echoes the broad concerns of Salamone and Kirk-Greene in seeking to 
elaborate what is involved in becoming a man of social and moral standing. Through 
an exploration of young men’s efforts to navigate the marital process, it asks, what are 
the qualities and characteristics that form the basis of manhood's definition? What 
does it take to keep others convinced that such manhood has been achieved? Whose 
cooperation is required, and how is it secured? What happens when such efforts fail? 
With these objectives in mind, let me return to Abu and some of his friends, whose 
lives are very much patterned by these concerns. 
 
                                                          
1  I suspect that this concern is one with which many non-Hausa men would be able to 
empathise. 
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1.2 A Maid in Manhattan at Oakville Town Hall 
Abu skips deftly between the traffic and over the gutter without breaking his stride. He 
pauses and waits for me on the other side of the road. My gait is earnest and clumsy. 
I stumble through the throng of people and vehicles, cautious of the pockmarks and 
debris that attempt to outwit my footing. When I catch up with Abu he leads me through 
a narrow gap between two compounds. We follow a trail of soggy footprints, pressed 
into the dark earth, where run-off from a blocked gutter has turned dust into mud. We 
turn a corner at a T-junction, formed by the wall of a third compound, and into a 
courtyard. At the nearest end of the courtyard a group of elder men sit on white plastic 
chairs inside a concrete structure chatting. The men wear the loose babarigas and 
cylindrical caps that are typical of the vast swathes of Northern Nigeria and Southern 
Niger referred to as Hausaland, and from which many of Zongo’s inhabitants claim 
ancestry. 
As we approach the elder men, Abu’s stride slows. He lowers his body with a slight 
bend of the knees. He drops his shoulders and turns his chin down towards his neck. 
His voice sinks to a softer, almost whispered tone. As we exchange greetings with the 
men, Abu’s eyes slip off to one side and come to rest on an imaginary speck on the 
floor. Though we address the group as a whole, one man seems to have a stronger 
presence and commands an emphasis to our attentions. We begin with the Arabic “As 
salaam alaikum”, peace be with you. Then switching to Hausa we ask after ‘well-
being’, “kwa lafiya?” Spiralling down through extended families “ya gida?” immediate 
families “ya iyali?” and the individuals that comprise them: “ya mata?” – wives; “ya 
yaro?” – children. “Lafiya2 lau” – all is well – is the response to each enquiry, until we 
conclude with “Mungodiya Allah”, thanks be to God. 
Away from the concrete shack at the far end of the courtyard a woman batters and 
wrings wet clothes in a large metal bowl. Another woman vigorously pounds cassava 
in a pestle held firm by another more elderly woman. Two small children spot Abu and 
I as we make our way across the courtyard. They run over, shrieking and bouncing. 
Abu barks something at them in Hausa and they scuttle off through a doorway. Against 
one wall is a block of four showers and opposite the shower is a wooden lean-to, 
                                                          
2  Here my translation of the term ‘lafiya’ does not do justice to its complexity or 
significance. This will be remedied in Chapter Four where I give greater attention to what the 
concept implies. 
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hammered together from scraps of greying wood. On a shelf at the front of the shack 
is a dusty, ageing television set connected to a cable that rises up into a web of wires, 
spraying outwards above the enclosure and into the adjacent compounds. Several 
young men, perhaps in their twenties, sit chatting on wooden benches inside. A larger, 
more rotund man with short dreadlocks sits in front of them on a chair facing the 
television set. He stands up and introduces himself as Murtala and welcomes me to 
“Oakville Town Hall”. Murtala explains that it takes its name from the adjoining 
compound, where he and his family live. His uncle had spent some time in Oakville, 
Canada and upon his return the compound had become known as “Little Oakville”. 
Abu points out Murtala's father, sat with the elder men we had just greeted. One of the 
other men, Mohammad, interjects. “We call this place Town Hall because we like to 
discuss”. 
Abu removes his sandals. He is a slight man and easily squeezes in between his 
friends on one of the rickety wooden benches. He nudges a dozing man, who looks 
over to me, straightens himself, shuffles over and invites me to sit. As I take my seat 
the young men introduce themselves. Murtala returns to his seat. Leaning forward he 
adjusts the volume on the television set until the distortion silences our chatter. Abu 
gently rests his hand on my knee. He tells me that we are about to watch one of their 
favourite television shows; a Latin American telenovela, Maid in Manhattan. "This is 
our programme. We like it too much", he says, pursing his lips and allowing them to 
hang on the double vowel sound of the ‘too’ for emphasis. 
The men were utterly engrossed in the show. Throughout their viewing they variously 
cheered, cursed and tutted at the characters; and gasped, fidgeted and clutched at 
one another in excitement as the events unfolded on the screen. Once the programme 
had ended, the young men moved the benches outside, forming a horseshoe around 
a small plastic table. One of the men prepared tea, which we drank whilst discussing 
the events that took place in the episode. 
I asked them what the series was about, hoping to locate the episode I had watched 
in the show’s narrative arc. They explained that the show was about Marisa’s efforts 
to marry Cristobal. Marisa is a humble, hardworking and aspirational Mexican woman 
trying to make a better life for herself and her son whilst working as a Maid in a 
luxurious New York hotel. Along the way Marisa falls in love with Cristobal, the son of 
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a wealthy politician. She hopes to marry Cristobal and live the life that she has always 
dreamed of. However, standing in the way of her plans are Sara, her avaricious and 
scheming rival for Cristobal's affections, and Victor, her drinking, gambling and 
womanising ex-husband and the father of her son Lalo. The series follows Marisa and 
the twists of fate and moral dilemmas she confronts as she pursues her marital 
ambitions.  
For most of the young men that I met that day, the afternoons at Oakville Town Hall, 
when Maid in Manhattan is aired, were a regular fixture. I didn't always come to watch 
the show, but whenever I did the interactions followed an almost identical, even 
ritualistic format. The men would watch the show inside the wooden shack, before 
moving outside to discuss what had happened. The show aired around 2 o’clock and 
was finished by the time of ‘Asr’, the afternoon prayer. The conversations would often 
last for several hours, sometimes beyond the Maghrib and even Isha’a prayers at 
around six o’clock and half past seven respectively. The men would perform their 
ablutions in the adjacent shower block, lay out a large mat and pray together before 
returning to the benches to continue their conversations. 
 
1.3 Edutainment 
I was puzzled by the young men's apparent devotion to the show and the excitement 
it generated. I wondered what it was about Maid in Manhattan that they found so 
compelling. When I asked them why they liked the show, they told me it was useful. It 
was about “life” and so they learned things which were helpful to them in their own 
lives. I was struck by this response. I had enjoyed the show as a moment of ‘fantasy’ 
– fantasy in the sense of being remote, if not entirely removed, from real life. The crisp, 
polished, picture perfect world and simplistic characters offered respite from what to 
me felt like the complex, messy and challenging reality of life in Zongo. As I watched 
the show, the lives depicted in it seemed impossibly distant and different from my own 
and those of my informants in Zongo. I had located the story and characters in what I 
construed as bounded geographical and cultural spaces; discrete, distant and in 
opposition to the world inhabited by my informants. I assumed Muslim Hausa men 
living in Accra would feel little connection with a show about the trials and tribulations 
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of a Mexican woman in Manhattan.  How could it appear as anything other than 
‘fantasy’? 
The watching of television, however, ought not to be examined in terms of passive, 
preconstituted viewers and images, but as a reflective and reflexive social practice. 
This is to say that the act of viewing is constituted in and constitutive of wider social 
contexts and those who inhabit them (Abu-Lughod 1997, Appadurai 2005). Picking up 
from Anderson’s (2006) argument that the nation-state could be seen as an effect of 
“imagined communities” cultivated through the proliferation of print media, Appadurai 
(2005 p.4) argues that electronic media have served to confound many of the hitherto 
taken-for-granted boundaries upon which these imagined communities relied, such 
that “image” and “viewer” may be (de)territorialised in various ways. This can be seen 
in the distinctive ways in which the men at Oakville Town Hall and I identified and 
located the show’s characters. Where I saw migrant Mexican Others in New York, the 
men at Town Hall saw ‘white’ people ‘like me’, who despite living out their lives in the 
‘West’, occupied a reality akin to their own. In contrast to my perception of the show 
as lacking in realism, or at the very least portraying a world with which I had very little 
in common, the young men saw themselves and the show as inhabiting the same 
moral universe; to the extent that it had value as a source of guidance. 
Though at the time, I was surprised by the men’s remarks, soap opera audiences have 
often been seen to frame their engagement with such shows as learning experiences. 
For example, in rural Nigerien Hausaland, Masquelier (2009a) describes how a 
popular Mexican telenovela, ‘Rubi’ was perceived as having pedagogic value. Young 
men and women saw the show as a source of moral instruction and practical guidance. 
Helping them to make sense of the uncertainties of ‘romantic love’ and navigate the 
moral dilemmas it posed for them in a society heavily stratified by class and gender. 
Weiss (2009) observes a similar scenario in urban Tanzania. He describes how 
viewers evaluated soap operas, films and other televised media on the basis of their 
perceived educational merits. 
The conversations following each viewing of Maid in Manhattan at Oakville Town Hall 
were often didactic in tone. The men would discuss the challenges faced by the various 
characters, how they had responded, whether their behaviour could be adjudged 
“correct” or not, and how they might have gone about things differently. The men 
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explained that there were many lessons to be learnt from the show which were directly 
applicable to their own lives, such as strategies for managing one’s emotions, coping 
with envy, gossip, loss, failure and the difficulties of fulfilling one’s responsibilities to 
others, the importance of patience, self-discipline, piety and the dangers of drinking 
alcohol. Though many ideas and issues were raised in these conversations, marriage 
and the difficulties of achieving it appeared to be particularly important. Though 
different viewers will likely interpret the story in different ways, I suspect that most 
people in Zongo or elsewhere would broadly agree with Abu and his friends in seeing 
Marisa’s marital aspirations as an important if not central element of the show. I will 
discuss the particular nuances of the young men’s interpretation of the show and its 
significance later, but for now let me stay with the puzzle as to why these young men 
seemed to gravitate towards the show. 
 
1.4 Normative Aspirations 
As I got to know the men at Town Hall it became apparent that their enthusiasm for 
Maid in Manhattan was in part a reflection of their own preoccupation with marriage. 
They expressed diverse aspirations, from becoming professional footballers or 
businessmen, to working in Europe or North America. However, an ambition to marry 
was something they all had in common. It was this desire to marry that was a key part 
of what they enjoyed about the show. While Abu and his friends' enjoyment of the 
show could at least in part be explained by their marital ambitions, I was curious as to 
why exactly it was that they wanted, so intensely, to get married. It is this concern that 
forms the basis of Chapters Four and Five of this thesis, in which I ask: Why do men 
want to get married? 
A preoccupation with marriage is not limited to the men at Oakville Town Hall. Sit at 
any of Zongo’s chop bars, barbershops or ‘bases3’, and other such places where men 
gather, and the topic of conversation will eventually turn to marriage. It is the subject 
of sermons, prayers, songs and status updates. Marriage is something that both men 
and women are expected to aspire to and achieve, and a source of bafflement, anxiety 
and even suspicion when it is not. Ask a man whether he wants to marry and the 
                                                          
3  See Chapter Two. 
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answer will always be yes; not infrequently accompanied by an expression of 
bemusement that one would ask a question with such an obvious answer. The idea 
that a man would not marry, let alone not want to, is for people in Zongo a bizarre 
notion. I met a small number of elderly men who had not been married, and yet even 
they were keen to assert that they were planning to. Marriage thus appears to be a 
normative ideal. This would seem to go some way towards understanding Abu and his 
friends’ preoccupation with it. 
The norms and values which inform the behaviours and beliefs that are expected or 
accepted in a society cannot be thought of as arbitrary, but must be viewed in the 
context of broader cosmological orientations concerning the nature of reality, how it is 
organised, and what members of a society should be or do in relation to it. Here, the 
insights of gender analysis are useful4. From the outset this thesis is concerned with 
men as a category of the person. Implicit to the notion of the ‘mutumin kirkii’, the good 
man, is that it can be differentiated from non-men, perhaps most obviously women, 
but also other kinds of men; men who are perhaps not quite so ‘good’. 
A central trope in the anthropology of personhood has been the idea that categories 
of the person do not pre-exist or transcend the social contexts in which they are 
constituted5. The processes through which people are differentiated within a society 
are grounded in broad cosmological orientations manifest in social practice (Ortner 
1972, Bourdieu 2007, Douglas 1995, 2010). I explore the social constitution of the 
                                                          
4  A concern with ‘men’ is explicit in this thesis from the outset. It thus follows that gender 
analytical approaches ought to provide a useful starting point for analysis. Such approaches 
are not only valuable on the basis of a common subject matter, but offer a set of conceptual 
and analytical tools that are useful in interrogating the mechanisms of social (re)production, 
and so shed light on the particular conundrum of how individual accounts and practices relate 
to wider social norms and values. Gender analysis is comprised of diverse theoretical, 
methodological and political orientations, not all of which can be seen to agree with one 
another all of the time. Nevertheless, there tends to be broad consensus that categories of the 
person are to some extent socially constructed. I discuss this theme in greater detail in Chapter 
Three. 
5  Within gender analysis notions of biology have been called upon in various ways in 
making sense of gender as a social phenomenon. There is considerable debate as to the 
extent to which ostensibly biological differences, such as the capacity to give birth, inform 
gender. Several authors, such as Foucault (1977, 1978), Butler (2011) and Fausto-Sterling 
(1993) have argued that notions of biological difference are themselves socially constructed. 
From this point of view gender is seen as the product of social relationships and cannot be 
entirely reduced to inherent properties of a group or individual (West and Zimmerman 1987, 
Moore 1994). It thus follows that it is social relationships that inform the judgements that are 
made as to which categories of person an individual belongs. 
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person in greater detail in Chapter Three, but for the time being it is enough to say that 
one of the key objectives of this thesis is to elaborate how accepted and valued notions 
of manhood in Zongo are framed in a larger social and moral universe. This is the 
focus of Chapters Four and Five, where I aim to situate the marital desires, aspirations, 
norms and values expressed by men, in collective representations of how the world is 
or should be and the place of men within them. 
The viewing of Maid in Manhattan at Oakville Town Hall and the discussions that 
followed it, can be seen as a moment in which norms and values are articulated and 
cosmological positions alluded to. My initial observations of the Oakville Town Hall 
discussions demonstrate at least a degree of congruity between widely held norms 
and values and the expressed marital aspirations of individuals. However, the 
processes through which norms and values come to shape practices and people’s 
accounts of them remain unclear. That Abu and his friends like Maid in Manhattan 
because they want to get married, and want to get married because everybody else 
does so and expects them to do the same, is an unsatisfactory answer to our puzzle. 
To draw on the language of statistics, we cannot assume causality from correlation. 
Thus far we have no account of the pressures and process through which the accounts 
and practices of individuals come to correspond to, and indeed deviate from, widely 
held social norms and values. 
The significance of this concern can be illustrated through the example of ‘Sallah’ – 
prayer. As will be discussed in Chapter Two, most of Zongo’s inhabitants are Muslims, 
meaning morality is often articulated through a discourse of Islam. The five daily Sallah 
are a normative obligation from which men seldom deviate and generally assist one 
another to fulfil without condition. One man will never decline another who asks for a 
pot of water for his ablutions, a mat to pray upon and a space to lay it; be they friend, 
enemy or stranger. Prayer is clearly a potent norm, and one that it is embedded in the 
very social fabric of Zongo, exerting a considerable influence on the temporal, spatial 
and moral order of social life there. Indeed, as mentioned above, the post-viewing 
discussions of Maid in Manhattan at Oakville Town Hall are punctuated by the call to 
prayer, and meal times, bedtimes and the working day are all oriented towards 
adherence to this normative obligation. 
Emil Dauncey 3750701 
 
21 
 
Yet despite this obligation to conform, and the embeddedness of the means by which 
such conformity is achieved, prayer does not seem to grip the subjectivities of men to 
the same extent as marriage. Men express an obligation to conform to both prayer 
and marriage as normative expectations, but where prayer is a taken-for-granted 
event, marriage is the subject of unparalleled expressions of desire and preoccupation 
amongst men. The question here, then, is: What are the particular social entailments 
that lead to the expression of marriage as an intensified desire amongst young men? 
The status of marriage as a normative ideal does not in and of itself explain why 
specific individuals should express desire for it, why it should be so widely discussed, 
nor why it should be such a pervasive preoccupation for young men. Why do some 
normative ideals seem to exert a particular influence on the things that people say and 
do? How can we make sense of the relationship between collective representations of 
marriage as important, and the importance that men like Abu and his friends attach to 
it as individuals? How do we account for the particular subjective attachments which 
seem to permeate talk about marriage and make Maid in Manhattan such compelling 
viewing? 
1.5 The Dramaturgical Self: Imagining Selves and Others 
A concern with subjectivity brings to the fore a number of ideas which inform my 
analysis. The relationship between social organisation and individual subjectivity has 
long been an important focus in social theory. It is not within the scope of this thesis 
to enter into debates concerning the nature or validity of the self as an ontological 
principle. However, it is necessary to briefly outline the notion of self at play in this 
thesis and the analytical framework it gives rise to. These ideas will be revisited and 
elaborated in greater detail throughout this thesis, but it is perhaps helpful to bring one 
or two of the most important ideas into the foreground so as to orient the reader. I 
deploy a notion of the self as both individuated and valued. Though I take Mauss 
(1985) as my entry point into the situational analyses of Erving Goffman (1956, 1974, 
1980), this thesis follows in the footsteps of Durkheim (1964, 2014) who examines the 
puzzle of the coherence of the self in modernity. 
Drawing on Durkheim’s argument that the individual self is an effect of modernity, 
Mauss (1985) posits a distinction between an individuated personal consciousness or 
‘moi’ and the social self or ‘personne’. Mauss sees the 'moi' as a kind of pre-social 
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biological given of the individual. In contrast, the ‘personne’ can be thought of as the 
culturally specific concepts of the person, embodied in social institutions such as 
religious institutions, kinship systems and law. In effect, ‘personne’ refers to the sets 
of ideas and beliefs about what it means to be a person and how these beliefs relate 
to social expectations concerning an individual’s behaviours. The debate within the 
social sciences concerning the extent to which individual behaviours are structurally 
defined is an enduring and lively one. However, I situate my discussion under the 
premise that the individual self is neither an entirely autonomous agent nor mere 
structural effect. I see the boundaries between Mauss’ ’moi' and ’personne' as 
analytical constructs rather than ontological fact, in the sense that socially constituted 
and culturally variable notions of the self and the sense of personal consciousness are 
mutually constitutive in a manner akin to Goffman’s (1956) ‘dramaturgical self’. The 
term dramaturgical self serves as a way of marrying Mauss’ 'moi' and 'personne' 
together as the sense of self (re)produced through interaction with others. Thus the 
dramaturgical self, whilst individuated, is subject to a degree of fluidity, contingent 
upon the particular relations and representations at stake in specific social 
interactions. 
However, although an individual's sense of self may be more or less fluid, he may 
value and so become emotionally attached to or desirous of a particular sense of self 
at a given moment in time. He may lack a sense of self-worth or self-esteem when his 
sense of himself is at odds with his own, or indeed his society's, wider expectations 
concerning what a person ought to be or behave like. Furthermore, he may feel 
anxious when a particular sense of self is under threat. Consequently, individuals are 
often preoccupied, albeit subconsciously, with their sense of ‘self-worth’; the sense of 
who they are and the value they attach to it. I use the term subjective attachment to 
refer to an individuals’ desire for self-worth and its realisation in the coherence of 
'personne' and 'moi'. In short, I assume that people do not only value and desire a 
certain image of themselves, but require that such a self-image be validated by others. 
People desire the things that establish, reinforce and validate their sense of self-worth. 
Particular objects may operate as symbols of socially recognised achievements or 
personal characteristics; for example, consumer goods, exam certificates and military 
medals may stand to represent desirable or valued personal qualities such as financial 
prowess, intellectual ability or bravery in combat. The symbolic content and value of 
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such objects will vary from context to context, and from person to person, but the point 
is that certain objects serve to reinforce, or indeed undermine, a person’s sense of self 
as aligned with social expectations as to what qualifies a person as being of worth. Of 
course, a sense of self is not only invested in the acquisition or accumulation of specific 
material things, nor can the symbolic value of such things be divorced from the wider 
social contexts in which their meanings are constituted (Douglas and Isherwood 1979, 
Appadurai 1988, Miller 2005a, 2005b). Crucially, a sense of self is achieved through 
relations with others, and so is implicated in how one person behaves in another's 
presence. It is this idea that underpins Goffman’s (1956, 2005) borrowing of 
Durkheim’s (1964) notion of the self as ‘sacred’; as ritual object cared for in social 
interaction. Indeed, one of the principle objectives of Goffman’s microanalyses is to 
elaborate the forms of ritual through which the self is honoured (and dishonoured) in 
the immediacy of face-to-face social encounters. 
Goffman (1956, 2005) argues that because people care about selves and selves are 
socially constituted through social interactions, social behaviour is at least to some 
extent directed towards sustaining and cultivating the self. Through interpersonal 
behaviour an individual influences the impressions that others have of him, but also 
the impression he has of himself. The image that an individual has of himself may be 
reinforced, revised or adapted when he encounters the judgements of others in social 
interaction. Goffman calls these efforts to influence the perceptions of others so as to 
cultivate a particular sense of self “impression management” (Goffman 1956 p.49). 
The key point here is that we might begin to make sense of Abu and his friends' 
preoccupation with marriage and why they find Maid in Manhattan so compelling by 
examining the viewing of the show as a context of impression management in which 
personal significance is at stake. 
However, before turning this lens to my analysis, I’d like to consider a further point, 
which can also be seen as the legacy of Durkheim and Mauss, specifically the ways 
in which modernity might be seen to impinge upon the processes through which the 
self is constituted. Although I am ambivalent about the view of modernity as linear, put 
forward by Durkheim (1964, 2014) and later Mauss (1985), there is something to be 
said for the idea of 'modernity' as fostering a particular emphasis on the individuated 
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self6. This idea is picked up in the work of Appadurai (2005) and Weiss (2009). Of 
particular interest are their ideas about the confluence of fantasy and desire in the 
social practice of 'imagination' as 'self-making'. I have already touched upon 
Appadurai's (2005) concern with the proliferation of electronic media and how it can 
be seen to reconfigure the kinds of imagined communities in which individuals situate 
themselves. At the centre of Appadurai's argument is a notion of modernity as a shift 
in both means and scale of cultural flows. According to Appadurai, mass mediation 
and migration have generated increasingly diffuse, unstable and yet prolific circuits of 
cultural (re)production. This profusion of imagery exposes individuals to an expanding 
range of social referents with implications for the constitution of subjectivities7. On the 
one hand, this renders centres of representation uncertain, offering new resources 
and possibilities for the imagining and thus making of selves and others. On the other 
hand, it can also be seen to foster anxieties, as people attempt to forge a sense of 
identity and 'belonging' in circuits of representation characterised by economic, 
political and cultural inequalities, such that it is not only the immediacy of inequalities 
between oneself and one’s neighbours which have the potential to impinge upon one’s 
sense of self-worth, but how one identifies and locates oneself in larger ‘imagined 
communities’. 
This can be seen in Weiss’ (2009) account of Tanzanian barbershops as an effect of 
young men’s engagements with globalised imagery of the mass media. Weiss’ 
informants do not merely passively consume, mimic, nor even appropriate ostensibly 
globalised cultural influences, but actively participate in the making and remaking of 
representations of the wider world and their location within it. The young men’s 
encounter with the globalised imageries of hip-hop provides fuel for the imagination of 
                                                          
6 Both Durkheim (1964, 2014) and Mauss (1985) saw ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’ as 
occupying two ends of a spectrum. Simple, small scale societies at one end and complex large 
scale societies at the other. Ostensibly ‘traditional’ societies were characterised by the relative 
absence of social differentiation and emphasised a sociocentric notion of the person. In 
contrast, the division of labour in large, complex societies demanded specialisation and thus 
differentiation was vital to social solidarity. The assumption was that traditional societies would 
eventually become more complex with the passage of time and develop a similar emphasis 
on individuation. 
7  The social pressures described here might be seen as characteristically postmodern 
in the sense that the focus is on the proliferation and diffusion of social referents. However, 
unlike many concepts of postmodernity, which have often emphasised the fragmentation and 
indeterminacy of the self, Appadurai retains a notion of individual subjectivity as coherent even 
if fluid (see Appadurai 2005 p.201). 
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selves and others enacted in everyday practices such as haircare, dress and 
language. However, Weiss observes that commentaries on inequality and constraint 
are central to these imaginings. Weiss argues that young men’s description of 
themselves as ‘thugs’, a term drawn from hip-hop culture which connotes ‘toughness’ 
in the face of adversity and conflict, serves to articulate their sense of themselves as 
part of an imagined yet marginalised community where toughness is not only desirable 
but necessary to survive8. 
Goffman’s interest in the micromechanics of face-to-face interaction might seem to be 
distant from the global encounters which frame Appadurai and Weiss’ analyses. 
However, Appadurai and Weiss’s concerns echo those of Goffman in the sense that 
they are similarly concerned with the ways in which selves are constituted through 
engagement with collective representations and imaginings of how the world is or 
should be. When drawn together, these ideas suggest that the viewing of Maid in 
Manhattan can be seen as a productive resource, a process of 'imagining', through 
which selves, others and the worlds they inhabit are not only understood and 
navigated, but also made. This idea raises a number of questions. What kinds of self-
images are the men at Oakville Town Hall hoping to cultivate or sustain through the 
viewing of Maid in Manhattan, and why? How do they go about trying to achieve them 
and what opportunities and constraints do they encounter in the process? As will be 
elaborated in the analysis to follow, when taken beyond the context of the viewing of 
Maid in Manhattan these questions speak to the overarching theme of this thesis: Why 
does marriage matter, and how does it mediate the making of manhood? 
 
1.6 When the Heart is Hungry: Marriage and the Desire for Manhood. 
“Asa zuchia ta chi, shi ya kawo ji’n yungwa – To make the heart eat is to bring a feeling 
of hunger” (Hausa Proverb9). 
Goffman’s (1956) idea of the dramaturgical self as an effect of social interaction raises 
the question of what kinds of persons and selves are at stake in marriage. Marriage 
has often been observed as a site in which gendered categories of the person are 
                                                          
8  See also Newell (2012) for a similar account focused on dress amongst young men 
in Ivory Coast. 
9 Merrick (1905 p17). 
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(re)produced. Marital status frequently operates as a means to differentiate between 
categories of men and different types of masculinity; for instance, in the view of 
marriage as a ritual marking an individual’s transition from youth to manhood (Smith 
1959, Olawoye et al 2004, Van Gennep 2011). However, categories of the person 
cannot be thought of as mere labelling systems; they inform as much as describe a 
person’s relations with others. For example, by establishing or redefining an 
individual’s relationship to a specific household or kin group. This is perhaps most 
evident where marriage involves changes in residency and a concomitant shift in 
relations of consumption, production and exchange. For example, in Northern Nigerian 
Hausaland, upon becoming a wife, a woman typically leaves her paternal household 
for a room provided for her by her husband. She enters seclusion, ceases to have 
contact with men other than her husband and is expected to care for the domestic 
needs of her husband and children. Their husbands sleep in their wife’s or wives’ 
rooms, for whom they are expected to provide clothing and food to cook with 
(Schildkraut 1982, Cooper 1997, Robson 2000, 2006, Weimann 2009). 
The key point here is that marriage may invoke not only changes in the particular 
category of person with which an individual is associated, but also different normative 
expectations concerning an individual’s entitlements and responsibilities and the kinds 
of social activities that they are expected to pursue. The implication here is that Abu 
and his friends’ desire to marry might reflect a larger preoccupation with selfhood – of 
being and becoming a certain kind of person, and realising a particular relationship. 
This idea is significant in the context of a development studies concerned with social 
justice and equality as integral to notions of well-being. The cosmological orientations 
that prevail in a society do not just differentiate between people, but hierarchically 
organise them. Judgements as to who qualifies as a particular kind of person are not 
only embedded in prevailing cosmologies, but have political implications which 
impinge upon individual well-being. This is evident in the fact that some categories of 
the person are accorded greater prestige and authority than others (Ortner 1972, 
Bourdieu 1984, 2007, Douglas 1995, Cornwall and Lindisfarne 2003). This has often 
been observed in the notional authority and privileged access to resources of married 
household heads relative to unmarried youths (see for example Aguilar 1998, Abbink 
and Van Kessel 2005, Perry 2009). Relations of status and authority can be seen to 
influence an individual’s well-being, not least by affecting the esteem they accord 
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themselves or are accorded by others, but also in enabling or constraining participation 
in specific activities and mediating access to social, political and economic resources. 
In light of these observations, we might hypothesise that marriage is important for Abu 
and his friends because it confers a personhood that they see as being desirable or 
advantageous. This would be consistent with observations made in other Hausa-
derived societies, where marriage has been observed as a rite of passage 
demarcating youth from adult manhood (Barkow 1974, Cooper 1995, Masquelier 
2005, 2009b). Such transitions often also imply a hierarchical ordering in terms of 
differences in social practice and the social value that such practices are afforded. I 
explore this idea in Chapter Three, but for now it is enough to say that status, privilege 
and authority arise from the inherent entanglement of who you are with what you do. 
The implication here is that mutumin kirki is not merely a man, but a man who does 
being a man well, who performs manhood convincingly. With this notion in mind let us 
return to Abu and his friends. 
For the men at Town Hall, the central theme of Maid in Manhattan was marriage. 
However, they did not only express a general interest in the show’s theme, but were 
also explicit in stating that they saw the show as informative. They could relate to the 
particular social and moral dilemmas that were raised in the show in terms of their own 
social practice. They saw it as a source of guidance, as a way of learning about how 
to conduct oneself correctly when faced with similar challenges.  
If being a certain sort of person is at least in part constituted by the things that a person 
says or does, then the young men’s concern with what is and is not ‘good’ behaviour 
can be seen as a discussion of what is involved in being a good person. Though the 
lessons that the men derived from the show were various, it was marriage that was 
paramount amongst them. We can see this preoccupation as evident in how the young 
men identified with Marisa’s struggle to achieve her marital ambitions, claiming that 
getting married was also difficult for men in Zongo. They empathised with Marisa’s 
seemingly endless battle with Sara’s efforts to sabotage her romance with Cristobal. 
They drew a parallel with their own lives, claiming that the marital pathways of many 
men in Zongo had been similarly scuppered by an envious rival. They cited stories of 
girlfriends who had been lured away by ‘charms’ and other kinds of magic, and men 
who had been poisoned or cursed by a competitor. They also saw Marisa’s marital 
ambitions as being impinged upon by the low status conferred to her by her occupation 
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as a maid. This dilemma was encapsulated in an example, drawn upon by Murtala, 
from an earlier episode in the series, in which Marisa first encounters Cristobal.  
Here, Cristobal stumbles upon Marisa as she tries on an expensive dress belonging 
to a wealthy guest. Cristobal does not realise that Marisa is a maid, and invites her to 
go for a walk with him. During their walk they fall in love. However, Marisa is uncertain 
whether Cristobal loves her for who she 'really' is, and agonises over what might 
happen if her humble circumstances were to be revealed. When reflecting on this 
dilemma, the men at Town Hall explained how on the one hand, the dress serves to 
deceive Cristobal by concealing her poverty; but on the other, it reveals a ‘true self’, 
ordinarily obscured by her working attire.  
The young men observing Marisa's dilemma claimed that they experienced a parallel 
concern in their own marital efforts. They claimed that women often misjudged them 
as unviable husbands on the basis of their relative poverty, whilst being seduced by 
richer men who despite their wealth lacked the moral propriety to fulfil their familial 
obligations. Here, the young men’s concerns resonate with Goffman (1980, 2005), in 
that being a good person and having others believe it may not always be quite the 
same thing. An individual’s circumstances may be more or less advantageous to 
cultivating certain impressions, not least in that others may come to exert a 
considerable influence on the presentation of self that one would like to give. The 
young men argued that Marisa's ex-husband Victor had a lot to do with her troubles, 
in that he reneged on his duty to provide for his son and thus the burden fell unjustly 
on Marisa. Marisa’s poverty was not of her own doing, but of her deadbeat ex-
husband’s failure to fulfil his moral obligations. 
Abu and his friends expressed firm disapproval of men who prioritised their own wants 
and needs before those of their wives and children for whom they were responsible. 
Their own fathers and senior kin were not exempt from such condemnation. They felt 
that while they were expected to be at the beck and call of senior men, these same 
senior men were failing to live up to their side of the bargain. This was especially 
evident in the context of marriage where they emphasised that securing the ‘sadaki’, 
the payment made by a groom’s father to that of the bride, was a particular obstacle.  
Take, for example, Mohammad. When I asked him why he had not yet married he 
responded, 
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“My father don’t support me. He just like chop and go10. He say go do this thing. Buy 
units [mobile phone credit]. Buy tuwo. Take letter this man. Collect money this man. I 
go. Sometimes far far place. Kasoa, Madina, even Takoradi. I go...Me I don't have 
unit. I don't get money. I don’t get chop [food]. I ask him. He just say go and come 
[back later]...Me I do my duty…Still always I must to go to search for money for 
something for me myself to chop…. How I go make sadaki? I don’t get money for 
chop" 
Other young men similarly complained that their fathers fell short of their responsibility 
to provide sadaki. Even when they had managed to secure the sadaki there was no 
guarantee that it would be accepted by the bride’s father, who might demand a greater 
sum. Young men claimed that elder men were demanding prohibitively high sadaki 
payments for their daughters, whilst offering little support to their own sons, who 
asserted that they were unable to raise the money themselves. It was the demand for 
high sadaki payments that they claimed kept them from marrying in good time. 
Furthermore, young men frequently asserted that whilst money was increasingly hard 
to come by, the gifts demanded by women, before they would agree to marry, were 
becoming ever costlier. Even when a prospective bride had accepted a proposal, they 
claimed there was no guarantee that the marriage would actually take place; 
contingent as it was upon meeting further demands, made by the bride and her kin, 
for increasingly high prestationary payments and extravagant weddings. 
From the above examples we can see that, although young men wanted to get 
married, they also described it as something difficult to achieve. Such difficulty might 
explain why young men like Abu and his friends seem to be so preoccupied with it; all 
the more so if the proposition stands that marriage is important to the masculine 
categories of the person that they see as being most desirable or advantageous. 
To sum up, it can be convincingly argued that Maid in Manhattan appeals to Abu and 
his friends because they are able to identify with what they perceive as being the 
themes of the show, in particular marriage. Furthermore, the show and the discussions 
that followed it provided an opportunity to articulate and reflect upon the particular 
                                                          
10  “Chop and go” is used to describe attending an event, such as a wedding or naming 
ceremony, with the sole purpose of taking advantage of the free food and without paying 
respects to the event’s hosts. 
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challenges that they themselves faced in pursuit of marriage and ways to overcome 
them.  
Clearly we need to know much more about the men at Oakville Town Hall and the 
extent to which marriage is important to social life in Sabon Zongo before drawing any 
firm conclusions. The extent to which marriage is significant to advantageous or 
desirable categories of the person is as yet to be ascertained, but there are a number 
of other issues that need to be considered if this explanation is to prove entirely 
satisfactory. In the first instance, we need to reconsider the ways in which the accounts 
provided by the men at Town Hall reflect the reality of social life in Zongo. 
 
1.7 Performance Anxieties 
As Goffman (1974) argues, we cannot see the things that people say and do as being 
independent of the social situations in which they occur. This is not to say that the 
things that people say and do are without significance beyond a specific social 
situation, but that what is articulated and how, is contingent upon the structure of the 
interaction in which they are produced. A number of considerations can be derived 
from Goffman that might help us more adequately interpret the accounts provided by 
Abu and his friends. 
First of all, Goffman (1974) argues that social interaction is subject to norms 
concerning the kinds of behaviours and forms of talk that are and are not appropriate 
in specific social situations. Take for example the noticeable differences in Abu’s 
demeanour when amongst his friends and when passing the elder men in the concrete 
structure. His energetic fidgeting stopped, he dropped his shoulders and lowered his 
chin. He spoke in a softer tone and more formal register. We can see this change in 
Abu’s deportment as a response to the distinct normative expectations of particular 
social situations. There are a variety of ways in which adherence to such norms might 
be enforced. For example, when Murtala turns the volume on the television up to the 
point of distortion, the other men end their conversations and turn their attention to the 
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television set. Murtala’s actions might be interpreted as a means of enforcing the kinds 
of behaviour that are acceptable when watching the show11.  
Secondly, Goffman (1974) argues that the things that people say in a given social 
situation may be aimed at a variety of social objectives quite apart from describing a 
particular set of circumstances. An individual may see a particular representation, or 
indeed misrepresentation, of his circumstances as being more or less advantageous 
to the objectives he is hoping to achieve in a particular social encounter. The key point 
here is that we cannot make sense of an individual’s account solely on the basis of its 
descriptive content, but must take into account what they might have invested in 
producing it. 
The implications of this argument are twofold. First of all, we cannot ascertain whether 
marriage is difficult to achieve or not on the basis of Abu and his friend’s assertions 
alone. Secondly, regardless of whether marriage is difficult to achieve or not, other 
motivations might be at play in the production of such accounts. We need to know 
more before drawing any firm conclusions as to what motivates Abu and his friends to 
produce the particular accounts that they do. However, we can argue that the things 
that people say or do in a social situation are, at least in part, motivated by the effect 
that they hope they will have on others. As described above, Goffman calls these 
efforts to influence the perceptions of others so as to be congruous with our own social 
objectives 'impression management' (Goffman 1956, 1974, 1980). So the question 
here is, what kind of effects are young men like Abu hoping to achieve when they 
produce the particular accounts that they do? 
Abu and his friends were clearly concerned with how they might be perceived by 
others12. We can see this concern reflected in the way in which Murtala related 
Marisa’s encounter with Cristobal whilst wearing an expensive dress to the difficulties 
they themselves faced in convincing others of their viability as husbands. The young 
men clearly felt that they needed to appear to be a certain kind of man in order to be 
                                                          
11  Clearly we would need to know more before being certain of this particular 
interpretation. However, the point here is to illustrate an analytical process, rather than 
establish Murtala’s intentions. 
12  This is not to say that social interaction can be reduced to the pursuit of a particular 
self-presentation, but we might surmise that the specific accounts and practices observed at 
Oakville Town Hall are at least in part motivated by a desire to create impressions themselves 
that they see as desirable or favourable. 
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considered viable husbands and realise their marital ambitions. However, impression 
management is not merely about representing an image of oneself that stands apart 
from an innate and unflinching ‘who I really am’, but integral to the processes through 
which the image we have of ourselves is constituted. This brings us back to the 
‘dramaturgical self’ (Goffman 1956, 1974). Thus impression management is just as 
much about the image that one has of one’s self, as it is the perceptions of others; or 
to put it another way, the sense of self that is achieved through relations with others. 
Thus Goffman’s dramaturgical self is reflexively constituted through social interaction. 
The concept of impression management provides a way of talking about the efforts 
people make to cultivate a particular image and thus sense of his or her self. The idea 
that people value particular self-images implies that the self is something that is not 
only constituted and managed in social interaction, but also cared for. 
Goffman (1967 p.5.) uses the term “face” to describe the “positive social value a 
person effectively claims for himself” during a social encounter. Face can be seen as 
the relationship between a person’s desired or preferred self-image and the image that 
others have of him. When a particular self-image is publicly discredited, that person 
suffers a ‘loss of face’; the social value that he is able to claim for himself is 
diminished13. A salient example can be drawn from Salamone’s (1976) exposition of 
conjugal conflicts in Hausaland, where control over women is central to accepted and 
valued notions of manhood. Husbands are expected to control their wives and wives 
are expected to obey their husbands. Husbands value an image of themselves as the 
kind of men who fulfil this expectation. Consequently, a husband avoids arguing with 
his wife in public, as to do so would discredit the self-image he would like to claim for 
himself. 
With this idea in mind, one way of interpreting Mohammed’s anger at his father might 
be as a response to a ‘wounded’ or uncertain self-image. When Mohammed frames 
the running of errands on behalf of his father as doing his “duty”, he is claiming an 
image of himself as the kind of person who does what is expected of him. Furthermore, 
Mohammed asserts that his father ought to reward his efforts by providing him with 
                                                          
13  Impression management is seldom a one-shot game. Keeping one’s audience, and 
oneself, convinced of a particular self-image, requires constant policing of one’s own conduct 
and the conduct of others. If an individual wants to avoid a loss of face, he must avoid social 
situations in which his self-presentations might be discredited. 
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sadaki. But Mohammed’s father does not meet his expectations of reciprocity. 
Mohammed seems to be saying that his father neither recognises nor values his 
actions. If self-image is a function of one’s interactions with others, then we might 
interpret Mohammed’s anger as a response to his father’s failure to validate the image 
that he seeks to claim for himself14. Mohammed hasn’t suffered a loss of face in the 
way that Salamone’s (ibid) husbands might have done when caught in the midst of an 
argument, but he has thus far failed to “gain face”; the self-image he has been trying 
to cultivate through his relations with others has not as yet been realised. Both these 
examples illustrate how a concern with self-image permeates social interaction. 
However, we can take this analysis further by returning to the idea that social practice 
speaks to larger social and moral orders. An argumentative wife not only implies a 
husband who lacks control, but calls into question the ideological principles that 
underlie such social expectations. When others express disapproval of a husband who 
fails to control his wife, they are making a statement about how they perceive the world 
is or should be; i.e. that women ought to be subject to the authority of men. What we 
see in this example is that self-image is linked to a set of social expectations, grounded 
in wider social and moral orders and ritualised in norms of social conduct – in this case 
the avoidance of public arguments. 
 
1.8 Conclusion: The Analyis to Follow. 
“Thus, when the individual presents himself before others, his performance will tend 
to incorporate and exemplify the officially accredited values of the society, more so, in 
fact, than does his behaviour as a whole. To the degree that a performance highlights 
the common official values of the society in which it occurs, we may look upon it, in 
the manner of Durkheim and Radcliffe-Brown, as a ceremony—as an expressive 
rejuvenation and reaffirmation of the moral values of the community. Furthermore, in 
so far as the expressive bias of performances comes to be accepted as reality, then 
                                                          
14  “A person may be said to have, or be in, or maintain face when the line he effectively 
takes presents an image of him that is internally consistent, that is supported by judgements 
and evidence conveyed by other participants, and that is confirmed by evidence conveyed 
through impersonal agencies in the situation. At such times the person’s face clearly is not 
something lodged in or on the body, but rather something that is diffusely located in the flow 
of the events in the encounter and becomes manifest only when these events are read and 
interpreted for the appraisals expressed in them”. (Goffman 1967 p.7). 
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that which is accepted at the moment as reality will have some of the characteristics 
of a celebration. To stay in one’s room away from the place where the party is given, 
or away from where the practitioner attends to his client, is to stay away from where 
reality is being performed. The world, in truth, is a wedding”. Goffman (1956 p.60). 
This chapter has been framed by two interrelated questions. In the first instance, I was 
interested in making sense of why Abu and his friends found Maid in Manhattan such 
compelling viewing. I have gone some way towards answering this question, by 
suggesting that the show provides a vehicle through which they were able to articulate 
their marital aspirations and the obstacles which seemed to frustrate them, whilst 
attempting to exonerate themselves from the pitfalls of failure. It is in this sense that 
the viewing of Maid in Manhattan can be seen as a ‘performance’. When interpreted 
as a platform for impression management, the men’s conduct can be seen not only as 
an attempt to present themselves favourably to Others, but alludes to the normative 
reference points against which male prestige and status are evaluated. 
My second question relates to why marriage matters in the first place. I have put 
forward a tentative hypothesis, that marriage is a normative aspiration upon which 
socially accepted and valued manhoods rely. Clearly, if this argument is to prove 
convincing we need to know more about the social significance of marriage in Zongo. 
As was discussed earlier, some normative expectations seem to grip the subjectivities 
of men more than others. Whilst both prayer and marriage are expectations which are 
taken for granted, marriage is the subject of desire. This raised the question of what 
else might be at stake in marriage. I argued that the marital desires, aspirations, norms 
and values expressed by men needed to be situated in collective representations of 
how the world is or should be. It is this concern which frames Chapters Three, Four 
and Five of this thesis. 
I have already touched upon the idea of marriage as a rite of passage, through which 
adult manhood is achieved (Kirk-Green 1974, Cooper 1995, Masquelier 2005). 
Chapter Three explores this idea further, where I provide a brief overview of how a 
relationship between marriage and manhood has been conceived within the context 
of a wider anthropological and gender analytical literature. This literature review serves 
as the springboard into my own analysis. In Chapters Four and Five, I set out how 
marriage is invoked in notions of manhood in Sabon Zongo. I begin Chapter Four by 
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describing the ways in which young unmarried men are talked about in Zongo. I 
elaborate the notion of ‘samari’ as unmarried youth and describe the ways in which 
young men are associated with social and moral disorder.  
In Chapter Five I show how these moral discourses speak to wider cosmologies and 
the ideological content they contain within them. At the heart of these moral 
commentaries are relations of production, consumption and exchange, which 
hierarchically organise men and women. The idea of youth as morally troubling, 
operates to make the notion of ‘productive’ and ‘responsible’ manhood meaningful, 
and so desirable as a position of relative prestige and status. Consistent with what I 
have proposed in this chapter, and the literature surveyed in Chapter Three, I 
demonstrate how marriage is the central mechanism through which the relations 
distinguishing youth from manhood are brought into being. This is achieved through 
an analysis of the domestic space and the relations between those who inhabit it. I 
show how marriage relates to household morphology and mediates the different rights, 
responsibilities and statuses of men within and beyond the kinship group. 
This brings me back to Goffman (1956) and the idea that people have a range of 
investments in social interaction, which pattern the kinds of things that they say and 
do. I have already argued that amongst these investments is the sense of self that 
participants are hoping to construe from them. In turn I argued that the social value of 
a particular self-image was a function of social expectations which are themselves 
foregrounded in wider ideas about how the world is or should be. In Chapters Four 
and Five, I show how it is the pursuit of the prestige and status derived from idealised 
relations of production, consumption and exchange which underpins young men like 
Abu’s desire to marry. Chapters Four and Five can be seen as an elaboration of the 
idea of manhood in Zongo, the larger ideologies and orders it implies and how they 
inform men’s quest for personal significance. What emerges from this analysis is an 
idealised account of marriage as a linear process through which youth make the 
transition to the forms of socially accepted and valued manhood. 
However, this trajectory seems rather one way; we have a notion of social behaviour 
and personal self-worth as emergent from some overarching normative order. As we 
shall see in Chapter Three, through a reading of DeCerteau’s (1984) work as an 
eschewal of the passive or ‘docile’ subject, the idea of such organisational principles 
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as totalising is called into question, drawing our attention to the negotiations, 
manoeuvres and machinations that may take place within them.  
Thus, never far away in my analysis is a concern with how individuals situate 
themselves within these orders as agents; how individuals navigate and make use of 
dominant ideologies of manhood and the social expectations associated with them. 
This idea gains emphasis in Chapter Six. The initial aim of Chapter Six was to 
elaborate the ideas men held about what constitutes the ideal bride. I attempted to 
evaluate the extent to which men manage to fulfil their aspirations for marriages to 
desirable brides. I present some basic statistical data concerning who men actually 
marry as reported by individuals, but find my attempt to map ideals onto actualities are 
thwarted by men’s efforts to conceal or evade categorizing their own brides as 
anything other than the ideal bride, even when I had good reason to suspect the 
contrary. Though my efforts to reconcile ideals and actualities are left wanting, my 
analysis reveals that how a bride is perceived by others clearly matters to men. This 
idea alludes to marriage and the marital process as sites of representation in which 
male prestige and status are at stake. 
Chapters Seven and Eight hone in on this concern through an elaboration of the 
marital process. In Chapter Seven, I describe what people in Zongo say the marital 
process ought to look like, what it involves, where and when it takes place, who does 
what and why. I show how in Zongo, the marital process is marked by a series of 
formalised social interactions or ‘rituals’, in which marriage goods are exchanged, 
without which a marriage cannot be said to have taken place. I elaborate the 
significance of marriage goods as described by men. I draw out how these 
significances relate to accepted and valued notions of manhood and how the status 
and prestige of individual men is implied by them. 
I have already argued that we needed to consider what is actually being expressed in 
accounts such as those provided by the men at Oakville Town Hall and the ways in 
which they reflect the reality of social life in Zongo. Accounts of what the marital 
process should and should not look like clearly represent only a partial view. Such 
accounts might operate as ‘official scripts’, sets of expectations and ideals, normative 
reference points for the kinds of beliefs and behaviours that are accepted or approved 
of. However, we must be cautious of assuming that they correspond to actual marital 
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practices. Indeed, I find significant differences between idealised discourses of marital 
pathways and what actually takes place in practice.  
Having established the ‘ideal’ in Chapter Seven, Chapter Eight seeks to explain how 
and why actual marital practices correspond or deviate from idealised or normative 
accounts of the marital process. If the marital process is as difficult to negotiate as Abu 
and his friend’s claim, we might expect a degree of divergence from official scripts. As 
we have already seen above, Mohammad’s anger at his father’s failure to provide 
sadaki indicates how a marital pathway is contingent upon relationships with others. I 
show how marital processes involve complex relationships between multiple 
stakeholders, with diverse and sometimes competing ideals and interests, as well as 
varying degrees of influence, playing a part. Crucially, I show how and why public 
perceptions of a groom’s status and worth are at stake in the exchange of marriage 
goods, and how such exchanges are perceived by others. I show how men seek to 
manage the performance and reception of the marital process and to enlist others in 
the co-production of positive social evaluations. With Goffman and DeCerteau in mind, 
I make the case for the marital process as a site of self-making. 
Before I embark upon my analysis it is perhaps necessary to say a little more about 
Sabon Zongo and my experience of living there – where it is, how I arrived there, how 
the data was produced and how my interpretation of it has shaped my analysis. 
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Chapter Two: Walking in the Zongo 
 
2.1 Locating Zongo 
This Chapter has three objectives. First, to provide an introduction to Sabon Zongo, 
spatially locating and defining Sabon Zongo and what it means to the people who 
inhabit it; second, to situate my analysis within a specific social, spatial and historical 
context;15 and third, to give an account of how I was located in Zongo, and the 
decisions I made during my research. This chapter owes a great deal to the work of 
Deborah Pellow (1985, 1999, 2002, 2007). It is Pellow’s book ‘Landlords and Lodgers’ 
(2002), which led me to Zongo, and is the source of much of the historical data which 
makes my own analysis possible. I provide a brief portrait of Zongo: where it is, what 
it looks like, and who lives there. I describe how Zongo’s inhabitants locate themselves 
in – and navigate through – Zongo, highlighting the spatial designations that recall its 
particular history. 
I draw heavily on Pellow’s work to situate the contemporary cultural landscape of 
Zongo in its history as a place for ‘strangers’. I elaborate the historical forces which 
have shaped Zongo’s ‘character’ as a place apart from, but firmly rooted in, the 
regional development of Accra. I describe how the idea of Muslims as ‘strangers’, with 
limited land rights, has informed what it means to be both Muslim and Hausa in Accra, 
and how they have converged in what Pellow (2002) terms “Zongwanci” – a particular 
culture and character pertaining to Sabon Zongo’s inhabitants. I then turn my attention 
to Sabon Zongo’s Chieftaincy. I describe the formal structure of the Chieftaincy, the 
rights and responsibilities it entails, and the norms of reciprocity and exchange that 
underpin them. 
I track formal political structures in contemporary Zongo back to its founding in the 
early 20th Century. I describe how the formal authority of the Chieftaincy has been 
foregrounded in the control over land and housing enjoyed by men from specific 
                                                          
15  I recognise that what constitutes context is inextricable from my reading of it. I have 
chosen to separate these two concerns for the sake of style and structure. In Sections 2.9 – 
2.14 I discuss how I locate myself in this context and the particular sorts of social experience 
and relationships that have produced what constitutes the data for this thesis. 
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lineages. The title of Pellow’s (2002) book “Landlords and Lodgers” alludes to the 
importance of these differential land rights and how they are brought to bear on social 
organisation. I draw out the importance of land rights to formal political hierarchies and 
how housing serves as political currency used to recruit followers and legitimate claims 
to authority. However, I also note an inherent fragility in this relationship, derived from 
the diverse mechanisms through which land and other forms of property are 
transferred. With the help of Pellow’s (ibid) rich genealogical histories, I describe how 
the formal authority of the Chieftaincy has been reinforced through marital alliances 
between landholding lineages. I also describe how the Bako Chieftaincy has sought 
legitimacy from powerful external institutions. 
Though Pellow’s emphasis differs from my own, there are many aspects of her 
analysis that are relevant to this thesis. I draw the themes raised in this chapter 
together to discuss how Pellow’s account of social-spatial organisation in Zongo 
informs my exploration of the questions raised in Chapter One. I ask, how might 
Pellow’s landlord/lodger distinction inform my own account of male-male relations? 
What are the demands of my own analysis of manhoods in Zongo? How and why does 
Pellow’s account leave them unfulfilled? 
 
2.2 Origins of Zongo. 
Mallam Bako was a Katsinawa16 Muslim Hausa who had been resident in the 
congested Muslim enclave at Zongo Lane. In 1907, the Jamestown Mantse17 Ababio 
awarded Mallam Bako custodianship of a swathe of land on Accra’s western periphery. 
The area would become known as Sabon Zongo. He allocated plots of land to the men 
who were or would become his followers. By the second decade of the 20th Century, 
many of Mallam Bako’s followers had relocated to Sabon Zongo. Each of the men 
brought with him his own family and followers, to whom Bako and his followers made 
further allocations of land as sub-custodians. (Pellow 1985, 2002, Rain et al 2011). 
Sabon Zongo is only about two miles from Zongo Lane, but at the time of its founding 
it was a rural setting. Over the last 100 or so years, Zongo has been absorbed into 
Accra’s expanding urban landscape (Pellow 2002, Rain 2011). Sabon Zongo now lies 
                                                          
16  From Katsina in Nigeria. ‘Awa’ is the suffix added to a place name to indicate origins. 
17 Mantse refers to the traditional ruler of the Ga. 
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nestled between two other neighbourhoods; Lartibiorkioshie and Abossey Okai. 
Accra’s busy Ring Road skirts its Eastern edge, demarcating the formal boundary 
between Accra Central and Accra West within the larger administrative district of the 
Accra Metropolitan Area (Engstrom et al 2013). Together with Market Lane to the 
South, Oblogo Road to the North, and Eduardo Mondlane Road to the West, Zongo’s 
boundaries form a crude rectangle (see Map 1). 
 
Photograph 1. Harmattan Avenue with Abokin Ango Mosque in Background. 
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Map 1. Sabon Zongo, Accra Central and Western Periphery. 
 
Adapted from Google Maps (2015a).
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Zongo’s Northern boundary is about 900 metres long, demarcated by Oblogo Road 
running East/West. Along the North/South axis, Harmattan Avenue runs about 500 
metres through the middle of Zongo linking Oblogo Road to Market Lane; it is the only 
tarmacked road within Zongo’s boundaries. Harmattan Road is thought of by many as 
Zongo’s main road and is more commonly referred to as Mallam Bako Road within the 
neighbourhood. Another important road is Korle Bu Street which runs through the 
middle of Zongo roughly parallel to Oblogo Road. Sabon Zongo is subdivided into four 
areas, Kan Tudu, Gangare, Municipal and Ayigbetown, which converge at the 
intersection of Harmattan Avenue and Korle Bu Street at the Abokin Ango Mosque, 
also known as ‘Dogoo Masalaci’ meaning ‘Tall Mosque’ (see Map 2). 
Under the influence of the British colonial administration, Zongo was initially designed 
around a gridded system of streets and avenues (Pellow 2002). Many of these roads 
have gradually grown narrower with the encroachment of buildings, leaving a network 
of passageways or ‘lungu’ only traversable on foot or motorbike. Harmattan Road and 
Korle Bu Street might be thought of as Zongo’s main thoroughfares. However, most 
movement is “lungu lungu” – on foot via the haphazard alleyways that wind their way 
through Zongo.  
 
2.3 Living Arrangements: Social-Spatial Organisation 
When I first arrived in Sabon Zongo, I attempted to navigate using a map I had printed 
from Google Earth. There are no roads signs in Zongo, and when asking for directions, 
many people were baffled when I referred to Harmattan or Volta Avenue. Instead of 
road names, it is the history of Zongo, and the etching of that history upon spatial 
designations within its boundaries, which serve as the principle means of location. For 
example, in Kan Tudu people locate themselves relative to Gidan Mallam Bako, the 
compound built by Sabon Zongo’s founder, or Abokin Ango Masalaci, the mosque built 
by Mallam Abokin Ango, who had followed Mallam Bako to Sabon Zongo from Zongo 
Lane. Within Gangare, different areas are denoted as Unguwa Kariki, where Ali Musa 
Kariki was first allocated land by Mallam Bako; Unguwa Zabarma, an area historically 
inhabited by those with Nigerien Zabarma ancestry; Gaskiya, where the now crumbling 
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concrete shell of what was once Gaskiya Cinema18 can be found. In Municipal, people 
refer to Unguwa Makafi19, an area set aside by Mallam Bako for blind people to build 
houses and still populated by a large number of blind people and their families. In 
Ayigbetown, people might refer to Chief’s House, where the current Chief Yahaya 
lives; or Unguwa Kutare20, where people with leprosy and polio once resided. During 
my time in Zongo, I lived in Kan Tudu, in a room about midway between Ankobra 
Avenue and Harmattan Avenue, but arrived at via a passageway on Market Lane.   
 
Photograph 2. Korle Bu Street with Abokin Ango Mosque in background. 
                                                          
18  Gaskiya Cinema had been built by an Akan man who had been leased land by the 
Bako’s  
19  Makafi literally means blind. 
20  Kutare literally means leper. 
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Adapted from Google Maps (2015b).
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Photographs 3 and 4. ‘Lungu’. 
Zongo covers an area of approximately 0.3 square kilometres or 30 hectares (Pellow 
1985, Owusu 2010, Engstrom 2013). Squeezed into this space are somewhere 
between 18,000 and 25,000 inhabitants21. There are clearly more people living in 
Zongo now than when its founders first settled the area, but in the absence of reliable 
data it is difficult to get an idea of how Zongo’s population has changed, not least in 
terms of population density. This is not altogether surprising in that Zongo's origins are 
firmly grounded in the movements of migrants and traders who travelled the trade 
                                                          
21  These figures represent the approximate upper and lower ends of sources which have 
ventured to be more specific. According to the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS 2005), Sabon 
Zongo had 21,507 inhabitants in 2002. A more recent survey by the Accra Municipal Assembly 
gives the figure of 18,616 (AMA 2006). The 2010 census suggests a population approaching 
25,000 (Engstrom et al 2013). Though this represents a significant margin of error, it is doubtful 
whether a more precise figure is achievable given the particularities of Zongo’s demographic 
composition (see section 2.5 below) and the methodological challenges of collecting 
population data. The difficulties of defining who should and should not be counted, and the 
complex social factors which influence who actually ends up being counted, mean that 
population data for Accra is at best questionable (Grant 2006, Engstrom et al2013). 
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routes between Hausaland and pre-colonial Ghana (Schildkraut 1970, Peil 1974, 
Pellow 2002). Pellow (2002 p.115) described how during her time in Zongo there was 
a “continual flow of long-term temporary residents”. This remains the case today. Many 
of Zongo’s inhabitants come and go between various locations across West Africa, in 
particular between Zongo and the area historically referred to as Hausaland. People 
also go back and forth between Chad, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Libya, Brazil and 
Northern Europe, to name but a few of many well-furrowed paths. Some people spend 
just a few days in Zongo; others remain for months, or even years. Amongst the most 
itinerant are the beggars, traders and Mallamai who come and go between Zongo, 
Hausaland and other Hausa communities in West Africa, staying for longer or shorter 
periods of time and with varying degrees of regularity. Even Zongo’s notionally more 
permanent inhabitants maintain links to disparate parts of West Africa. It is not unusual 
for men and women in Zongo to have a spouse or children elsewhere, sometimes in 
one of Accra’s other Zongos, such as Nima, Madina or Kasoa, but also occasionally 
further afield, such as in Kano, Lome or Lagos. The combination of transience and 
transnational relations means that it is hard to decide who qualifies as resident in 
Zongo. Indeed, an important part of Zongo’s identity for residents and non-residents 
alike is the idea of Zongo as a place for ‘strangers’; a place for Muslim migrants whose 
cultural ancestry is elsewhere (Pellow 2002). 
Alongside the paved roads that mark its periphery, the sense of crowdedness and 
distinctive architecture make it easy to discern where Zongo ends and adjacent 
neighbourhoods begin. Unlike Lartibiorkioshie and Abossey Okai, there are few multi-
story buildings in Zongo. Most buildings are constructed from a variable combination 
of cement blocks, wood and corrugated metal sheeting. Those who can afford it live 
in concrete block constructions with shuttered windows and metal roofs. At the other 
extreme, the poorest quality dwellings are made of little more than a few planks of 
scavenged wood precariously balanced against the side of an adjacent more robust 
building. 
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Photograph 5. Street in Kan Tudu. Some of Zongo’s larger streets have cement guttering to 
carry waste water away, but these are often blocked with refuse such that they are prone to 
flooding. On other streets, channels have been cut in the mud or else waste water simply 
runs through the street22. 
                                                          
22  Poor sanitation is only one of a number of challenges faced by people in Zongo, but 
perhaps that which has gained the most attention from outside observers. Songsore (2009 
p.75) describes Sabon Zongo as being one of the most “environmentally deprived 
communities” in Greater Accra. Out of 91 communities, Zongo was categorised as one of 
twelve in which the environmental health context was categorised as “absolute deprivation”. 
This is echoed by Owusu (2010), who argues that Sabon Zongo lags behind the rest of Accra 
in terms of the development of basic sanitation services and infrastructure. 
Emil Dauncey 3750701 
 
48 
 
Few would dispute that Sabon Zongo is incredibly crowded when compared to other 
residential areas of Accra23. This is most apparent around the time of the Al-Maghreb, 
or sunset prayer. At this time, Zongo’s main thoroughfares swell with people 
performing their ablutions, taking their evening meal, shopping, socialising and making 
their way to and from mosque. Zongo’s main streets are far quieter during the day. 
The locus of activity shifts away from the main streets and into the maze of alleys and 
courtyards where shade can be found to work, rest or pray. It took me some time to 
adapt to this routine. However, the sense of over-crowdedness is perhaps most 
evident in the density of living spaces. 
 
Photograph 6. Photo taken from the interior courtyard of a more affluent compound facing 
two separate dwellings. 
                                                          
23  Based on figures from the Accra Municipal Authority, Owusu (2010) calculates 
average population density at 141 and 620 persons per hectare (0.01 km2) for the Accra 
Metropolitan Area and Sabon Zongo respectively. A later report (AMA 2010) identified Sabon 
Zongo as being one of 15 communities, (of the 79 that make up the Accra Metropolitan Area), 
with a population density in excess of 300 persons per hectare (30,000 per km 2), with an 
average of 74 persons per hectare (7,400 persons per km2) for the Metropolitan area as a 
whole. 
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When Mallam Bako and his followers established Sabon Zongo, they built compounds 
reminiscent of those that might be found in Hausaland where ‘respectable’ femininities 
have often been associated with confinement to the domestic space. ‘Auren kulle’ – 
marriage of seclusion – has increasingly become the ideal in Northern Nigeria. Contact 
between women and non-kin men is precluded by women’s confinement to the 
compound. Even when auren kulle is not practiced, relations between men and women 
are framed by norms of avoidance. Such avoidance was demarcated in the internal 
structure of the compound with clearly defined spaces for married and unmarried men, 
and women. Rooms were built around a central courtyard with a single entrance via a 
‘zaure’ or entrance chamber. Though married men slept in the compound, their domain 
was that of the zaure, or else the street. The courtyard was principally the domain of 
women who ran small businesses and undertook their domestic tasks. The zaure 
served as an intermediary space between the compound and the ‘public’ domain, 
where compound men could interact with other men whilst preserving the sanctity of 
the notionally feminine compound interior24. 
There is no longer room to build such compounds. Though I am unable to determine 
the trajectory of population growth with any certainty, there is clearly great demand for 
living space25. A very small number of people have managed to build upwards, adding 
a second story to existing dwellings to accommodate expanding families and make 
room for tenants. Sometimes additional rooms have been built onto exterior walls or 
within the compound courtyard. However, seemingly intractable disputes over land 
rights, lack of space and resources means that Zongo’s residents tend to create new 
living spaces by dividing existing rooms into ever smaller spaces. Many of the original 
compounds, and the rooms and courtyards that comprised them, have been 
partitioned, and new entrances and passageways added. Courtyards have contracted; 
the zaure has disappeared; living spaces have become incredibly small and 
congested26.  
                                                          
24  See Schildkrout (1982), Callaway (1984), Robson (2000, 2006), Kudoadzi (2014). 
25  We cannot entirely discount the effects of demand for non-residential property. A 
number of my informants had partitioned rooms to create shops or store rooms. 
26  Pellow (2002) has documented this process in great detail. 
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Photograph 7. Exterior Dwelling. Structures are often added to the exterior wall of a larger 
compound which may be used as living space or for commercial activities. (Courtesy Helen 
Morrissey). 
 
 
Photograph 8. Dwelling Constructed in Compound Courtyard. 
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Though seclusion and avoidance remain an ideal, this pattern of residential 
development has had far-reaching consequences for gender relations and their spatial 
manifestations, thrusting what would once have been contained within the boundaries 
of the compound into the public domain. Perhaps the most obvious indicator of these 
changes is the disappearance of auren kulle27, the demise of which is lamented by 
many of Zongo’s inhabitants, both male and female. An important point to draw out 
here is that in the absence of private space, it has become more difficult for men to 
evade the public gaze, with the effect that their behaviour becomes subject to greater 
scrutiny that it might have been previously. 
Though still dominated by women, compound courtyards are no longer the sole 
preserve of women from specific kinship units, but shared spaces in which men and 
women from different households intermingle. A degree of gender segregation is 
preserved by going about some activities at different times of day. Before the sun has 
risen, when men are yet to rise, women queue with their towels at Zongo’s public 
showers and toilets; the men take their turn once the women have begun their daily 
chores. Nevertheless, many activities such as cooking, eating and clothes washing, 
which once took place within the privacy of the family compound, now take place in 
shared courtyards or else the street. This is not to say that men and women interact 
freely. It is ill-thought of for married women to spend unaccompanied or unobserved 
time with men other than their husbands, even their husband’s kinsmen. For example, 
one of my neighbours used to regularly take food to her husband’s father, but the two 
of them would never be left alone in the room. Similarly, women who sell food from a 
compound courtyard do so in groups. My own contact with women was similarly 
curtailed. Whilst I was able to meet and talk with men one-to-one, my conversations 
with women were nearly always in public, under the watchful eye of someone else, or 
otherwise in secret. The exception was elderly (post-menopausal) women, whose 
interactions with men are less restricted28. 
                                                          
27  A number of Pellow’s (2002) older informants recalled how auren kulle had been 
prevalent in Zongo’s earliest days. During my time in Zongo I met only one woman who had 
experienced auren kulle, and this had been more than forty years ago when living in Kano 
with her now divorced husband. 
28  Norms concerning interactions between men and women have been extensively 
described and discussed elsewhere in Hausaland. See for example, Pittin (1984), Robson 
(2000). 
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Photograph 9. Wooden Dwelling. Washing hangs outside a wooden room constructed in a 
shared courtyard. 
Married men still sleep in their wives’ rooms, but in the absence of a zaure, the street 
has become the principle venue of male-male social interaction. Though I was often 
invited into people’s houses, I was seldom allowed to see inside the bedroom, which 
remains the most personal and intimate space of a man’s wife. Even a husband’s 
access to a bedroom is limited, and a wife will likely complain about a husband who 
lingers there too long. Bearing in mind that many people do not have the luxury of a 
two room dwelling, spaces such as Oakville Town Hall can be seen to take on a 
function equivalent to that of the zaure. I came to know many of my informants by 
hanging out at ‘bases’ – homosocial spaces where men would frequently gather. A 
barbershop, video centre or any other predominantly male business might also 
operate as a base for the owner and his friends. However, bases are ordinarily 
established in notionally public spaces, such as a derelict or partially constructed 
building, outside a mosque or under a tree.  
Many bases are well established and maintained. Some bases, such as Oakville Town 
Hall, are decorated with posters, and are furnished with plastic chairs, a stove to 
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prepare tea on and a television set. Many bases have relatively formal identities, which 
are embodied in names and mottos. However, the basic criteria for a base is a patch 
of shade and something to sit on.  
When I first arrived in Zongo, I found it difficult to discern the boundaries between 
public and private space. I spent much of my time wandering Zongo’s main streets 
where my presence was most obviously acceptable. Though driven by uncertainty 
rather than calculation, this was not an entirely unfruitful strategy. I got to know many 
people in Zongo when buying my breakfast or through conversations with the curious 
who wanted to know what I was doing sitting on the roadside. However, the kinds of 
encounters that take place on Zongo’s main streets do not lend themselves to getting 
to know people. Most people on these streets are busy moving from A to B or 
purchasing goods to take elsewhere. Eventually I grew a little bolder and started to 
explore the lungos and courtyards, where a much wider variety of activities take place. 
Unable to differentiate between public thoroughfare and private courtyard meant I 
often found myself in places I shouldn’t have been. Of course, boundaries of any sort 
are often only noticeable when they are broken. I was obviously a stranger by virtue 
of my skin tone and general appearance of bafflement. When I intruded on private 
space people generally assumed I was lost, forgave me my faux pas, and politely 
corrected me hough there were occasions when my transgressions rubbed someone 
up the wrong way or I found myself caught up in a disagreement. 
 
Photograph 10. ‘Base’. Young men watch television at one of Zongo’s many ‘bases’. 
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The absence of alternative living space means that many men pass large parts of the 
day at one base or another. However, this is also a function of norms concerning the 
gendered division of labour. As a man without ‘outside’ work, I was expected to do the 
same; and accordingly, I did so. In Chapters Four, Five and Six we will see how ideals 
and expectations concerning the division of labour are central to the realisation of 
accepted and valued masculinity in Zongo. For the time being, it is enough to say that 
women are expected to direct their labour towards reproductive activities within the 
household, such as cooking, cleaning and raising of children. In contrast, men are 
expected to generate the income needed to provide for dependent wives and children. 
As we shall see later, realities seldom reflect this dualism29. Under- and unemployment 
and an associated lack of income are pervasive problems for men in Zongo such that 
this expectation is not always easily realised. 
 
2.4 Making Ends Meet 
Many of my informants stressed that it was better to engage in a range of income 
generating activities rather than rely on a single occupation or source of income30. This 
is reflected in men often engaging in a range of occupations. For example, one of my 
informants worked as a scrap metal collector and occasionally as a plasterer when 
such work was available. Another worked at a plastic bag factory by day, and as a 
Koranic teacher at weekends. Amongst the most common jobs which might make up 
these permutations were motorbike taxi driver, mechanic, electrician, security guard, 
cleaner, carpenter, medicine seller, tailor, butcher, Mallam, Koranic teacher, musician 
or praise singer, nail cutter, beggar and various kinds of manual labourer and factory 
worker. There were also men who made money from livestock keeping, money 
changing or lending and mobile phone repairs. Others operated or worked at video 
centres, clothes shops or travel agents. 
                                                          
29  Not least in the fact that though notionally the dependants of their husbands and 
fathers, lots of women have their own sources of income. For example, many women prepare 
and sell food. Others operate kiosks where they sell items such as sachets of drinking water, 
soap, snacks, cosmetics and other household goods. A number of women import electronic 
goods from Togo or cloth from Nigeria. 
30  This is exemplified in the popular adage ‘gida biyu maganin gobara’ – literally, two 
houses is the medicine for fire – which broadly equates to ‘don’t put all your eggs in one 
basket’. 
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Photograph 11. Livestock. Livestock keeping is one of several income generating activities 
engaged in by men in Zongo. Men with only a few livestock will often pay shepherds or men 
with larger herds to look after them. 
Some men have inherited housing and make money by renting it out to tenants. Others 
have turned access to a water pipe into income, by selling water or charging for use 
of a toilet or shower31. As we shall see in Chapters Five and Six, pre- and post-mortem 
inheritance of housing and other kinds intergenerational transfers are extremely 
important for men, particularly those with precarious livelihoods. Senior men are 
expected to assist their juniors. It is ill-thought of to decline a man food, especially 
one’s kinsmen. Many of my informants had low if not precarious personal incomes and 
relied upon wealthier others to meet their daily needs. Many of my own relationships 
in Zongo were subject to the same expectation. When someone from the base went 
to fetch bread or tea I was expected to pay for it. If I went to eat at a chop bar I would 
invariably be accompanied by one of my informants whose food I would pay for. 
Conversely, when I spent time with an elder or other senior man we would eat from 
the same bowl and he would settle the bill. Zongo-specific income data is patchy if not 
                                                          
31  The standard charge for a bucket of water was 10 pesewas. Use of a shower was 50 
pesewas. Use of a toilet for defecation was 20 pesewas. There was normally no charge for 
urination or for a small pot of water to perform ablutions. At the time of fieldwork, 20 Pesewas 
was approximately 0.05 dollars (www.oanda.com 2015). 
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unreliable32, but it is safe to say that within the context of Accra, many of Sabon 
Zongo’s inhabitants struggle to make ends meet. As was touched upon in the previous 
chapter, the precariousness of men’s incomes has consequences for the marital 
process. In the following chapter I discuss this further in light of a literature which has 
drawn attention to the impact of large scale social change on the achievement of 
marriage. In Chapters Seven and Eight I return to this theme in the context of the 
marital process and men’s efforts to secure the resources necessary for a successful 
marriage. 
2.5 Islam in Zongo 
  
Photograph 12. Tafseer outside Abokin Ango Mosque. 
                                                          
32  According to AMA data, Accra's mean household income is US$ 8.86 per day. Sabon 
Zongo is grouped with Nima and Korle Gonno as the lowest income neighbourhoods with an 
average household income of US$ 3.5 per day (AMA/CHF International 2010). Based on the 
exchange rate of approximately $1 US to 4 GHS at the time of fieldwork (Oanda.com 2015), 
in Zongo a kilo of rice cost approximately $3.50/14 GHS, a standard meal of tuwo and stew 
purchased from a street vendor cost about $1/4GHS perhaps 1 or 2 GHS more if served with 
meat. 
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As is the case in other Zongos, Islam pervades every aspect of social life in Zongo. 
The majority of Muslims in Zongo identify as followers of Tijjaniyah Islam, though there 
are also some followers of Ahli-Sunnah33, which is particularly popular amongst more 
recent migrants from Niger. Followers of Ahli-Sunna often talk disparagingly of 
Tijjaniyah, claiming that the Tijjaniyah is a corruption of Islam as evident in their 
obsession with spirits and sorcery, materialist orientation, idolatry and enthusiasm for 
elaborate Mawlid34 celebrations. Conversely, those who follow the Tijjaniyah tend to 
regard Ahli-Sunnah as a somewhat austere and oppressive version of Islam prone to 
literal and overly legalistic interpretations of scripture, and neglectful of spiritual 
experience. Though Alhi-Sunnah has risen to prominence in large parts of 
Hausaphone West-Africa35, it exerts little influence on Zongo’s religious landscape. 
There are a handful of mosques and makarantas which are seen as more closely 
associated with Alhi-Sunna, but they represent a small proportion of Zongo’s many 
Islamic institutions. People forge friendships and business relationships, and even 
marry, with little regard for sectarian differences. 
                                                          
33  Ahli Sunnah is associated with the reformist movement of Salafist Islam, which 
emphasises a jurisprudential interpretation of the Quran, Hadith and Sunna as a means to 
‘purify’ Islam of external influences. In contrast, the Tijjaniyah movement is associated with 
Sufism and is characterised by an ethos of flexibility into which a range of beliefs, ‘traditions’ 
and interests can be accommodated (Paden 1973, Hiskett 1984, Samwini 2006, Dumbe 
2013). 
34  Mawlid is the celebration of the Prophet Mohammed’s birthday, but Mawlid are also 
held for important Muslim figures such as Sheik Ibrahim Nyass (1900-75) who is widely 
regarded as the spiritual leader of the Tijjaniyah movement in Ghana (Dumbe 2013), and the 
present National Chief Imam of Ghana, Sheik Osman Nuhu Sharabutu. 
35  See Last (2005) and Masquelier2009). 
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Photograph 13. Mural of Sheik Ibrahim Nyass (1900-1975), an important figure in the 
Tijjaniyah movement. 
Though Islam in West Africa is characterised by syncretism36, there are many parallels 
between the practice of Islam in Sabon Zongo and other Muslim societies, not least 
the five daily prayers or ‘sallah’. As mentioned in Chapter One, prayer is a normative 
obligation from which men seldom deviate. Though prayer may be conducted in 
private, people often pray together. Alongside Zongo’s dozens of mosques, there are 
many spaces for people to gather together and pray. Most compounds will have an 
area set aside for prayer, demarcated by prayer mats and the plastic tea pots used to 
perform ablutions37. Zongo’s many ‘makaranta’ – or Islamic schools – double up as 
mosques or places to celebrate Muslim festivals such as Mawlid or attend Tafseer. 
Prayer is clearly a potent norm, and one embedded in the very social fabric of Zongo. 
It exerts a considerable influence on the temporal, spatial and moral order of social life 
in Zongo. Meal times, bedtimes and the working day are all oriented towards 
adherence to this normative obligation. During my fieldwork in Zongo, it often felt like 
the only indicators of the passage of time were the five daily prayers and the airing of 
certain television shows. 
                                                          
36  See Last (1976, 1981), hiskett (1984, 1994), Dumbe (2013), James (2014). 
37  Zongo’s few Christian residents do not have to go far to find a place to worship. 
Though there are no churches within Zongo itself, there are many churches nearby in 
Lartibiorkioshie and Abossey Okai. 
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A notion of Islam is clearly important to social life in Zongo. However, the role of Islam 
is perhaps most important to my analysis as a discourse through which moralities are 
articulated and social evaluations are made. I began this thesis with reference to Kirk-
Greene’s (1974) essay ‘Mutumin Kirkii, The Concept of the Good Man in Hausa’. Kirk-
Greene described how for the Hausa, kirki or ‘goodness’ is a moral concept 
inextricably bound to Islam. He described how a man must demonstrate ‘karamci’ 
(generosity), ‘hakuri’ (patience), ‘kunya’ (humility), ‘girma’ (respect), ‘gaskiya’ (truth) 
and ‘amana’ (trust), if he is to be considered a man of moral standing. For the Hausa, 
it is these characteristics which give expression to ‘adali’ – fear of God – as the 
overarching and indispensable foundation of moral virtue (Kirk-Greene 1974). As this 
thesis progresses we will see how men in Zongo are socially evaluated on the basis 
of a similar set of criteria. However, I am less concerned with defining Islam in Zongo 
than with how moral discourses are put to work in processes of social evaluation. My 
focus is not on Islam as doctrine, as a set of rigid moral principles, but how people 
might make use of discourses of Islam to frame their behaviours and the behaviours 
of others in moral terms, and the social evaluations that arise from doing so. This 
theme will be revisited throughout this thesis as I explore manhood as a social and 
moral status. However, before embarking on this endeavour it is necessary to briefly 
discuss how the practice of Islam informs Sabon Zongo’s relationship with the wider 
Accra. Important here are the ways that Islam permeates notions of ethnic identity, 
specifically an idea of ‘hausaness’, or ‘gargajin bahaushe’38 that many of Sabon 
Zongo’s inhabitants claim sets them apart from Accra’s other Zongo communities. 
 
2.6 ‘Zongwanci’: The Convergence of Islam and Hausa 
“The Zongo Community in Kumasi are angry over growing xenophobia and ethnic 
discrimination after a leading member of the community was denied a passport 
because of his ethnic identity and origin. The Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) was 
said to have argued that, there is nothing called Hausa tribe in Ghana and therefore 
anybody who has his/her ethnic origin outside Ghana is not a Ghanaian. “Being in 
Ghana for more than 300 years does not make you a Ghanaian”.  
                                                          
38 Gargajin bahaushe literally translates as ‘traditional Hausa’, but implies something akin to ‘true’ Hausaness. 
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This came to light at a well attended press conference in Kumasi by the Zongo 
Community calling on the government to clarify the position of members of their tribe 
in Ghana. The Chairman of the Zongo Community in Kumasi, Alhaji S. M. Shariff, told 
a press conference that they are dreading the ongoing consequences of this year's 
voter's registration exercise, as they fear a problem of citizenship and identity, which 
they experienced during the population census exercise in 2010, will re-occur again”. 
Modernghana.com 28th March 2012. 
 “In contradistinction to the majority of the city, which is predominantly Christian, 
Western in orientation and outward-looking, the Muslim communities are insular and 
inward-looking and represent a kind of ghettoization that occurred both by accident 
and by design and produced the third-class or slum-class Zongo”. 
(Pellow 2002 p38). 
“In Kano when I was small small boy my grandmother she would call. Come come 
today we have shinkafa [rice]. Oh how we jump. Running and jumping to the house. 
You see in Kano we have rice, but it is not the cheap one like dawa [guinea corn]. 
Dawa is the normal food there. Me I like shinkafa more than any foods. That is why I 
chop shinkafa. But in Zongo the normal one is dawa. That one is our food. The Hausa 
food.” 
Interview with Alhaji Musa (Sabon Zongo, Accra, October 2012)39. 
There is a popular caricature of Accra's Zongos as 'bounded communities' - peculiar 
islands of Muslim insularity and exclusiveness running against the grain of an 
increasingly cosmopolitan Accra. However, my feeling is that such notions are 
mistaken in being based on a set of problematic assumptions as to what an outward 
orientation should look like. There is an element of truth to the claim that many of the 
ostensibly 'western' influences which have come to shape the cultural landscape of 
Accra do not seem to have penetrated Sabon Zongo in quite the same way as many 
                                                          
39 Alhaji Musa is now in his forties and lives in the Unguwa Kariki neighbourhood of Sabon Zongo. Alhaji Musa 
was born in Sabon Zongo, but when he was around six years old his father sent him to live with his widowed 
grandmother in Kano, Nigeria to learn Arabic and study the Quran. Children sent away from the parental home 
to study Islam are are known as ‘almajirai’. I am told by my informants in Sabon Zongo that this practice is less 
common now. Nevertheless, there remains a belief that Islamic knowledge is best sought outside Ghana, 
preferably in Northern Nigeria where Muslim scholars and teachers are said to be amongst the most 
knowledgable. 
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other neighbourhoods40. However, to elide cosmopolitanism with westernisation is 
problematic on many levels, not least in that it fails to capture the dynamics of cultural 
consumption as productive processes of transformation involving synthesis, 
appropriation and representation (see Hannerz 1996, Weiss 2009). 
Throughout this thesis I will provide many examples of how Zongo's inhabitants 
actively make use of cultural artefacts to (re)produce and represent themselves and 
others in specific ways. However, the focus of this section is on how the inhabitants of 
Sabon Zongo draw upon cultural reference points that transcend the boundaries of 
Accra, even Ghana, giving rise to a distinctive 'local' identity and character, expressed 
in Sabon Zongo vernacular as “zongwanci” and elaborated by Deborah Pellow in her 
book ‘Landlords and Lodgers’ (2002). As will become clear in this chapter, Zongwanci 
emerges from ideas about what being Muslim and Hausa in urban Accra means for 
people living in Sabon Zongo. 
Accra is Ghana’s largest and arguably most cosmopolitan city, where cultural flows 
collide, fragment and intersect, giving birth to a shifting bricolage of social and cultural 
frames through which people might come to view and make sense of themselves and 
others, forge ideals and aspirations and go about their everyday lives (Langevang 
2008, Quayson 2014). This can be seen in the ways that Maid in Manhattan serves 
as lens through which Abu and his friends interpret and articulate their own social 
realities. However, the 'West' is but one of a number of 'imagined communities' whose 
presence can be felt in Sabon Zongo's cultural landscape. Perhaps most significant 
are social and cultural affinities with the parts of Northern Nigeria and Southern Niger 
historically referred to as Hausaland, such as those expressed in the quote from my 
informant Alhaji Musa above.  
Sabon Zongo may be distinctive from other neighbourhoods in Accra, including other 
Zongos, but it is certainly not isolated or inward looking. Indeed, that Alhaji Musa’s 
account of his dietary preferences is framed in terms of his memories of a childhood 
spent in Northern Nigeria alludes to a ‘deterritorialised’ identity, in which ‘imaginings’ 
of place may be as significant to social identities as geographical proximity (Appadurai 
1988). It is not within the scope of this thesis to discuss how and why a notion of 
                                                          
40 See for example Quayson’s (2014) study of the ways in which ‘transnationalism’ and ‘globalisation’ have 
shaped the upmarket neighbourhood of Osu. 
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Hausaness has become so central to identities and relationships in Sabon Zongo in 
detail. However, it is necessary to say something about the legacy of the Hausa 
presence in Ghana and why ideas about what it means to be Hausa in Sabon Zongo 
remain an important backdrop in my efforts to make sense of the marital practices 
explored in the chapters to follow.  
 The Hausa in Precolonial Ghana. 
There has long been a significant Hausa presence in Ghana. Long before the 
emergence of the modern nation state, Accra’s establishment as colonial capital and 
the arrival of Europeans, trade routes had been established by Hausa merchants 
across West Africa and beyond, linking precolonial centres of commerce, political and 
military power, such as Yendi (Eades 1993 p.25), Tamale (MacGaffey 2009), the 
Asante Kingdom (Abaka 2009), and the Habe States, which would later merge to 
become the Sokoto Caliphate under the rule of Usman dan Fodio ( Last 1977, Lovejoy 
1971, 1980). For example, MacGaffey (2009) describes how Hausa traders came to 
dominate the iron trade and blacksmithing in Tamale through monopoly of trade routes 
linking the pre-colonial Dagbon kingdom, the Hausa States and iron-working region of 
Bassar in what is now Togo. The Hausa also operated many of the markets and 
staging posts pivotal to the slave trade, moving people, kola and currency between 
the Northern Sahel and Southern coastal regions of West Africa (Lovejoy 1980, Perbi 
1992, Austin 2005, Agamba 2006, Samwini 2006).  
Hausa control over trade routes helped to established the economic power of Hausa 
traders and migrants, but also enabled the movement of Muslim scholars and teachers 
from Hausaland throughout the region. On the back of their mercantile power, the 
Hausa came to occupy positions of authority and influence within both migrant trading 
communities and religious institutions. Though in many, if not most, majority Muslim 
areas the Hausa constituted a minority, Hausa men were amongst the most respected 
and influential Imams, often holding positions of formal religious authority (Lovejoy 
1971, 1980, Eades 1993, Pellow 2002, Samwini 2006, Soeters 2012). Indeed, 
Samwini (2006) describes how the social and economic power of Hausa merchants 
and traders during the 18th Century enabled the rise to prominence of a Hausa variant 
of Islam that eventually led to the demise of Wangara Islam with roots in Timbuktu, 
which had previously dominated the region.  
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Many Hausa Imams were literate in Arabic, assumed to have a sophisticated 
understanding of the Quran and speak from a position of religious authority and so 
were treated with a degree of reverence (Trimingham 1975). In predominantly non-
Muslim areas Hausa men were often appointed as Chief Imams or ‘Headmen’ of 
Muslims (Schildkraut 1978, Lovejoy 1981, Pellow 2002). A pattern that to some extent 
continues today as we shall see below. Under the weight of this influence Islam took 
on a markedly Hausa flavour (Eades 1993, Samwini 2006, Bierlich 2007). This 
perhaps explains the association of the Hausa language with Islam in Ghana. Indeed, 
as Lentz (2006) notes, Hausa has become ubiquitous as a second language and long 
been a marker of learnedness, prestige and power amongst Muslims in Ghana.  
As can be seen in Lovejoy's (1980) examination of the 18th and 19th Century kola 
trade, the trade routes established by the Hausa across West Africa fostered an 
enduring Hausa influence in Northern Ghana. Alongside elements of religious practice, 
and language, music, dress and architecture were amongst the social exports brought 
to Ghana by migrant Hausa (Adamu 1978). Prussin (1969) describes how the Hausa 
have had a significant influence on architecture in the region as local elites adopted 
Hausa building styles which had become associated with social, economic and 
political prosperity41. Bierlich’s (2007) account of health and healing amongst the 
Dagomba of Northern Ghana, shows the indelible mark of Hausa influence, with many 
medical terms articulated in the Hausa language and a demonstrable resemblance to 
healing cultures in Hausaland42.  
Those who have examined notions of Hausa culture and identity and their historical 
movements across West Africa have described processes of both expansion and 
absorption. As Hausa people have migrated they have not simply brought their culture 
with them, but rather have brought forth a process of amalgamation in which diverse 
peoples and practices are absorbed into an expanding notion of Hausa identity and 
culture given expression through the practice of Islam (Adamu 1978, Sutton 1979, 
Jaggar 2010, Rossi and Haour 2010). However, whilst cultural flows work both ways, 
the combined forces of economic and religious power helped foster a pervasive Hausa 
                                                          
41 See also Schwerdtfeger (2007) and DeLancey’s (2016) accounts of Hausa influence on architecture in West 
Africa. 
42 This can be seen in a comparative reading of Bierlich’s (2007) study in Dagombaland and Wall’s (1988) 
medical anthropological work in Northern Nigeria. For example, in the moral connotations of the Hausa 
language term for wealth ‘arziki’ (Bierlich 2007 p.140, Wall 1988 p.39). 
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influence on the social, cultural and political landscape of what would later become 
Northern Ghana and Muslim communities in Ghana’s southern regions. The influence 
of the Hausa have been particularly prominent in shaping religious institutions and 
practices in Ghana and so it is perhaps not surprising that that many ostensibly Islamic 
practices bear a resemblance to those that would be found in Hausaland (Adamu 
1978, Hiskett 1984, 1994, Samwini 2006).  
The Hausa in Accra 
Islam has been present on West Africa's coast for hundreds of years, long before a 
cluster of Ga speaking villages began to coalesce to form Accra, and certainly prior to 
1877, when the city became the capital of the British Gold Coast colonies (Lovejoy 
1971, Grant and Yankson 2003, Pellow 2002, Skinner 2009). As in other parts of 
Ghana, the Hausa had been particularly influential amongst Muslims in coastal 
regions, due to their prominence within the slave and kola trades (Lovejoy 1971, 
1980). 
With the arrival of Europeans, the influence of the Hausa was to some extent 
reinforced. Following the coming of the British and conquest of Asante in the late 19th 
Century, the Muslim presence in the South grew. An increasing number of traders from 
the North sought to establish themselves in southern towns such as Kumasi, Nkawkaw 
and Koforidua, but also in the coastal trading centres of Cape Coast, Sekondi and 
eventually Accra. The prosperity of coastal regions also attracted migrant labourers 
from the Muslim Sahel. They were joined by members of the Gold Coast Constabulary, 
a militia formed by the British amongst which the Hausa were particularly numerous 
and Hausa served as the lingua franca (Lovejoy 1971, Adamu 1978, Schildkraut 1978, 
Pellow 2002, Soeters 2012).  
Whilst it certainly wasn’t only the Hausa who migrated to the South, indeed they were 
a minority amongst other Muslims groups, their influence endured. The British made 
use of pre-colonial institutions in an effort to establish a colonial administration, 
including those which had accorded the Hausa status within religious institutions. In 
areas, such as Kumasi and Accra the positions of Chief Imam and Muslim headmen, 
traditionally occupied by Hausa men were formalised and incorporated into colonial 
administrative structures (Schildkraut 1978, Pellow 2002). In Accra as in many 
southern towns, the Hausa retained their influence within the Muslim community 
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through their dominance of religious institutions, close economic and political ties with 
the British, and prominence within the Gold Coast Constabulary. As a consequence 
of this political dominance, within the context of Accra, a sense of ethnic identity was 
developed and sustained amongst Muslims which subsumed multifarious ethnic 
affiliations, social and cultural practices under the rubric of Hausa, such that the terms 
Muslim, migrant and Hausa have often been seen as synonymous (Peil 1971, Kropp-
Dakubu 1997, Pellow 2002).  
The social and cultural influence of the Hausa, in particular their dominance of religious 
institutions might go some way towards explaining similarities in marital practices 
amongst Muslims in Accra. For example, it is worth noting that in Northern Ghana 
Dagomba marriages are seldom accompanied by substantial prestationary payments 
(Goody and Tambiah 1973, Bierlich 2007). However, where marriages occur between 
Hausa and Dagomba in Sabon Zongo the marital process appear to conform to the 
same prestationary principles as those where both husband and wife are Hausa. 
Indeed, according to my informants in Sabon Zongo, intermarriage between Muslim 
ethnic groups was generally unproblematic because they followed broadly similar 
marital practices and had similar ideals as to what conjugality contract ought to involve. 
Sabon Zongo is a Hausa term which translates as 'New Camp'. In Accra the term 
Zongo has come to mean a place for 'strangers'; more specifically predominantly 
Muslim neighbourhoods, such as Nima, Kotobabi, Mamobi and indeed Sabon 
Zongo43. The use of a Hausa language term to denote these areas not only alludes to 
the importance of Hausa cultural influence in Ghana and the tethering together of 
migrant, Muslim and Northern identities, but a particular relationship between Zongo 
inhabitants and the wider Accra. 
Though there had for centuries been a significant Muslim presence in the area, Accra 
was founded on the territory of the predominantly non-Muslim Ga. Under the influence 
of the British colonial administration, differences between Muslim groups were 
downplayed whilst those between Muslims and non-Muslims were brought into relief. 
The colonial administration regarded the Ga, Fante and Akan speaking people of the 
South as ‘natives’, whilst Muslims remained ‘migrants’ or ‘aliens’ from the North (Peil 
                                                          
43 This usage is not limited to Accra. See for example Schildkraut’s (1978) account of identity formation in 
Kumasi’s Sabon Zongo. 
Emil Dauncey 3750701 
 
66 
 
1971, Pellow 2002, Kropp-Dakubu 1997). Even before the arrival of the British, Muslim 
migrants and traders had tended to settle in close proximity to one another on land 
allocated them by the Ga Stools. However, colonial planning initiatives served to 
reinforce a distinction between migrant and native communities and their spatial 
organisation. As was often the case in West African cities44, particular areas of Accra 
were formally designated as ‘strangers’ quarters. Alongside other Muslims, Hausas 
were concentrated in these areas to be joined overtime by some of the 'local' 
population who had converted to Islam45. It is these areas that became known as 
‘Zongos’ (Peil 1971, Kropp-Dakubu 1997, Pellow 2002, Agyei-Mensah and Owusu 
2012).  
Whilst not without its variations in practice, zongo inhabitants had Islam in common. A 
collective identity came to solidify around a distinction between Muslim ‘migrants’ and 
non-Muslim ‘natives’, played out spatially in the designation of Zongos as a place for 
‘strangers’. Within the context of this relationship, the term Hausa emerged as 
shorthand for  an assortment social identities (Peil 1971 Ntewusu 2005, Quayson 
2014).  
However, as Quayson (2014) notes, each Zongo is demographically distinctive and 
ethnic affiliations and differences matter. The population of Accra’s Zongos cannot be 
collapsed into a homogeneous whole. Although in the broader context of 
contemporary Accra the term Hausa has to some extent become divorced from its 
associations with Hausaland, the same cannot be said for Sabon Zongo. In Sabon 
Zongo, Hausaland remains an important presence in ideas about what it means to be 
Hausa, such that the term not only serves to articulate a relationship between Muslims 
and non-Muslims, but mark Sabon Zongo as distinctive from other Zongos in Accra. 
In order to make sense of the particular connotations of the notion of Hausa in present 
day Sabon Zongo, it is necessary to revisit Accra during the late 19th and early 20th 
Centuries and the political cleavages which had emerged in Accra’s central Zongos. 
 
                                                          
44 See Cohen (1969), Peil (1974), Smith (1997), Fourchard (2009), Agyei-Mensah and Owusu (2012). 
45 That ‘bako’ is the Hausa word for stranger, might lead one to wonder whether Mallam Bako and his father 
Nenu Bako’s names are derived from their status. Though I am unable to find any source to corroborate the 
idea. 
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Being Hausa in Sabon Zongo 
In the period preceding the establishment of Sabon Zongo, Accra’s Hausa population 
had been concentrated in the predominantly Muslim but ethnically mixed Zongos at 
Zongo Lane, Okaishie and Horse Road (Pellow 1985, 1999, 2002, Hanretta 2011 
Mumuni 2002, Skinner 2009). Under the weight of a growing population, Accra’s 
original zongos became congested. Factions formed and rivalries developed as their 
leaders competed for power and influence. Tensions between Accra’s Muslim 
inhabitants were often articulated through discourses of ethnic identity. For example, 
many non-Hausa Muslims resented Hausa dominance of religious institutions; not 
least the position of Chief Imam, which had long been occupied by Nigerian Hausa. 
One of the most important factions was led by Mallam Nenu and Mallam Garuba, two 
Hausa men who had migrated from Katsina in Northern Nigeria. They enjoyed 
considerable influence amongst Accra’s Muslims, in particular those who identified as 
Nigerian Hausa (Pellow 2002). Mallam Nenu Bako was Chief Imam of Central Accra, 
and Mallam Garuba was his assistant (Odoom 1971, Pellow 2002). When Nenu died, 
Mallam Garuba became Chief Imam and Mallam Bako, Nenu’s son, his assistant. 
Mallam Bako and Mallam Garuba had been keen to leave Accra’s overcrowded Zongo 
Lane, to escape the rivalries and infighting. They sought to establish a community of 
Hausa in the image of Nigerian Hausaland, unpolluted by ‘foreign’ cultural influences 
(Pellow 2002). To some extent their ambitions were successful.   
Though Sabon Zongo was at least initially dominated by Hausa migrants from 
Northern Nigeria (Pellow 2002), the population is more mixed in the present day. 
Based on data from the 2000 Ghanaian Population and Housing Census, Agyei-
Mensah and Owusu (2010) described Zongo’s ethnic composition as being 36.7% 
Akan, 13.8% Mole-Dagbon, 11.7% Ewe, 11.3% Ga and the remaining 26.4% as 
‘Other’. These figures would seem to support Pellow’s (2002) suggestion that the 
proportion of Hausa residents has declined in Zongo as Muslims from Northern Ghana 
and elsewhere have taken up residence in the area. These observations immediately 
raise questions as to whether a notion of Hausa makes for a suitable backdrop to this 
study at all. Certainly Agyei-Mensah and Owusu’s (ibid) figures made for 
uncomfortable reading when I first encountered them upon my return from fieldwork46. 
                                                          
46  I am for a number of reasons sceptical of Agyei-Mensah and Owusu’s (2009) analysis. 
The purpose of their analysis was to investigate the extent of ethnic segregation in Accra. I 
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However, I would argue that their analysis has little bearing on my contention that this 
study is well-situated in the context of a wider literature concerned with the Hausa. As 
a means to make my argument, let me present the case of one of my informants, Issa.   
During my initial relatively formal interview with Issa, he described himself as Hausa. 
However, as I got to know Issa during my fieldwork I learned that his ancestry was 
mixed. His maternal ancestry was in Northern Nigeria, but his paternal grandparents 
had been Dagomba from Northern Ghana. Issa explained that though neither he nor 
his father denied their Dagomba roots, they had always identified as Hausa because 
the lifestyle they lived as Muslims was closer to that of Hausa than Dagomba, who he 
claimed had not perfected a truly Islamic way of life. Given this complex narrative of 
ethnic affiliation, one would wonder how Issa might report his ethnic identity to 
somebody administering a census. Would he have been recorded as part of the 13.8% 
Mole-Dagbon or included in the 26.4% ‘Other’?  
The work of Schildkraut (1978) in Kumasi Zongo is insightful here. Schildkraut (1978) 
describes how disparate migrant groups have been incorporated into a common 
Zongo culture. According to Schildkraut first generation migrants, in particular Mossi 
migrants from Northern Ghana, became socially, economically and politically 
integrated into Zongo life by establishing ties of fictive kinship with Kumasi's Muslim 
elites. These affinities were gradually replaced by actual kinship ties fomented in 
marriage. Crucially, Schildkraut observes how many of the cultural practices that 
would have been familiar to Mossi society in Northern Ghana, including language, 
have receded into the background whilst Muslim Hausa ideals have come to 
predominate.  
We have already seen how Sabon Zongo’s founders sough to establish a ‘Hausa’ 
community in the image of Hausaland. As we shall see throughout this chapter, the 
social, economic and political power of Hausa men in Sabon Zongo has been 
grounded in their control over land. This perhaps explains the enduring hegemony of 
ostensibly Hausa ideals in Sabon Zongo, despite the existence of disparate ethnic 
identities. 
                                                          
would argue that implicit to Agyei-Mensah and Owusu’s (ibid) study is an essentialist idea of 
ethnic identity as singular – as being an inherent and fixed property of the individual.  
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The key point here is that expressions of ethnic identity and the social and cultural 
practices which come to be associated with them play out in the context of local 
hierarchies. Consequently, we need to be careful about what we infer from statements 
of personal identity. As discussed in Chapter One, the things that people say and do 
are informed by the exigencies of the particular social situation in which they find 
themselves (Goffman 1956, 1974, 1980). An individual may find cause to adopt, 
negate, emphasise or downplay different identities.  
Quite apart from Hausa, Sabon Zongo’s inhabitants can be seen to (re)produce a 
range of ethnic identities including Fulani, Ewe, Ga, Dagomba, Zabarma, Asante and 
others. My own data suggests that the proportion of people in Sabon Zongo who would 
claim an exclusively Nigerien or Nigerian Hausa ancestry is indeed relatively small, 
but there are very few people who do not in some way identify with a notion of Hausa; 
including the many inhabitants who trace ancestry to Northern Ghana, where historical 
ties to Hausaland and the presence of a large and influential Hausa population have 
shaped the cultural landscape, in particular the practice of Islam.  
As an ethnic identity, being ‘Hausa’ is not only socially constructed but also 
performative, such that the idea of Hausa is perhaps more precisely defined as a 
cultural ‘frame’ or reference point through which a bricolage of cultural practices come 
to be expressed. Issa claims a Hausa identity, amongst others, not because of where 
his ancestors were born, but through a particular set of social practices, not least those 
associated with Islam. Issa’s example serves to illustrate a fluidity, contingency and 
multifariousness of ethnic identity not picked up on in Agyei-Mensah and Owusu’s 
(2009) analysis. This does not necessarily mean that their results are wrong, but 
simply that in seeking to evaluate the ethnic composition of Sabon Zongo their findings 
might be more illuminating when situated within an account of the political exigencies 
at play in expressions of ethnic identity. 
 In the wider context of Accra, a degree of stigma and opprobrium has often been 
attached to Muslim Hausa such that an inhabitant of Zongo might seek to disassociate 
from such an identity47. Indeed, as is apparent in the quote from modernghana.com at 
                                                          
47 The experiences of the 1969 Aliens Compliance Order, which saw many of Accra’s Muslim Hausa expelled from 
Ghana, reverberate in the present day, and is one of a number of reasons why a resident of Sabon Zongo might 
be unwilling to formally identify as Hausa in the presence of the Ghanaian state or its agents. Enacted by then 
Prime Minister Kofi Abrefa Busia, the Aliens Compliance Order saw the mass expulsion of ‘non-Ghanaians’, 
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the start of this section, it may at times make sense to refute a Hausa identity in an 
effort to access the benefits of formal citizenship such as electoral representation. 
As will become apparent throughout this thesis in some social situations it may be 
advantageous to assert a Hausa identity and in other social situations less so. Indeed, 
as we shall see in sections 2.6 and 2.7 of this chapter, particular expressions of identity 
may be required in order to tap into the political networks through which social, political 
and economic resources necessary for marriage can be secured.  
In the present day many aspects of Sabon Zongo’s social and cultural life resemble 
that which would be found in Northern Nigeria. Its language, food, architecture, 
clothing, and relative deprivation serve to differentiate Sabon Zongo from the 
surrounding non-Muslim neighbourhoods, but it is the emphasis on a particular notion 
of Hausaness which calls upon on social and cultural affinities with Hausaland that 
distinguishes it from Accra’s other Zongos. This social and cultural landscape is 
perhaps the legacy of its founders’ roots in Hausaland. That the conflicts and 
cleavages which occurred in Accra’s central Zongos at the end of the 19th Century 
developed along ethnic lines, implies a sharpening of a sharpening of ethnic identities. 
This may explain why a distinctive notion of Hausa identity more closely tethered to 
affinities with Hausaland seems to have (re)emerged in Sabon Zongo. 
Despite the seemingly limitless possibilities presented by the context of urban Accra 
in modernity, Hausaland is a time and place with which many of Zongo’s inhabitants 
identify. Most of Sabon Zongo’s residents have never set foot in in Hausaland and yet 
ideas about what it means to be Hausa were important social and cultural reference 
points for many of my informants, not least the many young men for whom a notion of 
Hausaness is prominent in their expressions of identity. At first glance this would seem 
to run counter to the idea of modernity as presenting limitless possibilities for identity 
formation. However, consistent with the notion of ‘deterritorialisation’ (Appadurai 1988 
see Chapter 1), it might be argued that there has been a sharpening of a Hausa ethnic 
                                                          
defined as those whose mothers had not been born in Ghana (Peil 1971, 1974, Henckaerts 1995, Apter 2015). 
Though this did not necessarily mean automatic expulsion of all those who identified as Hausa, surrounding the 
act was a pervasive discourse of Hausas as non-Ghanaian, such that they bore the brunt of popular anger, forced 
evictions and appropriation of property (Peil 1974). During my own time in Accra I often encountered people 
who had extremely negative views of Hausa. Indeed, young men in Zongo would claim that when going for a job 
it was normally best to identify as anything but Hausa as many employers considered the Hausa to be dishonest, 
lazy and unreliable. 
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identity and entrenching of particular social practices, as ‘local’ political exigencies play 
out in a social and cultural field no longer limited by spatial proximity. Sabon Zongo is 
an ‘enclave’ in the sense that it is socially and culturally distinctive from other parts of 
Accra, including other Zongos, but it’s cultural topography is characteristically ‘modern’ 
in the ways that its inhabitants’ have forged affinities, real and imagined, with a 
geographically distant Hausaland. 
One of the most enjoyable aspects of undertaking fieldwork in Zongo is the 
extraordinarily rich culinary culture. Ghanaian staples such as kenkey (steamed 
maize) and fufu (pounded yam) are readily available and popular, but amongst the 
most popular cuisine are those dishes which resemble those found in Northern 
Nigeria. Crucially, the notion of particular foods as being Hausa is important to people 
in Zongo. As with the consumption of any material good, food is one means through 
which social relationships are created and sustained, identities expressed, groups 
defined and terms of membership established. The quote from Alhaji Musa above 
resonates with Pellow’s contention that the consumption and definition of certain foods 
as Hausa is one means through which people in Sabon Zongo forge affinities with 
Hausaland and make them concrete in the practice of everyday life (Pellow 2007). 
Where kenkey is described as Ga food, and fufu as Asante food, by contrast tuwo 
dawa miyan kuka (balls of pounded and steamed guinea corn with baobab leaf soup), 
kosai and koko (millet porridge with fried maize balls) and other Hausa staples are 
described as “our food”. In fact, Zongo is one of the only places in Accra where many 
of these notionally Hausa foods are readily available. 
 
Photographs 14. ‘Masara’ balls of maize typically consumed with stew. 
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Photograph 15. Preparation of stew. 
The Hausa influence is also felt in formal political structures. As we shall below, 
Zongo’s Chieftaincy has been modelled on the Hausa Emirates of Northern Nigeria. 
Formal political titles, such as Madawaki, Yeroma and Sarkin Fada correspond to 
those that would be found in the Hausa Emirates of Nigeria (see table 2 below). 
Furthermore, the Sallah Remix owes much to the Northern Nigerian Durbar, where an 
Emir’s officials also parade on horseback and make declarations of allegiance (see 
Apter 1999, 2002; and Griswold and Bhadmus 2013). 
As this thesis progresses we will see how many aspects of social life in Zongo are 
reminiscent of Hausaland. Pellow argues that it is the entanglement of ‘Hausaness’ 
with Islam which gives Zongo its particular character or ethos, for which she coins the 
term “Zongwanci” (2002 p12). The implication here is that in seeking to make sense 
of social life in Zongo, insights might be gained from the broader Hausa Studies 
literature. 
Of course, it is not only Hausa influences which shape Sabon Zongo’s cultural 
landscape. The presence of kenkey, kente, hip-life, hip-hop and Hollywood clearly 
suggest otherwise. Furthermore, many social practices, norms and institutions appear 
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to be major departures from those that would be found in Hausaland, but they are 
framed by Sabon Zongo’s inhabitants as Hausa nevertheless. Zongwanci can be seen 
as the glue that binds Zongo’s inhabitants together and makes the idea of Sabon 
Zongo as a Hausa ‘community’ meaningful to those who live there (Pellow 2002). As 
touched upon earlier, Nigerian Hausa had exerted considerable influence in the 
political life of Accra’s central Zongos. During the late 19th and early 20th Centuries this 
influence was challenged as men competed for positions of political power. It was at 
least in part as response to these cleavages that Mallam Bako and his followers sought 
to establish a specifically Hausa ‘community’ (Pellow 2002). It is perhaps not 
surprising, then, that much like its architecture, formal political hierarchies in Zongo 
are reminiscent of those that would be found in Northern Nigeria. However, as will be 
see in the following section, this ethos does not only bind but also stratifies.  
2.7 The High Table at Sallah Remix 
 
Photograph 16. The High Table. From left to right: Sheikh Dr Osmanu Nuhu Sharubutu, The 
National Chief Imam; George Nii Adama Tackie, The Ga Mantse; Sarki Yahaya Hamisu 
Bako, Chief of Sabon Zongo; Hajj Shuibu, Deputy Chief Imam. 
 
The annual Durbar or ‘Sallah Remix’ is held in Zongo a few weeks after Eid-al-fitr. At 
one time the celebration had been held on the day of Eid itself. More recently 
competition between Accra’s various Zongos, as to who could hold the most 
spectacular celebration, has led to the Durbar seldom coinciding with Eid. Instead, 
each Zongo agrees to hold its Durbar on successive weekends. The Durbar takes 
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place in addition to the more modest celebrations of Eid-el-Fitr. The celebrations begin 
with a parade which snakes its way from the Accra Central Mosque just inside Accra’s 
Ring Road and along Oblogo Road. Oblogo Road demarcates the boundary between 
Abossey Okai to the North and Sabon Zongo to the South. It then turns left into Sabon 
Zongo onto Harmattan Avenue or ‘Mallam Bako’s Street’, one of the few paved roads 
within Sabon Zongo. As it works its way along the road, it passes Zongo’s tallest 
building, the Abokin Ango Mosque, through Gangare, ‘the Down’, and Unguwa 
Zabrama, until it arrives at Night Market square in the heart of Kan Tudu or ‘Hill Top’. 
At the core of the procession are Zongo’s sub-chiefs and their supporters: The 
Omonhene, Asante Chief; Igbe Papa, Ewe Chief; Sarkin Fawa, Chief Butcher; Sarki 
Wanzam, Chief Barber; Sarki Makafi, the Chief of the blind –  to name but a few of 
Zongo’s many sub-Chiefs. 
Several flatbed trucks and pick-ups with sound systems accompany the procession 
blaring out a clashing combination of Azonto, techno, prayer music and the clatter and 
boom of Zongo’s maroki – praise singers – and Asante drummers. Women cluster 
around the sound systems dancing, ululating and twirling handkerchiefs. Groups of 
women dance together wearing matching cloth, indicating that they are friends in ‘biki’. 
Men’s friendship groups, ‘bases’ and associations like Mahama Fun Club and Asafo 
have printed matching t-shirts and parade down the street together. Most young men 
simply wear their best clothes: either jeans and t-shirts or more traditional Hausa wear. 
Many have had babariga tailored especially for the occasion. Amongst the most 
impressively dressed are the young men who ride horses. Their clothes emulate those 
that might be seen at Durbar in Hausaland: large flowing babariga and heads wrapped 
in turbans. Others have opted for a more unusual style. One man is wearing a cowboy 
hat and neckerchief with what appears to be the protective armour an ice hockey 
player wears. Another man wears a batman costume complete with cape, but with a 
maroon fez instead of face mask. There are at least thirty horses in the procession. 
Few of the riders seem to have much experience with a horse, and struggle to keep 
control of them. As the horses plough through the crowds, people rush into kiosks and 
fall into gutters as they seek to avoid being trampled. The swarms of people follow the 
parade until it arrives at the night market. 
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Photograph 17. The Omonhene Zongo stands atop his palanquin as he is carried through 
Zongo for Sallah Remix. 
At the night market a stage and canopy have been erected upon which various 
dignitaries sit in front of an open parade area. On either side hundreds of people are 
seated on plastic chairs, sheltered from the sun by ragged canopies. One side is 
designated for women and the other for men so as to prevent excessive ‘mingling’ in 
the intoxicating festival atmosphere. Facing towards the stage, it resembles something 
of a tiered football stand. On the main stage or ‘high table’48 sit various dignitaries from 
across Accra. In the middle of the front row, sitting in a cloth draped armchair is the 
National Chief Imam, the event’s most prestigious guest. Sat to the right of the Imam 
is the Ga Mantse, within whose dominion Sabon Zongo falls. Next to the Mantse is 
Sarki Yahaya Bako, the Chief of Zongo. I barely recognise him – his head wrapped in 
a turban and his eyes are concealed behind dark aviator style sunglasses. To the left 
hand side of the stage is Alhaji Sule Bako, nicknamed ‘Power’. Power is the eldest son 
of the former chief, the current chief’s nephew, and erstwhile rival for the Chieftaincy. 
Alongside them sit the Hausa Chief of Accra, the Dagomba Chief and the Chief of 
Nima Zongo, and several of Accra’s other Muslim Headmen. Seated in front of the 
stage are Zongo’s ‘manyan Gari’, elders from prominent households who make up the 
Zongo ‘Fadawa’ or council. All of them are dressed in traditional Hausa clothing. The 
                                                          
48  An actual table does not feature on the stage. 
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Dogari’s babariga, divided into bright red and green quarters much like those I had 
seen worn by The Emir of Kano’s Dogari, is particularly distinctive. Those seated on 
and in front of the stage are arguably the most powerful and respected people in 
Zongo. In front of the stage a group of youths with sticks zealously beat children and 
younger boys in an effort clear space for the arrival of Zongo’s sub-Chiefs. One-by-
one each of the sub-Chiefs approaches the stage, bows to one knee and raises a 
clenched fist and thumb, then pronounces “ranka dede” – may your life be long – 
before peeling off to take a seat on either side of the stage. Once the sub-Chiefs have 
paid their respects, men who have recently completed hajj approach the stage and 
bow. I ask my research assistant Hamisu why the well-dressed men on horses have 
not presented themselves to the Chief. He tells me that though they look “big”, they 
are “nobody”, from “nowhere”. In many people’s view, it is those seated on or around 
the stage that are the most influential and respected people in Zongo. 
Though its form has varied, and its influence waxed and waned, Chieftaincy has been 
an important part of Hausa political culture since at least the 15th Century if not longer 
(Last 1967, Smith 1978 1997, Miles 1987, Iliffe 2005, Umar 2013)49. An important 
feature of this political culture has been a distinction between ‘talakawa’ – commoners 
– and ‘masu sarauta’ – noblemen – which informs the prestige and status of individual 
men (Smith 1959, Hill 1972, Miles 1987, Arnould 1989, Coles and Mack 1991, Gaudio 
2011)50. 
In 2011, I undertook a small research project in Kano State, Nigeria. When it comes 
to research permissions, people are somewhat relaxed with regards the Nigerian 
Federal Government. However, the same cannot be said of attitudes towards the Kano 
Emirate. Before any research could take place it was necessary to secure permission 
from the Emir of Kano. This was achieved by way of a visit to the Emir’s Secretariat, 
submitting a written application, specifying the nature of the research and listing the 
specific villages where it would be undertaken. The Secretariat is a large busy 
compound in central Kano. Various sub-Chiefs, ward heads and functionaries mill 
about amongst the Emir’s Dogarai or security guards. I sat in a small waiting room 
                                                          
49  Chieftaincy is a recurrent reference in historical texts, but the specifics of its structure 
and significance are clearly difficult to ascertain. 
50  The talakawa/sarauta distinction may for a number of reasons not always be as salient 
in rural contexts as is in towns and cities (Manvell 2005). 
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before being granted an audience with the Emir’s Secretary, to whom I submitted my 
application. Once my application had been accepted, I was given a letter signed by 
the Emir’s Secretary on the Emir’s behalf, stating that I had formal permission to carry 
out my research. When I arrived in each village I would go to the house of the local 
Chief or ward head, present my letter and a ‘gift’. Invariably the Chief had anticipated 
my arrival, having already been advised by one of the Emir’s messengers the day 
before. The process is marked by expressions of deference. Social encounters with 
holders of office involve bowing, ‘gifting’ and praising of the office holder and their 
Emir. In Kano, as might be expected in a realm spanning more than 20,000 sq. km 
and with a population in excess of ten million (ADB  2014), such office holders are 
numerous. 
Sabon Zongo neither falls within nor answers to the Hausa Emirates. In terms of the 
wider political order of the Ghanaian State and local Ga Mantsemei, the Zongo 
Chieftaincy is much less important than its equivalents have been in Northern Nigeria. 
Nevertheless, many elements of Hausa political culture are replicated in Zongo’s 
Chieftaincy, albeit on a much smaller scale (Pellow 2002). When seeking to undertake 
research in Zongo, the procedures one needs to follow are not entirely dissimilar to 
those I had encountered in Nigeria. There are far fewer intermediaries involved, and it 
is reasonably straightforward to gain an audience with the Chief in person, but gifts 
must still be given and bows performed in much the same way as in Kano. The first 
port of call for any visitor to Zongo is the Chief’s house, the gate to which is always 
attended by one of his older sons, who act as the Chief’s personal assistants or 
stewards. They greet visitors, hear their concerns, schedule meetings with the Chief if 
required, or else direct them towards another official to deal with the matter. At least 
once a week, the Chief and a number of his officials and followers walk from his house 
in Ayigbetown, through Sabon Zongo to the ‘Chief’s Palace'51 in Kan Tudu, where he 
meets with the ‘Fadawa’ or council. The Fadawa is comprised of ‘manyan gari’, or 
town elders – the senior men from Zongo’s most prominent households – many of 
whom hold formal titles akin to those typically found in the Hausaland. It is these men 
who sit at the High Table at Sallah Remix. 
                                                          
51  The last two Sarkin Zongo have not resided in the Chief’s Palace. 
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Mallam Bako had been appointed custodian by the Ga Mantse and served as Sabon 
Zongo’s de facto headman. However, it wasn’t until his eldest son Idrissu Bako 
succeeded him in 1933 that Accra’s other Muslim headmen and the British colonial 
administration formally recognised the position of Sarkin Sabon Zongo and the 
structure of the present day Chieftaincy was established (Pellow 2002). Idrissu 
assembled a Fadawa comprised of Zongo’s manyan gari – the senior men from 
Zongo’s most prominent households – and awarded many of them titles derived from 
those that would be found in Hausaland. Idrissu allocated the titles typically held and 
inherited by an Emir’s kinsmen (see Smith 1960) to men within the Bako lineage who 
had settled at Sabon Zongo. 
Table 1. Sabon Zongo Chiefs 
Mallam Mohammad Bako 1893-1933 
Mallam Idrissu Bako 1933-1969 
Mallam Lebo Bako 1969 – 1981 
Mallam Sha’aibu Bako 1981 - 2001 
Mallam Yahaya Bako 2001 - Present 
 
With the exception of Lebo Bako, the position of Sarkin Zongo has followed a 
patrilineal line, inherited by the eldest willing52 male within the Bako line. Other 
subordinate positions are allocated between the Chief's brothers, adult sons and 
nephews, and are also kept within the Bako lineage. If the holder of a subordinate 
position dies, the title is allocated to another Bako man by whichever Bako reigns as 
Chief at the time. The positions of Galadima and Yeroma serve to illustrate this 
process53. Under Idrissu, his half-brother Hamisu performed the role of Galadima and 
his nephew Sha’aibu (son of Idrissu’s full brother Lawal) served as Yeroma. When 
Idrissu died in 1969, he was succeeded by Lebo the eldest grandson of Mallam Bako, 
                                                          
52  There have been a number of occasions when the eldest Bako male has declined the 
Chieftaincy. For example, when Chief Idrissu died in 1969, Hamisu Bako was the eldest Bako 
male but declined the Chieftaincy saying he was too old (Pellow 2002). Inussa Bako also 
declined the Chieftaincy in 2001 when Chief Sha’aibu died. 
53  See Pellow (2002) for further examples. 
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son of his brother Lawal and Sha’aibu’s elder brother54. Under Chief Lebo, Sha’aibu 
remained Yeroma, but Hamisu stood down as Galadima. Lebo appointed his cousin, 
Inussa, Hamisu’s eldest son, Galadima. Inussa has remained in this position under 
three chiefs; Lebo, Sha’aibu and now Yahaya. After Lebo’s death in 1981, his younger 
brother Sha’aibu became Chief and so vacated the position of Yeroma. Chief Sha’aibu 
appointed his cousin Yahaya, (his uncle Hamisu’s son and Inussa’s brother) Yeroma. 
When Sha’aibu died in 2001, Yahaya became Chief and his brother Abdulahi became 
Yeroma55. 
Idrissu Bako also gave positions to prominent men from Zongo’s founding lineages, 
and it is generally accepted that there should always be non-Bako’s on the Fadawa. 
Though Idrissu did not formally define rights of succession for these positions, many 
of them remain within specific lineages and have been passed-on according to the 
same principles of patrilineal succession as those held within the Bako lineage. These 
principles are often etched into space through place names. For example, the position 
of Sarkin Fada, first held by Ali Musa Kariki’s son Musa, is currently held by his 
grandson Abdulahi Kariki. Abdulahi lives in the compound built by Ali Musa Kariki, 
which has been known as Gidan Sarkin Fada since Musa first took up the position. 
Similarly, Gidan Waziri refers to the house of Alhaji Badamase whose lineage has held 
the position of Waziri for successive generations56. 
In Hausaland, titles have been associated with specific duties or functions (Smith 
1952, 1997) as is reflected in Table 2, below. In Zongo, various titles are allocated to 
the manyan gari of the Fadawa, but it is seldom the case that specific duties are 
attached to them, with most titleholders performing broadly similar functions. They 
accompany the Chief to important events in Accra, such as meetings of the Council of 
Zongo Chiefs, engagements with Government officials, ceremonial occasions such as 
major Islamic festivals, the appointment of Chiefs or dignitaries, as well as weddings 
and funerals. Within Zongo, they will accompany the Chief to the many wedding days, 
naming ceremonies and funerals which take place there, or they will represent him in 
                                                          
54  Most of Idrissu’s brothers had died and those that were alive declined the Chieftaincy 
on the basis that they were too old (Pellow 2002). 
55  According to Sarki Yahaya, he could have chosen any Bako man as Yeroma, but he 
decided to appoint his younger brother Abdulahi to the position. He felt that the tradition started 
by Lebo was a good one as his brother might one day succeed him and would benefit from 
the experience of holding the position. 
56  See Pellow (2002). 
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his absence. They will arbitrate in disputes and decide upon sanctions when required. 
They will also regularly attend council to discuss affairs in Zongo and facilitate action 
if necessary. They are the Chief’s closest, most influential and important advisers, and 
they act as his intermediaries, and speak and act on his behalf. For example, the Chief 
is invited to most weddings in Zongo. Although he accepts many invitations, he attends 
very few weddings in person; instead an elder of the fadawa or other sub-chief will 
represent him. As is customary at a wedding, the names of notable guests are read 
out at the commencement of the ceremony. Whether or not the Chief himself is 
physically in attendance, his name will be announced alongside that of his 
representative, who speaks and acts in his stead. 
Subordinate to the Fadawa are Zongo’s many sub-Chiefs. Again, Hausaland provides 
the model, with sub-chiefs as the formal representatives of and principle authority 
within particular social groups. There are recognised chiefs for specific occupations, 
such as butchers, barber surgeons, tailors and scrap metal collectors; as well as for 
ethnic identities such as the Dagomba, Frafra, Zabarma and Akan, and for other types 
of social group considered to share a collective identity and interests, such as the 
blind, the lame, and the young. Some of these groups replicate the structure of the 
Hausa fadawa. For example, alongside a Chief, the Dagomba, butchers and blind all 
have a Waziri, Galadima and Madawaki. Some groups deviate from this structure or 
have no formal office below the level of Chief. For example, Zongo’s Akan Chief is 
referred to by the title Omonhene Zongo, the traditional title given to an Akan 
Paramount Chief, rather than Sarkin Akan. Omonhene Zongo is the only formal office 
specifically concerned with Akan people in Zongo. In a similar vein, the Sarkin 
Wanzam is the only formal office pertaining to barbers. Whilst a Sub-Chief’s rights and 
responsibilities may be formally defined, who exactly falls within his constituency and 
when is often less certain. This is partly a result of the inherently malleable nature of 
collective identities. As described earlier, individuals occupy multiple overlapping 
identities. A person may be variously identified as a Muslim, Hausa, Dagomba, 
butcher, scrap metal collector and youth; the particular identity given emphasis at any 
one time is contingent upon the social situation and the relationships at play, when the 
boundaries between collective and individual identities are often blurred. As a result, 
a sub-chief’s constituency may be more ambiguous than the rigidities of its formal 
definition imply. 
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Table.2. Customary Hausa Office Holders. 
Title Meaning/‘Function’ 
Alkali Judge. Advises Chief on Islamic Law. 
Sarkin Fada Major-domo and Head of the Chief’s Council. 
Madawaki In charge of horses. 
Salama Greets the Chief’s visitors. Schedules audiences with 
the Chief. 
Majidade Expresses ‘Chief’s happiness’. 
Ubandoma Announces arrival of Chief. 
Galadima Senior Councillor. 
Yarima Official under the chief. 
Waziri Deputy (Vizier). 
Maaji Treasurer. 
Dogari Bodyguard/Head of security.  
Adapted from Bargery (2002), Smith (1978, 1997) Pellow (2002)57. 
The kinds of issues each sub-Chief will deal with varies, but they do have some 
common responsibilities. Much like the men of the fadawa, sub-Chiefs mediate 
disputes, witness weddings, attend funerals and so on. These encounters are framed 
by norms of reciprocity. A commoner seeking an audience with the Chief or one of his 
dignitaries will be expected to provide a gift, perhaps money, meat or fruit. A gift is 
given to a dignitary when he attends an event organised by his political inferiors. 
Similarly, it is standard practice for visitors to Zongo to give the Chief a bag of rice58. 
Though it is hard to know the specific sums involved, it would seem that they vary 
depending on the rank of the official, prestige of the occasion and the giver’s means. 
In addition, Sub-Chiefs are responsible for collecting contributions towards the upkeep 
                                                          
57  The meanings and functions of these terms are subject to considerable historical and 
geographical variation. It is thus perhaps inevitable that the interpretations and translations 
offered by different sources do not always agree. Even when they do, the extent of 
equivalence is uncertain. For instance, the title madawaki is derived from Mai Doki; mai 
meaning master and doki meaning horse (Bargery n.d). The title madawaki has endured, but 
his responsibility for leading an Emirs’ cavalry into war (see Smith 1960, Hogendorn 1980, 
Last 1980, Davidson 2014) perhaps less so. Nevertheless, Madawaki has endured as an 
important title in Hausa political culture. 
58  I became aware of this custom only by observing the arrival of other visitors to Zongo. 
When I first met the Chief I gave him 50 Cedis, and a football jersey to each of his sons. 
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and ceremonial expenses of the Chieftaincy from their constituents. For example, 
when a member of the Chief’s household marries, contributions towards expenses will 
be provided by his sub-Chiefs, who in turn raises the funds from their constituents. A 
sub-Chief’s responsibility for collecting contributions from his constituents is 
accompanied by a corresponding entitlement to retain a portion of any such income 
for himself.  
The flow of goods is not always upwards in these hierarchies. A sub-chief is expected 
to contribute towards the ceremonial expenses of his constituents, such as funeral 
costs and wedding expenses, and to assist them in times of need. For example, when 
a blind man arrives in Zongo, the Sarkin Makafi organises his lodging. Similarly, when 
one of my informants, a butcher who had recently migrated from Katsina, fell ill and 
was unable to work, the Sarkin Fawa provided the money to pay for medicine. Though 
forms of assistance vary, it is primarily political services that elite men provide for their 
juniors. The Chief, Manyan Gari of the fadawa and sub-Chiefs are expected to 
represent the interests of their constituents and provide access to political resources 
and services. Take for example the case of Gibril. 
Gibril works as a tailor from a small kiosk some five minutes’ walk from his home. In 
Zongo, as in many Muslim societies, people often buy new clothes to celebrate Eid-
el-Fitr. At the start of Ramadan, Gibril had decided to upgrade to an electrical sewing 
machine, so as to make the most of the increased demand for clothing. However, 
Gibril’s kiosk lacked an electricity supply. He had asked the kiosk owner, who lived in 
the adjacent compound, whether he might connect to his electricity and pay him 
something in return. The kiosk owner declined, and so Gibril decided to carry out his 
tailoring at home. As many people do during Ramadan, Gibril worked at night when 
he wasn’t fasting and was therefore least fatigued. However, Gibril’s Christian Ewe 
neighbours complained that they were unable to sleep because of the noise. They 
took their complaint to one of Zongo’s Manyan Gari, who was also their compound 
Mai Gida or landlord. Gibril was summoned to the Mai Gida’s house such that they 
could find a solution. The Mai Gida advised Gibril’s neighbour that he and his family 
lived in a Muslim neighbourhood and so ought to respect their customs. Nevertheless, 
he recognised that Gibril’s neighbours needed their sleep if they were to be able to 
work during the day and that the problem could be solved if Gibril’s kiosk could be 
connected to an electricity supply. Using his authority as Manyan Gari, he sent for the 
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kiosk owner who had declined Gibril an electricity connection. The kiosk owner 
explained that he had refused Gibril a connection as he doubted his ability to pay59. 
The Mai Gida resolved that the kiosk owner should allow Gibril to connect to his 
electricity and that he would act as his guarantor. To avoid any disputes over 
payments, the Mai Gida would act as a witness. Gibril was told to bring the money to 
the Mai Gida every month for the kiosk’s owner to come and collect it. Gibril agreed to 
pay the kiosk owner five Cedis (GHS) per month, plus “something extra” for the Mai 
Gida. As a further expression of thanks, Gibril agreed to sew several designs for the 
Mai Gida without charge. 
As is apparent in the above, reciprocal exchange is at the core of the relationships 
between office holders and their constituents. Just as goods may flow between junior 
and senior men in either direction, so does political support. In return for representing 
his constituents’ interests and fulfilling his responsibilities to them, a Chief or other 
dignitary can expect his formal status to be recognised through public expressions of 
deference. As we shall see below, housing has been a particularly important currency 
in these exchanges. 
2.8 ‘Landlords and Lodgers’ 
Kinship amongst the Hausa is acknowledged as bilateral. Affective ties with maternal 
kin are valued and encouraged and may have considerable social, economic and 
political significance (Smith 1952, 1957, Manvell 2005). However, in terms of 
household composition and lineage affiliation it is patrilineal descent and virilocality 
which have the greatest emphasis. Married women reside in the accommodation 
provided them by their husbands. Divorced women and those who are yet to marry 
reside in the paternal home. As we shall see in Chapter Five, a husband is obliged to 
provide his wife with a room. When a man marries for the first time, his senior lineage 
men are expected to contribute land, money and other materials needed to establish 
a marital home whether or not the bride has property of her own. The key point here 
is that a Hausa man intending to enlarge his household must first increase his housing 
space so as to accommodate wives and children (Smith 1952, Hill 1972, 
Schwerdtfeger 1982, Arnould 1984, Cooper 1997). In many West African cities 
                                                          
59  Many electricity connections are illegal, but sometimes a person may get a legal 
metered connection and allow others to connect for a fee. 
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population growth, land scarcity and limited rights to land have made it difficult for 
Muslim Hausa populations to realise this requirement60. Crucially, in contexts where 
housing is scarce or difficult to access, people have often been able to convert control 
over housing into political influence61. It is this idea that frames Pellow’s (2002) 
historical analysis of social-spatial relations in Zongo and is alluded to in the title of her 
book, Landlords and Lodgers.  
During the colonial period, though Muslim Hausa had long been present in Accra, 
much of Accra and the lands that surround it fell under the authority of the non-Muslim 
Ga Mantse or chiefs. As ‘Strangers’, Accra’s Muslims lacked the land rights necessary 
to expand their living space beyond Accra’s congested central Zongos. The Mantse 
seldom sold land62, but were sometimes willing to grant custodianship to non-Ga (Peil 
1971, 1974, Pellow 1985, 2002). Custodianship meant being accountable to the Ga 
Mantse63, but also came with the right to retain or distribute usufructory rights to others 
(Pellow 2002, Grant 2006, Gillespie 2016). Following an outbreak of plague in central 
Accra in 1907, the British were eager to instigate a plan for urban renewal which 
involved demolition of housing in Accra’s central Zongos. Under the influence of the 
British, the Ga Mantse began to award custodial land rights to prominent men from 
Accra’s established Zongos. Mallam Bako seized upon this as an opportunity to secure 
custodianship of the land upon which Sabon Zongo could be established (Pellow 1985, 
                                                          
60  Similar scenarios have been described by Cohen (1969) in Ibadan, Hill (1966) and 
later Schildkrout (1978) in Kumasi. 
61  For example, Peil (1974) describes how with the enactment of the 1969 Aliens 
Compliance Order, the widely held perception that Muslims were ‘non-indigenous’ to Accra 
meant that they were particularly vulnerable to the threat of appropriations or demolition of 
housing and other property and even expulsion from the city. In order to secure their housing, 
they relied on the support of those who had influence within state institutions and whose land 
rights were more secure. More recently, Paller (2015) has examined informal political 
structures in Old Fadama, a settlement in Central Accra with a particularly contentious legal 
status, largely inhabited by first generation migrants from Northern Ghana. Paller elaborates 
how political power has accrued to those who have been able to make use of formal and 
informal political networks to secure housing for themselves and others (see also Grant 2006, 
Afenah 2009). 
62  According to the customary Ga tenure system, land was collectively owned by a 
community, not only of the living but also of deceased ancestors and yet to be born 
descendants. Land was inalienable from this community and merely administered by the 
Mantse on their behalf. The prevalence of this system has declined, but not altogether 
disappeared. As with other customary tenure systems in Ghana it has been incorporated into 
state legislation (Quarcoopome 1992, Parker 2000, Gillespie 2016) and is not infrequently 
appealed to in land disputes (see Kasanga et al 1996 for examples). 
63  For example, by preventing excessive noise making on festival days (Pellow 2002, 
Grant 2006). 
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2002). Mallam Bako began to allocate land to his friends, family and followers. Aside 
from his own sons, daughters and other kinsmen, amongst the first to arrive in Zongo 
were Ali Musa Kariki, a Hausa man from Kano; Abokin Ango, a friend of Mallam Bako’s 
who had lived at Zongo Lane; and Mallam Garuba’s two sons, Badamase and Salisu. 
There was also Haruna Bawa Allah, an herbalist from Sokoto; the barber surgeon 
Wansa Damaley, who arrived in Accra via Ashanti; and Dan Kambari and 
Mohammadu Al’Wali, who had been friends with Mallam Bako’s father Nenu.  
Accra’s population has continued to grow, and demand for housing now is as great if 
not greater than it has ever been. Control over land and access to housing remains an 
important source of political power (Engstrom et al 2013, Paller 2015). Given this 
relationship between land and power it is not surprising that it is the descendants of 
Zongo’s founding patriarchs who hold positions on the ‘Fadawa’ and are seated at the 
High Table, which might be taken to imply a stable political system. However, the pomp 
and ceremony of Sallah Remix belies a degree of fragility to this relationship in present 
day Zongo. 
Chieftaincy and custodianship always coincide in a single individual. Land, on the 
other hand, has a tendency to become fragmented. When Mallam Bako and his 
followers first settled Zongo, they derived influence from their ability to allocate land. 
The moment they made further allocations to other men, this influence began to 
become diluted.  
This has had implications for the Chieftaincy in that the influence associated with 
control over land is in tension with the transfer of formal authority within the structures 
of the Chieftaincy. Whilst rights to land may be partitioned and transferred in a variety 
of ways – such as through gifting, sale, rental or inheritance – Chieftaincy always 
follows a patrilineal line, transferred as it is to the eldest male within the Bako lineage. 
Control over land, and the wider social influence that is derived from that control, has 
to some extent dissipated away from the Chieftaincy. The same applies to the authority 
enjoyed by Zongo’s other landholding lineages. 
To some extent this potential has been mitigated by keeping land within lineage 
control. Landholders in Zongo have generally preferred to rent or loan land rather than 
sell or gift it to others so as to prevent it from becoming permanently alienated from 
lineage control. 
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Marriage has been important in Zongo as a mechanism of alliance; it has been, and 
continues to be, a means to shore up political loyalties by making and remaking the 
bonds forged between Zongo’s landholding lineages and to incorporate powerful, 
potentially competing lineages into centres of power (Pellow 2002). 
As Mallam Bako’s followers arrived in Zongo their families became interwoven through 
marriage. For the Hausa polygamy is both acceptable and desirable, and divorce is 
reasonably commonplace64. Mallam Bako alone married nine times, divorced twice 
and had thirty-seven children, so it is perhaps not surprising that the genealogical ties 
between Zongo’s founding lineages are incredibly complex – it is certainly not within 
the scope of this thesis to elaborate them anywhere near exhaustively. Furthermore, 
Pellow (2002) has outlined a number of these intermarriages in great detail. 
Nevertheless, it is worth examining a few examples to illustrate the point. 
The Bako-Garuba alliance was reinforced through inter-marriages between the two 
households and their followers as can be seen in figure 1 below. Mallam Garuba died 
shortly after being allocated land by Mallam Bako. The land allocated to Garuba was 
inherited by his sons, Salisu and Badamase. Salisu married Mallam Bako’s half-sister 
Hajiya Meri. Badamase married both Mallam Bako’s cousin Adama, and daughter, 
Mariam. Mallam Bako’s son Hamisu married Mallam Garuba’s grand-daughter 
Laraba. Ali Musa’s grandson, Abdullahi married Mallam Bako’s granddaughter, Antu. 
Abokin Ango’s son Musa married Badamase and Adama’s daughter Amina. Wansa 
Damaley married Abokin Ango’s daughter Abu. Dan Kambari married Badamase’s 
half-sister Nana and Mohammadu Al’Wali married Mallam Bako’s daughter Hajiya 
Marya (Pellow 2002). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
64  Though as we shall see in Chapter 6, polygyny and divorce both seem to be on the 
decline in Zongo. 
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Figure 1. Interconnections of the Founding Families. 
 
Adapted from Pellow 2002. p101. 
 
Figure 2. Selected Marriages within the Bako lineage. 
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The Hausa have long practiced ‘auren gida’ – intra-familial marriages between cousins 
(see Greenberg 1947, Smith 1952, Barkow 1972). Though less common amongst 
more recent generations65, this custom has been widely practiced in Zongo. For 
example, Chief Yahaya Bako is married to his uncle Idrissu’s youngest daughter, 
Rafiyagi. Yahaya’s sister, Rekiya was married to Sha’aibu Bako, his uncle Lawal’s 
son. Sha’aibu’s son Sulley is married to Hadiza, the daughter of his uncle Lebo66. 
Yahaya’s father Hamisu was married to Ayishetu, the daughter of Mallam Bako’s 
sister. 
Pellow (2002) argues that these marriages have been important to the consolidation 
of influence within Zongo’s founding lineages: first of all, by keeping land, and the 
influence derived from control over it, within specific lineages; and second, as a means 
to establish and reinforce political loyalties. 
Though marriage has clearly been important to relationships between Zongo’s 
founding lineages, they have not rendered the Bako Chieftaincy entirely immune to 
contest. As different men have managed to gain control over land, rivalries have 
developed and factions have formed in a manner akin to those that emerged in Central 
Accra at the turn of the 20th Century. When the Chieftaincy has been challenged, the 
Bako Chiefs have often looked to external institutions such as the Ga Mantse, colonial 
and postcolonial state to reinforce the legitimacy of their authority67. 
The most enduring rivalry has been between the Bako and Damaley lineages. It was 
Mallam Bako who had first allocated land to Wansa Damaley, but once allocated it 
was no longer under Bako control. Much like Mallam Bako, the Damaleys managed to 
convert land into influence. On several occasions, Damaley men have drawn on the 
political support of their many tenants to contest the Bako Chieftaincy, albeit 
unsuccessfully. 
For example, many people in Zongo supported Wansa Damaley’s grandson Adamu 
when he contested the Chieftaincy of Lebo Bako in the late 1970s. The Bakos and 
Damaleys both had land, but Adamu Damaley’s popularity in Zongo had been 
buttressed by the financial backing of Alhaji Maicancan, a wealthy Hausa man who 
                                                          
65  See Chapter Seven. 
66  Not Chief Lebo, but the son of Lawal, but Lebo son of Idrissu. 
67  Since the death of Chief Sha’aibu Bako the Damaley/Bako rivalry has been 
overshadowed by conflicts within the Bako Lineage, not least between Yahaya and Sulley. 
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was himself manoeuvring to become the Hausa Chief of Accra. Adamu expanded his 
network of followers beyond those that relied on the Damaleys for housing. As well as 
sponsoring weddings, funerals and other such ceremonial events, he funded and 
organised the construction of water pipes and gutters and the resurfacing of roads. 
According to one now elderly Damaley supporter, the Bakos had only ever looked after 
their own friends and kinsmen, but Adamu took care of everybody. “If you don’t have 
money then Alhaji Adamu he help you. Money for funeral, for hospital, he help you. 
Even if you are Bako supporter he help you. When Nigeria boys come Ghana 
everybody say go to Alhaji Adamu. He find you job. He find you house”. There was 
little that Lebo Bako could do to undermine Adamu Damaley’s popular support within 
Zongo. However, Chief Lebo had documentary evidence of Mallam Bako’s 
appointment as custodian, the ratification of the Chieftaincy and rights of succession 
under Idrissu, and most importantly the support of the Ga Mantse. Lebo took Damaley 
to court and won. 
In the context of differential land rights, control over land often serves as political 
currency. As access to housing is exchanged for political support, political capital 
accrues to those who control land. It is these political elites that Pellow is talking about 
when she uses the term landlords, and those who depend on them for housing which 
she refers to as lodgers. Pellow (2002) argues that the relationships which have 
emerged from these transactions have been fundamental to social organisation in 
Zongo. The landlord/lodger binary implies not only residential statuses but the wider 
political statuses which have emerged from different relationships to land. 
As has been described above, the formal authority of the Bako Chieftaincy can be 
seen to have emerged from a context of differential land rights, in which access to 
housing could be exchanged for political support. The limited land rights enjoyed by 
Accra’s Muslim Hausa meant that Mallam Bako was able to exploit his position as 
custodian to recruit followers by allocating land to men seeking space to establish or 
expand their households. These men were able to attract their own followers by virtue 
of their ability to make further allocations of land to other men (Pellow ibid). Although 
it is still Bako men who dominate as landlords, land has become fragmented. Men 
from other lineages have gained access to land and joined the ranks of Zongo’s 
landlords. Much like Mallam Bako, these men have been able to convert control over 
land into influence, on a number of occasions challenging the formal authority of the 
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Bako Chieftaincy. These challenges have to some extent been mitigated by marriage, 
as a means to forge political alliances and absorb potential competitors. External 
institutions have also been important, in particular the support of the Ga Mantse who 
had originally appointed Mallam Bako as custodian of Sabon Zongo. Though the Bako 
Chieftaincy draws legitimacy from this formal recognition, custodianship no longer 
implies monopoly control over land. 
These relationships are embodied in the Bako Chieftaincy. Chief Yahaya and his Bako 
kinsmen might be seen as representing the apex of a hierarchy of exchange relations 
cascading down from the High Table to the Fadawa, through the sub-Chieftaincies 
and into the crowds of followers below. This hierarchical ordering receives further 
legitimacy within a wider social and political order: the support of external institutions 
represented by figures such as the Chief Imam, the Ga Mantse, and the various 
Headmen from Accra’s other Muslim Zongos, amongst others. 
 
2.9 Departures 
Pellow’s argument that the landlord/lodger distinction is fundamental to social 
organisation in Zongo is convincing. Many of Pellow’s findings remain consistent with 
my own more recent observations; or at the very least during my own stay in Zongo I 
encountered very little to dissuade me from agreeing with her conclusions. However, 
though many forms of social difference and sameness can be seen to converge upon 
the landlord/lodger distinction, we cannot assume that every aspect of social life in 
Zongo can ultimately be reduced to it. This is where my objectives differ from Pellow’s. 
Pellow describes how social-spatial relationships and the identities forged in them 
cohere in the notion of Zongwanci. I seek to elaborate the relationships that cohere in 
notions of manhood. 
The landlord/lodger distinction is clearly important to social organisation in Zongo in 
that it describes how a particular set of hierarchies have emerged from the coupling of 
demand for housing with the difficulty of accessing it. However, it does not explain why 
this demand exists in the first place. I began section 2.7 of this chapter with the idea 
that a Hausa man must secure additional living space if he is to enlarge his household 
and that the demand for housing was at least in part driven by this requirement. What 
remains unexplained is why expanding a household seems to matter so much for men. 
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This alludes to the conundrum presented in Chapter One of this thesis as to what is at 
stake for men when they seek to constitute particular kinds of household relationships. 
Why is expanding a household desirable and how might this be seen to inform men’s 
desire to marry? Conversely, if demand for housing is driven by a desire to expand a 
household, why are landlords willing to forgo housing to recruit followers? Why are 
such exchanges so central to Zongo’s political economy? 
That successive generations of Zongo’s landholding lineages have forged alliances 
through marriage suggests that marriage contains within it some sort of ideological or 
normative apparatus that establishes, defines and regulates certain sorts of 
relationships that are of value to those who participate in it. This speaks to a number 
of important questions raised in Chapter One: What does this ideological content look 
like? How and why does marriage give it substance in actual social relationships? 
What do these relationships look like? In what ways might the hope of realising these 
relationships inform men’s desperation to marry? 
When construed as a binary relationship between lineage groups, the landlord/lodger 
distinction does not fully account for differentiation with such groupings. I briefly 
described how intergenerational transfers were important to men, particularly those 
with low or unreliable sources of income. I then touched upon some of the norms 
concerning transfers of property and housing in the context of marriage. Whether or 
not the bride has property of her own, her husband is expected to provide her with a 
room to live in. When a man marries for the first time, his senior lineage men are 
expected to help him fulfil this obligation. A number of important ideas emerge here 
which are not captured within the landlord/lodger binary.  
First of all, within the same lineage different individuals may be subject to distinct sets 
of normative obligations and entitlements concerning the transfer of housing and other 
kinds of property. This brings intra-household relationships to the fore. We have 
already seen how the authority of the Bako Chieftaincy has been underlined by control 
over housing. To what extent might similar relationships be at play within the individual 
household? This raises a number of questions about the structure and morphology of 
households and lineages and how, why and when resources are transferred within 
them. In Chapter Five I describe these relationships in detail. I ask, who is expected 
to provide what, to whom, and when? Who has access to and control over resources? 
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What kinds of power relations are invoked in their transfer? How can the answers to 
these questions be brought to bear on relations between men and the processes 
through which accepted and valued notions of masculinity are realised? To once again 
draw on the example of the Bako Chieftaincy, the relationship between formal 
hierarchies, resource control and the exercise of authority may not always be 
straightforward. In Chapters Seven and Eight I examine the complex processes 
through which intra-household resource transfers are negotiated and represented, and 
go on to investigate the larger question of whether and how normative authority 
translates into actual influence. What is actually going on when informants ‘talk’ of 
power, prestige and status? Can we assume that power and influence align with their 
representations? What might this mean for the idea that particular manhoods operate 
as positions of power and status, and of marriage as a rite of passage through which 
they are achieved? The following chapters of this thesis will address these concerns.  
However, before embarking upon this analysis, it is necessary to say something about 
how I was located in Zongo. 
 
2.10 Arrival 
“…man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun.” (Geertz 
2000 p5.) 
In 2012, as part of an MRes in Development Studies, I undertook fieldwork in rural 
Kano State, Nigeria. The objective of the study was to find out something about men’s 
health beliefs and behaviours. I carried out a series of interviews and focus groups, in 
which I asked people what kind of health problems were common in their villages, 
when they last felt unwell and what they did to feel better. I came back with the idea 
that when men talked about health in focus groups they were concerned with how their 
audiences evaluated their character. However, my ability to interpret these narratives 
was constrained by my limited understanding of the wider social context. This was not 
simply a question of needing more ‘contextual’ data, but a clearer understanding of 
the part I had played in these narratives. It is this idea that has prompted me to try and 
take a more ethnographic approach to this thesis. The aim of the following paragraphs 
is to give a brief outline of the decisions I have made en-route to producing this thesis 
and situate them in my relations with others in the field. 
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Shortly after I returned home from Northern Nigeria, Kano was engulfed in a wave of 
violence. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office issued an advisory against all travel 
to Kano and the feasibility of extended fieldwork became uncertain. Although, as 
described above, Northern Nigeria can be thought of as the social and cultural 
heartland of the Hausa, there are well-studied populations of people identifying as 
Hausa throughout West Africa (see for example Cohen 1969, Pellow 2002, 
Youngstedt 2004, Manvell 2005). Having read Pellow’s (2002) book, and following a 
conversation with my friend Adam Manvell, who had studied the migratory paths of 
Nigerien Hausa (Manvell 2005, 2006), Sabon Zongo seemed like a good alternative. 
Accra had for some time been ‘safe’ and ‘stable’ and my interest in Hausa studies 
would remain relevant. 
I had never been to Ghana, but a Ghanaian friend put me in touch with her brother in 
Accra, who offered to show me around the city once I got there. I arrived in Accra in 
March 2012. I met with my friend’s brother, himself a Hausa-speaker, who offered to 
take me to Zongo and help out if there were any language difficulties. We drove into 
Zongo, parked the car, and I asked the first person I saw where I could find the Chief. 
We were directed to the Chief’s house, where we were greeted by one his sons, who 
took my friend and I inside to meet the Chief. I explained to the Chief what it was I was 
hoping to do. He granted me permission to stay in Zongo and asked one of his sons 
to find me a room. 
The next day, one of his sons called to tell me that they had found me a flat on Oblogo 
Road and that I ought to come and have a look at it. The flat was on the second floor 
of a three story building. By the standards of most accommodation in Zongo, the room 
looked secure and comfortable. It had its own flush toilet, a ceiling fan and glass 
windows, which limited the noise from the busy road outside. As enticing as the flat 
may have been, it was socially and geographically peripheral. I asked whether they 
might be able to find somewhere more centrally located and more akin to the 
accommodation occupied by other people in Zongo. One of the Chief’s sons said he 
knew of a room in Kan Tudu, but advised that as a westerner accustomed to more 
comfortable accommodation, I might find it difficult to live there. He showed me to a 
room in one of Zongo’s oldest compounds and I decided to stay. The Chief’s sons 
arranged an electricity supply, and found a carpenter to repair the roof and fit a 
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lockable door. I had access to a tap from which to fetch water to wash with, but 
otherwise made use of the same amenities as most people in Zongo. 
I spent about twelve months living in Zongo and just over a total of fifteen months 
undertaking fieldwork there. Throughout my time in Zongo, I was well looked after and 
certainly never felt in any danger, but the Chief’s son was right. I did find it difficult 
living in Zongo. I often felt suffocated by people and noise, and was generally hot, tired 
and uncomfortable. For the sake of my nerves, I made two trips back to the UK to take 
a break and mull over my experience. For the final three months of fieldwork, I decided 
to find lodging elsewhere. An American expat offered me a comfortable room in his 
home in western Accra. During this time, I made daily trips into Zongo, only 
occasionally spending the night. 
 
2.11 Getting to Know People 
My fieldwork was principally ethnographic, by which I mean the data I have drawn 
upon in my analysis are derived from spending time in Zongo, interacting with people 
and observing what they got up to (Wagner 1981, James 1999, Geertz 2000, West 
2008). I also undertook a series of semi-structured interviews and focus groups. Most 
of these took place in the early stages of fieldwork and were an important means by 
which I got to know people. 
When I first arrived in Zongo I was shown around by one of the Chief’s sons. As he 
was the only person I knew in Zongo, and because his English and Hausa were good, 
I asked whether he might be able to arrange some interviews for me and to assist as 
an interpreter. He agreed and set about organising interviews with his friends, family 
and other people he knew. These interviews served as formal introductions – an 
opportunity to introduce myself to people, explain what it was I was doing, get an idea 
of how my presence might be received in Zongo, and lay the ground for the ongoing 
relationships necessary for my research. 
As has already been discussed, Islam is an important part of everyday life in Zongo. 
When I first arrived in Zongo, I made a point of visiting as many mosques as I could. I 
presented myself to the Mallams who oversaw them and asked whether I might be 
able to say a few words about myself and why I was in Zongo before their next sermon. 
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Standing before the congregation, I would hold up my notebook and explain why they 
might see me writing in it. I told people where I lived and gave out my number so they 
could find me if they wanted to. 
Though I got to know a lot of people through these relatively formal introductions made 
at the mosque, in focus groups and interviews, I also met people by just wandering 
around Zongo. People in Zongo are generally friendly to strangers, especially a clumsy 
white man who, is a cause for curiosity, if not adjudged a potential money-making 
opportunity – in Zongo, whiteness is often taken as indicative of access to 
wealth68.Men would approach me and ask after my business in Zongo. People would 
holler at me across the street, asking where I was going or would invite me to sit with 
them. They would introduce me to their friends and families, invite me to weddings, 
naming days and funerals. Over time I got to know more and more people in Zongo, 
such that wherever I found myself there was always somebody around I already knew 
or had at the very least met. Some people I got to know well enough that it was neither 
awkward nor unwelcome for me to accompany them as they went about their daily 
lives in Zongo. 
Zongo is far too populous for me to have met everybody, let alone to have got to know 
them well. However, it is important to highlight the fact that of those people I did get to 
know, the vast majority were men. As described above, there are a range of norms 
which impinge upon interactions between men and women. Women are firmly 
discouraged from spending unaccompanied or unobserved time with men other than 
their husbands. This was a major limitation on my fieldwork and in part explains the 
relative absence of women’s voices in my thesis. 
I did employ an unmarried Christian woman as research assistant. She was able to 
introduce me to other women and facilitate several interviews, but even so it was 
difficult to find women prepared to talk to me other than in public, where personal 
opinions were likely tempered by the public gaze. There were a number of women in 
Zongo who I got to know well enough to meet them in private, albeit discretely. Indeed, 
there were one or two women who became good friends, and who were amongst my 
most trusted informants. I am wary of talking about how I met these women or relating 
                                                          
68  I was often known simply as ‘Bature’. Though often used interchangeably to mean 
foreigner, the term carries with it connotations of wealth and prosperity. 
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what I learnt from them in specific detail. If anyone were to find out or even suspect 
who these women were, the consequences for them would likely be negative. Though 
what I learned from these women has informed my analysis, the fact remains that I 
know far too little to be able to say a great deal about how women feel about the issues 
raised in this thesis. 
Like the “Nuer’s cows, who were observed but also did not speak” (Ardener 2006 
p.50), the women in this thesis are muted in the sense that their voices are barely 
heard in a narrative which emphasises the perspectives of men. This limitation is 
important – regrettable, perhaps – and is even ethically questionable. I am under no 
illusion that my account can be taken as anything other than partial. However, 
ethnographic representations are by their very nature partial, contingent upon the 
positionality of those who produce them. The important thing is to account for these 
positions in making sense of the ethnographic encounter, or at the very least do one’s 
best to make them visible to others (Clifford 1986, Abu-Lughod 2000). Men’s 
perspectives are privileged in my account, in the sense that this thesis is about men’s 
perspectives. However, I do not grant them the authority of remaining ‘unmarked’, as 
the authors of universally applicable accounts of social experience in Zongo. Whilst 
this does not justify the absence of women’s voices, it does at least help lay the ground 
for a conversation. 
Though I have been as careful as possible about disclosing the identities of my female 
informants, I have also chosen to anonymise most of the men who feature in this 
account. Though I thank my research assistants in my acknowledgements, I have 
excluded or concealed their names in the body of the text, such that responsibility for 
errors or ill-judgements remains my own and they should not suffer the consequences. 
I have preserved names and other such details in the case of political figures 
performing public roles, such as the Chief at Sallah Remix or where information has 
been drawn from publicly available accounts. Otherwise I have changed names, and 
obscured or omitted discriminating details which may reveal or allude to identities. It 
is my view that I have not concealed anything that might be analytically important, but 
the fact remains that some of my informants wish to be disassociated from their 
specific accounts. There are other occasions when my observations and how I have 
written about them might be embarrassing or hazardous for those that feature in them 
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and so I have made an effort to conceal identities or insert one or two red herrings so 
as to throw a suspicious reader off the scent. 
 
2.12 Setting Up Base 
Throughout the course of my fieldwork, I undertook 118 interviews and 12 focus 
groups, of which the vast majority – 112 interviews and 8 focus groups – were with 
men. These figures should not be construed as the sum total of all people spoken with 
in, but merely those who I interacted with in the formal context of an interview or focus 
group. Interviews and focus groups were important as a means to meet people, but 
they also provided many valuable insights which have informed my analysis. 
Therefore, it is necessary to say something about how I approached these social 
encounters and have gone about interpreting the data produced in them. 
Though I conducted some interviews on my own, the majority were conducted with the 
help of research assistants, who would find respondents, organise interviews and 
assist as interpreters. Employing one of the Chief’s sons felt like a good way to 
reciprocate for the help that he had already offered, but it was also advantageous. As 
the Chief’s son, he was an important gatekeeper, enabling access to the elite men of 
the Chieftaincy and Zongo’s landholding lineages. However, there were also 
disadvantages in that I was principally meeting people from landholding households 
closely aligned with the Chieftaincy69. Furthermore, as a high ranking man close to the 
centre of formal political power, I thought it likely the presence of a Chief’s son would 
shape the responses of my informants in ways that might not be helpful. Consequently, 
it was necessary to employ other research assistants, who would enable access to 
different sections of the Zongo population. I talk about how I came to meet and employ 
these research assistants in greater detail below; for now, it is enough to say that all 
of the research assistants were residents in Zongo, who I had come to know in the 
course of fieldwork. They were selected on the basis of their proficiency in English and 
                                                          
69  One of Pellow’s (2002) key informants, Sulley Bako, the Chief’s nephew and one of 
Zongo’s most respected and influential men was a notable absence on the Chief’s son’s 
itinerary. Upon the death of Sha’aibu in 2001, both Yahaya and Sulley claimed the Chieftaincy. 
Though relations are no longer as hostile as they once were, interactions between the men 
tend to be limited to formal occasions such as the Sallah Remix and meetings of the Fadawa 
when a particularly important issue is at stake. 
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Hausa, their availability, and my perceptions of their need for the work. As well as 
taking notes, I recorded all of the formal focus groups and interviews on a digital 
recorder. 
My initial interviews and focus groups were semi-structured, focusing on health beliefs 
and behaviours. I would open by explaining what it was I was doing in Zongo and why 
I had asked to interview the respondent. Some of these interviews took the form of a 
life history; others were more specifically focused on health related concerns; most 
were a combination of the two. 
Initially I saw these interviews as uninteresting and their content superficial. This was 
neither surprising nor particularly disappointing. My technique left a lot to be desired, 
the atmosphere was often staid or awkward and interviewees seemed reluctant to talk 
in much detail. I accepted that these encounters were little more than introductions. 
The nitty gritty of my fieldwork would be through participating in and observing the 
everyday lives of people in Zongo. When I say everyday life, I mean to imply activities 
and interactions less explicitly or rigidly defined as data collection. 
I went to mosque, played football (badly), chatted at the public toilets, video centres, 
chop bars, barbershops and bases and just generally hung out with people in Zongo, 
watching what was going on, making notes and discussing my ideas and observations 
with others. In a context of pervasive underemployment, I was often received as a 
welcome distraction by men trying to keep boredom at bay. This identifies an inherent 
contradiction in my role as participant observer: as a distraction from boredom, I was 
by definition disrupting events. 
Within a few weeks of being in Zongo, I knew a lot of people. Indeed, so many people 
that it became overwhelming. I found myself pulled in different directions as different 
people wanted me to come and spend time with them. Whilst I welcomed this 
expanding network of informants, I needed to strike a balance between quality and 
quantity. As already discussed, bases are an important focal point in the lives of men. 
I decided a useful strategy to begin with would be to focus my attention on a handful 
of bases and the men who assembled at them. I hadn’t been in Zongo long and so 
had little idea about what might differentiate one base from another in terms of the 
larger stratifications at play. I thought that a base’s location might be important as well 
as the age of its attendees. This was little more than speculation, but I sought to 
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establish myself at bases in disparate parts of Zongo occupied by men of different 
ages. However, the most important influence in deciding which bases to focus on, was 
the extent to which its inhabitants seemed receptive to or at the very least unperturbed 
by my presence.  
I am cautious of calling this a ‘sampling strategy’ as to do so would over-emphasise 
the degree to which my decision was calculated at the time. It’s probably more 
accurate to say that I at least initially spent time at the bases I felt most welcome. It 
was by accident more than design that I happened to know men of different ages and 
at disparate locations. I merely chose to foster some of these relationships more than 
others, guided by some speculation as to the differences that might be important. 
Given this uncertainty, I made a point of maintaining relationships with men at as many 
bases as possible so as to keep my options open. 
I carried a notebook, mobile phone and digital sound recorder. As well as interviews I 
recorded a lot of my everyday social interaction. When I arrived at a base I would 
sometimes remove the recorder from my top pocket, put it down somewhere 
conspicuous and ask whether I could leave it to record. Most of the time people were 
happy to let me do this, but there were times when they objected, changed their minds, 
asked that I turn off the recorder or erase a particular recording, and I did so.  
Most of my data was recorded using a notebook or else my phone. Although I was 
fearful of forgetting things or failing to record something that might be important later 
on, it was also often impractical to write in a notebook. I found it nigh on impossible to 
write in a notepad whilst walking, let alone playing football. Aside from these 
impracticalities, producing a notebook or recorder from one’s pocket or bag tends to 
influence social interaction. Writing in a notepad is unusual behaviour in Zongo, and 
so feverish note-taking tended to shift attention away from the topic which had sparked 
my note-taking to the note-taking itself –  though this often stimulated other interesting 
and useful conversations. It is quite normal, however, to take out one’s phone whilst 
in the throes of social interaction, and so using a phone to make notes tends to have 
less impact upon the trajectory of an interaction. 
Though I used my phone, notebook and diary to record observations in the moment, I 
also kept a diary. At the end of each day I would write down an outline of what I had 
done, what had interested me, and what might be worthwhile following up. I also 
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recorded more reflective, personal feelings about my experience in the field: what had 
made me happy or uncomfortable and other such musings. I am often better at 
articulating my thoughts and feelings verbally than in text, and so I sometimes made 
these notes on my sound recorder. However, I had to be cautious about doing this as 
I was aware that others were listening70. 
Over time I came to realise that though health issues were important to people in 
Zongo, marriage was a far more pervasive concern. Once I had switched my attention 
from health to marriage, I revisited my original interviews and realised their value. I still 
winced at my lack of self-consciousness, my blunt and impatient efforts to engineer 
the conversation towards health. However, once I began to focus on what interviewees 
were rather than were not saying, a narrative emerged which was consistent with the 
preoccupation with marriage I had encountered elsewhere. 
 
2.13 Trying to Learn a Language 
My Hausa was and remains rudimentary, barely good enough to converse freely in 
Hausa let alone apprehend the nuances of a conversation71. Many people in Zongo 
have excellent English. Nevertheless, I relied heavily on interpreters and often got lost 
in the flow of conversation when conducted solely in Hausa. 
Concern has often been raised regarding the extent to which non-native speakers are 
able to make valid interpretations of meaning in languages that are not their own. The 
basis of this concern is the inherently complex relationship between translation and 
interpretation. It has been argued that specific ideas may not always find equivalence 
across languages and that the process of translation risks distorting or even erasing a 
term’s significance (Duranti 1997, Temple and Young 2004, Salzmann et al 2014). In 
the context of my own fieldwork this concern is immediately salient. One only has to 
spend five minutes in Zongo to realise that Hausa is the primary medium of 
communication, and two minutes observing my clumsy stammerings to realise that my 
command of the language is at best functional. However, it is my perception that my 
                                                          
70  I assure my reader that this is not merely a case of paranoia. I encountered a number 
of secretive eavesdroppers during my time in Zongo, whose intentions were not always 
benign. 
71  I have learnt Spanish to the point of fluency and so am well aware of the fact that I 
was missing out on a lot by virtue of my linguistic incompetence in Hausa. 
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linguistic deficiency impairs, but does not entirely invalidate my account of social life 
in Zongo. 
Even if the immediate environment is predominantly Hausaphone, it is perhaps more 
accurate to define Zongo's inhabitants as living in a multilingual world, where 
communication requires negotiating significance across languages. Everyday life 
involves a great many social interactions between Hausa and non-Hausa speakers. 
There are few non-Hausa speakers resident in Zongo, but there are many people who 
come to Zongo for one reason or another and speak little or no Hausa72. For example, 
Zongo's 'boka mallam', Islamic healers, scrap dealers and butchers have clients who 
speak a variety of languages. Most of the market traders, 'chemical sellers' or 
pharmacists that work in Zongo speak Twi; the language of instruction at the primary 
school is English; and many of the provision stores are owned and run by women from 
the surrounding neighbourhoods who speak Ga, Fante or Ewe. It is often, though not 
always, the case that the medium of communication in these interactions is English. 
Translation between Hausa in English is a fact of social life in Zongo and not unique 
to my interactions with people as a researcher. Having spent some time with a 
renowned Hausa herbalist and Akan pharmacist early on in my research, it was 
apparent that people in Zongo are accustomed to articulating sometimes complex 
thoughts, feelings and ideas in languages quite apart from Hausa and do so with not 
inconsiderable success. 
Seeing how translations operate, the kinds of equivalences that people found between 
Hausa and English was in and of itself informative. The process of translation involves 
defining a word or concept in one language in the terms of another. This process in its 
essence is about establishing the boundaries of signification, of establishing what a 
particular term can and cannot be taken to mean. The process of establishing these 
boundaries brings them into relief and helps make explicit those things that inhere in 
their untranslated form. This will be seen in my effort to make sense of a number of 
Hausa terms such as ‘lafiya’ and ‘samari’ amongst others73. 
                                                          
72  According to Kropp-Dakubu (2009) Hausa is the first language of only 0.7% Accra’s 
population, and a second language for 7.7%. English, by contrast, is the first language for 
4.9% and a second language for 89.2%. 
73  See Chapters Four and Five. 
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Ethnography is an act of interpretation, of drawing out meanings from the fieldwork 
experience and making them coherent to others (Geertz 2000). I would argue that the 
processes of translation and interpretation involved in learning a language are not only 
analogous to the ethnographic process, but an integral part of it. Hence, whilst I tried 
to make the most of my position as a language learner, I recognise that many 
significances will have slipped through the net of my linguistic deficiencies. 
The account of social life that I provide in this thesis does not rely upon those social 
interactions that took place in English, nor lone attempts to converse in Hausa. I would 
generally have one or two key informants at each base who would help me when I 
didn’t understand something. They were also those I employed as research assistants 
to help out with interviews and focus groups. These were the men I got to know 
particularly well and with whom I spent the most time. It is their voices which are most 
prominent in this thesis. 
 
2.14 Opportunity Costs: The Role of Reciprocity in Fieldwork 
Before I embarked on fieldwork I sought and was granted ethical approval by the 
University of East Anglia International Development Ethics Committee. In my 
application I wrote: 
"... a small amount of Nigerian Naira will be given to participants in cash at the end of 
focus groups, surveys and interviews to compensate for the time they have given". 
Reciprocity is a powerful, pervasive yet not uncontested ethic in social research 
(Edwards and Mauthner 2002, Huisman 2008, Maiter et al 2008). Although it is beyond 
the scope of this thesis to debate or define the meaning and merits of reciprocity as 
an ethical standard, the idea that participants should be compensated for their time 
alludes to the value that I have placed on reciprocity in fieldwork. However, this ethic 
was more difficult to engage with than I had anticipated prior to entering the field. 
Reciprocity and exchange are major themes in this thesis, and so my treatment of 
them here is brief in order not to get bogged down in detail which will be elaborated in 
the course of this thesis. For the moment, it is enough to say that reciprocity is 
embedded in wider social relationships such that the nature and value of what is being 
transferred, and the terms of exchange, are not only complex, but imbued with various 
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kinds of asymmetries. Consequently, reciprocity seldom equates to an egalitarian 
relationship. 
People in Zongo have encountered researchers before. Sometimes these researchers 
have been part of larger projects with tangible benefits for the area, such as the 
construction of gutters and public toilets. One of the first things people in Zongo would 
ask me, is whether I was undertaking my research with a particular project in mind. I 
was explicit that this was not my intention and that my research was motivated by 
other ideas for which the benefits for individuals in Zongo were at best uncertain74. 
People did not see this as a reason not to participate, but it did mean that my research 
offered few concrete incentives for them to do so. Many people in Zongo said that they 
thought my learning was a noble endeavour and were kind, helpful and encouraging. 
Nevertheless, in Zongo, as elsewhere, if one person does something for another he 
will expect them to return the favour at some point. 
In the context of focus groups and interviews, I would give those who participated 
money. As has already been discussed above, these encounters could not be seen 
as discrete. The end of an interview or focus group did not signal the termination of a 
one-off transaction in which all dues had been paid, but initiated an expectation – 
indeed obligation – to participate in further exchanges. This is especially important 
given the context of a sustained period of fieldwork. I had not just dropped in for a 
single interview and disappeared back to the UK never to be seen again. I was a 
feature of my informants' daily lives. The boundaries between interview and casual 
conversation were anything but clear. Moreover, these expectations were not only at 
play in my relationships with those who had participated in formally defined interviews 
and focus groups. They also applied with the many other individuals I encountered 
throughout the course of my fieldwork. 
I bought bread and tea when spending time at a base, medicine when someone was 
ill, helped with money for school fees and uniforms and contributed to wedding 
expenses. I was trying to fulfil what I thought were my social and moral obligations as 
                                                          
74  From the outset I have felt morally ambivalent about my research. I still subscribe to 
values of social justice and equality as underpinning my research, but I have become 
increasingly less certain as to what these might actually look like and in what ways my 
research contributes towards this agenda. Furthermore, my informants and I seldom agreed 
as to what positive social change might look like. Most people in Zongo see my lofty ideas of 
social justice and equality as for the best part irrelevant to them personally. 
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a researcher undertaking an essentially extractive endeavour. However, these 
exchanges and the ways I was participating in them were not merely matters of moral 
obligation, but political practices. As was apparent in my discussion of the entailments 
of gender for social interaction, my social identity and position were implicated in and 
by relations with others. My analysis is derived from data produced through these 
relations and so my analysis needs be read in light of them. 
In Zongo as anywhere, different kinds of people are subject to different social 
expectations which inform how individuals come to be positioned in social hierarchies. 
As could be seen in the example of the Chieftaincy, exchanges of political and 
economic support are an important feature of these hierarchies in Zongo. Senior men 
are expected to provide social, political and economic support for their juniors. In turn, 
junior men are expected to submit to their authority. From the moment I arrived in 
Zongo, people set about locating me in these structures. 
I was by no means considered an elite, but I was perceived by many in Zongo as 
somebody who had a degree of wealth and influence. Consequently, I was located 
towards the upper end of the social hierarchy and was accorded a degree of prestige 
and authority. For innumerable reasons, not least my own sense of unworthiness, I 
was uncomfortable with this position and often sought to resist it75. I also spent time 
with men who were by all accounts my social superiors. Though I found the company 
of these men challenging for different reasons, I generally found it easier to be 
deferential to others than to be deferred to myself. As has already been touched on, 
holding such a position comes with responsibilities, not least towards one’s social 
inferiors, who expect their deference to be rewarded. That I neither wanted, enjoyed, 
nor expected to be treated with deference was for the best part irrelevant. I was 
expected to meet my social obligations. Of course, most of the time I was interacting 
with men in murkier territory, where status differentials are less discrete and social 
expectations are more uncertain. As we shall see later, marital status is an important 
marker of status. That I was unmarried, yet perceived as wealthy and influential meant 
                                                          
75  For example, there were a number of events at which I was honoured with a seat at 
the High Table. I would scurry off into the crowd or linger discretely at the back with the 
younger men. This strategy was not always successful. Somebody would be sent out to find 
me. I would be put back in my place and have to endure embarrassment. Ironically, my 
attempts to evade the High Table were perceived as a sign of modesty, a trait widely regarded 
as admirable, which only served to reinforce the idea that I was a man of good character, 
worthy of praise and respect. 
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that my status was often ambiguous. This ambiguity accorded me a degree of freedom 
in terms of who I was able to interact with, and in what ways. For example, being 
unmarried enabled me to interact with low status unmarried men on a more equal 
footing, whilst at the same time my education and perceived affluence were important 
levellers when in the company of married men who were otherwise my social 
superiors. 
 
2.15 How to Make Friends and Disappoint People: Insights Achieved through 
Failure 
Sometimes, the expectations people had of me were explicit or obvious, such as when 
paying research assistants or when asked to make a donation to the cost of repairs at 
a mosque I frequented. There were occasions when I was unwilling or unable to meet 
people’s explicitly stated expectations. Indeed, people often called upon a notion of 
normative reciprocity as a means to engage the social, political and economic 
resources to which I was presumed to have access but didn’t; I was asked variously, 
for example, for large amounts of money, cars, visas, plane tickets and jobs. By 
contrast, a lot of the time it was difficult to work out what my obligations were, to whom 
I was obligated, and why. Some people tried and were indeed successful at exploiting 
my naivety, but my feeling is that these occasions were relatively rare. 
My transgressions and failures were many; most people were forgiving. They adjusted 
their expectations when I explained why I was unable to meet them, or else helped me 
understand my errors and how best to make amends for them. There were some who 
did not see my explanations as credible and came to treat me as any man considered 
a mean and miserly liar. I was not unaffected by these accusations, even when I 
thought they were misguided or unreasonable. There were moments when I was hurt 
or felt guilty about disappointing people. Whilst I never set out to disappoint people, 
let alone cause offence, my innumerable faux pas were hugely informative. I gradually 
came to understand the nuances of reciprocity and the trials and tribulations involved 
in meeting one’s social expectations. Given my own experience of life in Zongo, it is 
perhaps not surprising that disappointment and failure have emerged as important 
themes in my thesis. 
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Chapter Three: The Meaning of Marriage 
The principle objective of this chapter is to provide a brief overview of some of the 
ways marriage has been thought about in anthropology and how my thesis hopes to 
add to this thinking. The literature on marriage is far too vast to provide a 
comprehensive survey, so it is inevitable that the picture I provide is partial and 
selective. Furthermore, though I have loosely hung my review on the frame of 
chronology, I hasten to add that this is merely a means to structure the text, rather 
than indicative of a linear conceptual progression within the literature over time76. It is 
neither the aim nor indeed within the scope of this thesis to provide an ‘archaeology’ 
of marriage within anthropology. Nevertheless, briefly setting out the various directions 
from which anthropological analyses have approached marriage is useful, in that it 
enables an exposition of the particular methodological leanings that inform my thesis. 
This thesis does not hope to definitively put the idea of marriage to bed once and for 
all, nor does it intend to do away with it altogether, but instead provides an account of 
marriage that unsettles the terms that have hitherto formed the basis of its analysis. 
Specifically, I seek to propose an alternative approach to thinking about how people 
form attachments to particular meanings of marriage and how these attachments 
pattern the things that people say and do. 
 
3.1 Alliance or Descent? Structural Functionalism and Marriage 
Marriage has long been a staple ingredient of anthropology. In the early 20thCentury, 
anthropologists were concerned with the organisation of small-scale societies. In the 
presumed absence of large scale institutions such as a state, anthropologists saw 
kinship as the principal structure around which societies were politically organised 
(Borneman 1996, Carsten 2004). The question then was with how marriage mediated 
kinship and organised society. What does marriage do, such that a society is enabled 
to function? It is perhaps as a consequence of this concern that analyses of marriage 
                                                          
76  The anthropology of marriage, indeed anthropology in general, has seldom conformed 
to such linearity and has often resisted narratives that have attempted to do so. 
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have tended to centre on the kinds of rights and obligations marriage entails. Take for 
example the oft-cited definition from Notes and Queries (Murdock 1959 p.110): 
“Marriage is a union between a man and a woman such that children born to the 
woman are recognized legitimate offspring of both parents”. Notice that key to this 
definition are notions of gender and consanguinity as organisational principles. 
This definition can and indeed has been problematized in many ways. For example, 
Gough (1959) doubted whether marriage’s role in legitimating consanguinal paternity 
was always important. She described polyandrous marriage amongst the Nayar as a 
case in which consanguinity may not always have been very significant to social 
fatherhood. Similarly, citing ‘ghost marriage’ amongst the Nuer as an example, Bell 
(1997) questioned the insistence upon consanguinity to legitimate parenthood as well 
as the gender identities of a marriage’s constituents. However, the central idea 
remains that marriage serves to articulate and legitimate rights and responsibilities 
between parents, their progeny (however they might be defined) and a wider social 
group. The question then is what end do these rights and obligations serve? 
Within this paradigm, many scholars have had something to say on the social functions 
of marriage77, but it is perhaps Radcliffe-Brown and Levi-Straus who might be thought 
of as most prominent in a debate concerning whether it was alliance or descent that 
operated as the principal for the social function of marriage. The analyses of structural-
functionalism, such as those of Levi-Strauss (1969) and Radcliffe-Brown (1950), are 
important in bringing into view how marriage cannot be seen as a determinate 
phenomenon, but instead is inseparable from broader social relationships and 
institutions. 
For Radcliffe-Brown (ibid), it was descent that was most at stake; marriage was seen 
as a way of regulating biological reproduction: "An African marries because he wants 
children. The most important part of the 'value' of a woman is her child-bearing 
capacity" (1950. p51). Marriage, here, is a means through which men can be certain 
that they indeed have children, and that their descent group has been sustained. 
However, for Radcliffe-Brown and other structural functionalists, what was important 
                                                          
77  Examples of structural-functionalist interpretations abound and are as such too 
numerous to list here in full. However, Mogey (1963), Eggan and Scott (1965), and Riviere 
(1971) can all be considered to typify this approach. 
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was not the ‘preferences’ or ‘attachments’ that individual men might have for children, 
or as is my interest marriage, but the role that marriage plays in descent as a principle 
of social organisation in the absence of large institutions such as a state that might 
have performed this function in more ‘complex’ societies. 
The work of Levi-Strauss (1969) is markedly different to that of Radcliffe-Brown, in that 
where the latter saw the cognitive or psychological dimensions of marriage as being 
to some degree independent of social organisation, Levi-Strauss was concerned with 
what these larger structural arrangements might say about the underlying structures 
of the mind.  
For Levi-Strauss, marriage was less about descent than it was about alliance and 
social differentiation. He made the case for the ‘incest taboo’ as the basis of culture. 
Social differentiation was the first act of culture, in that it was what distinguished human 
kind from animals or ‘nature’. This was manifest in the universality of an incest taboo. 
This, he argued, reflected an opposition between nature and culture as fundamental 
cognitive structure from which marriage arises as a mechanism of social organisation. 
 
3.2 Accounting for Women 
Despite the differences between Radcliffe-Brown and Levi-Strauss, an important 
parallel can be found in their preoccupation with marriage as being linked to wider 
social structures. Marriage was described in terms of the sets of culturally sanctioned 
rights, entitlements and obligations. Marriage mattered as a means of establishing a 
relationship between kin and as an articulation of rights, responsibilities and 
entitlements that centred on social and sexual reproduction of a social group. It is thus 
perhaps no surprise that one outcome of these approaches was the analysis of 
marriage as a form of exchange. Many scholars working within this paradigm were 
concerned with the exchange of marriage goods and how they might operate to 
cement contractual obligations between those variously related to the bride and 
groom, and to provide stability to the social order (see for example Fortes (1962), 
Goody and Goody 1967, Goody and Tambiah 1973).  
As argued by Van Baal (1970), these kinds of analyses tend towards describing the 
role of women in marriage in terms of ‘gifts’ or ‘commodities’ circulated as political 
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resource. For example, debates surrounding bridewealth and dowry centre on the 
distinct forms of political organisation that are argued to underpin them78. The position 
of women within these exchanges largely evade scrutiny. Even in ethnographies of 
matrilineal societies, such as those of Melanesia, analyses of marriage’s role in 
political organisation focus on men as centres of representation and ascribe women 
an auxiliary albeit essential function as those who biologically reproduce the kinship 
ties that organise social relations between groups of men79. Women are ‘merely’ wives 
or mothers; the conduits of social organisation rather than active participants in its 
constitution. Marriage is seen as a mechanism through which their sexual and 
reproductive functions are circulated within masculine systems of political organisation 
(Van Baal 1975, Carsten 2004). 
A number of scholars have highlighted the inadequacy of these narratives to account 
for the position of women, raising dual concerns about how processes of social 
organisation as well as the interpretations made of them might be gendered. Ortner 
(1972), Van Baal (1975), Pateman (1988), Collier (1987), Young et al. (1981), are just 
some of those who have sought to address these concerns in an international context, 
as will be discussed below. Many of these authors offer a sharp critique of 
development policy, practice and the academic field of development studies itself, 
arguing that analyses of women’s positions and roles in development have failed to 
address the issue of women’s subordination80. These analyses repositioned women 
in accounts of marriage and marital processes, decentring the masculinist 
representations that had predominated and bringing relations between women and 
men firmly into view. This was achieved by shifting the analytical focus from macro-
level political organisation to interrogate conjugality and domestic organisation, where 
the work of reproduction was argued to take place (Moore 1995). Through these 
analyses, attention was drawn to how marriage mediated relations of domination and 
                                                          
78  According to Goody and Tambiah (1973), societies in which bridewealth is practised 
tend to emphasise unilineal kinship in which descent takes primacy. Marriage is thus primarily 
about gaining access to women’s reproductive capacities as a means to maintain and 
perpetuate a lineage. In contrast, dowry societies in their emphasis on bilateral kinship deploy 
marriage as a means to establish kin relations and hence as a mechanism of alliance. 
79  One notable, but contested exception being that of Margaret Mead (1963), who 
claimed that Chambri women often occupied positions of significant power. 
80  Within development studies this was reflected in the movement from ‘Women in 
Development’ (WID) to ‘Gender and Development’, (GAD) (Miller and Razavi 1995). 
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subordination between men and women, often in terms of differential access to and 
control over resources; for example, through inheritance, residential forms and 
divisions of labour (Moore 1995, Carsten 2004). 
Ann Whitehead’s (1981) often cited analysis of Kusasi domestic economy in rural 
Ghana is emblematic of this shift in approach. Whitehead observed how a husband’s 
authority within a Kusasi household is grounded in his juridical status as breadwinner. 
However, Whitehead argued that this position is not an outcome of actual contributions 
to household consumption made by individuals, but an ideology of gender that defines 
and values the labour of men and women differently81. The effect of Whitehead’s 
argument is to unsettle the idea of marriage as a ‘jural’ contract – a set of prescribed 
rules governing marriage, the marital process, spouse selection and marital relations. 
This resonates with Comaroff’s (1980) critique of structural-functionalist accounts of 
marriage and the marital process, in which it is asserted that the jural dimensions of 
marriage are overemphasised in earlier accounts. 
“This dimension is central to established anthropological conceptions: whatever other 
differences may be expressed concerning its analysis the conjugal bond is almost 
universally regarded as a jurally constituted and contractually defined relationship, a 
view grounded firmly in the concepts of western jurisprudence. Despite growing 
evidence in the shortcomings of this approach, marriage continues to be seen as a 
"bundle of rights" and bridewealth as the instrument of their production and/or 
exchange”. (Comaroff 1980. p.18). 
Whitehead’s response to this jural emphasis was to offer a notion of the ‘conjugal 
contract’; the normative rather than jural articulation of entitlements and 
responsibilities mediating the distribution of resources between spouses. In line with 
this critique, the 1980s saw a flurry of feminist scholarship that sought to examine 
conjugality as a normative apparatus: a mechanism through which ideologies of 
gender difference are established and sustained (see for example Whitehead 1981, 
Maher, 1981, Pateman 1988). A number of scholars sought to examine what the 
relations were that made the very idea of man and woman meaningful as distinct 
                                                          
81  For example, Kusasi women can and do farm, but because the staple crop millet is 
only grown on land owned by men, women are not regarded as farmers, regardless of any 
actual labour that they contribute towards its production (Whitehead 1981).  
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categories of the person such that the subordination of women was accepted or 
‘naturalised’ (see for example MacCormack 1980, Strathern 1988, Ortner and 
Whitehead 1981). This emphasis was captured in Sherry Ortner and Harriet 
Whitehead’s edited collection, ‘Sexual Meanings’: The cultural construction of Gender 
and Sexuality (1981). The contributors drew attention to the diversity of forms that 
gender difference seemed to take in different social and cultural contexts. They 
attempted to challenge the ontological assumption of man and woman as discrete pre-
biological categories, investigating them as symbolic categories, themselves 
constituted in and through social relations. As will be shown below, these analyses 
were not without their problems. However, their significance lies in ushering in a 
change in emphasis from a view of men and women as pre-given biological categories 
–sex – to the symbolic systems and social relations – gender – that give them 
meaning. 
“…natural features of gender, and natural processes of sex and reproduction, furnish 
only a suggestive and ambiguous backdrop to the cultural organization of gender and 
sexuality. What gender is, what men and women are, what sorts of relations do or 
should obtain between them – all of these notions do not simply reflect or elaborate 
upon biological “givens”, but are largely products of social and cultural processes. The 
very emphasis on the biological factor within different cultural traditions is variable; 
some cultures claim that male-female differences are almost entirely biologically 
grounded, whereas others give biological differences, or supposed biological 
differences, very little emphasis.” (Ortner and Whitehead 1981 p.1). 
In another example, Goodale (1980) describes how for the Kaulong of Papua New 
Guinea conjugality is central to the constitution of gender difference as manifest in the 
symbolic and spatial separation of men and women that occurs post marriage. 
The position adopted by Ortner and Whitehead, and by Goodale – that marriage is an 
ideological apparatus that constructs gender difference – has important implications 
for this thesis.  
It thus follows that in the context of marriage, it is not only the terms of the ‘contract’ 
that are disadvantageous to women, but the ideological positions from which they are 
interpreted and negotiated. This is to say that certain gender ideologies are articulated 
through the idea of marriage which operate to subordinate the interests of women to 
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those of men. For example, women’s roles within and relations to the household as 
wives and mothers, binds women to the household as well as other social institutions 
in different ways to men as husbands and fathers (see Stolcke 1981, Pateman 1992) 
82. 
 
3.3 Multiple Identities and Intersectionality 
Feminist scholarship, which saw female solidarity as a political imperative in the 
struggle for social justice and equality, not infrequently backgrounded relations 
between women. Though not without its political merits83, the emphasis was often on 
women as a category without internal differentiation, foregrounding their relations with 
men and the challenges faced under the structural constraints of patriarchy. This 
brought women’s roles and investments in marriage into view, and dwelt upon the 
extent to which they may or may not be in accordance with those of men. However, 
though relations between men and women were brought into the analyses, those 
between women and women within wider gender orders were under-examined 
(Cornwall 2007a). 
A number of authors have at various times picked up this trail. Collier (1987), Mason 
(1988) Jankowiak and Sudakov, et al (2005), are amongst those who have 
demonstrated how relations between women are implicated in marriage. Examples 
salient for this thesis can be found in the work of both Cooper’s (1995) and 
Masquelier’s (2004) analyses of marriage amongst the Hausa. They observed how 
marriage forms part of a network of exchange relations through which women forge 
relations with other women. These relations are also important for relations between 
women and men as a means for women to establish social, material and economic 
security independent of their husbands. Masquelier (ibid) and Cooper (ibid) expanded 
the analysis of marriage beyond masculine-centric notions of kinship to the much 
broader array of social relationships that may be involved, including those between 
                                                          
82  This argument is echoed in Sen (1987), who argues that women’s interests are often 
wholly subsumed into a household unit as wives and mothers and thus subordinated to those 
of their husbands and children. 
83  See for example Spivak (1996), Danius, Jonsson and Spivak (1993). 
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women whose relationships with one another may or may not be described in terms 
of kinship or descent. 
Crucially, relations between women as mediated by marriage are no less subject to 
hierarchical organisation than those between men and women. Collier (1987) 
observes how within polygamous marriages not all brides can be considered equals. 
Competition and conflict is often a feature of relations between co-wives, and 
bridewealth often serves as an index of a woman’s social value and prestige. Through 
a comparative analysis of marriage amongst North American Kiowa and Kachin of 
Burma, Collier demonstrated how the relative statuses of individual women within a 
household informed and were informed by the marital process. Again, exchange was 
the focus: Collier showed how the statuses of women might be mediated by and in the 
transfer of marriage goods. This is echoed in Cooper (1995) and Masquelier (2004), 
who described the exchange of goods in the marital process in terms of how they 
reflect individual women’s efforts to claim a valued social identity for themselves 
relative to other women. For example, Masquelier (2004), interrogated the importance 
attached to the gifting of a bed to a bride by her mother upon marriage. A mother 
acquires such a bed via female friends, kin and peers who contribute in expectation 
that their assistance will be reciprocated upon marriage of their own daughters. 
Acquiring a bed becomes a social reference point mediating relations between 
women. Because a woman’s status is seen as a function of the depth and breadth of 
her social networks, judgements as to the ‘value’ of the bed reflect evaluations of a 
bride and her mother’s status relative to other women as well as men. 
 
3.4 Locating Agency 
Thus far we have seen how marriage operates as a site in which gender identity and 
power are manifested. In contrast to the structural-functionalist vision of marriage as 
a mechanism for the reproduction of a harmonious social order, feminist scholarship 
of the 1980s examined the tensions and conflicts of conjugality, alerting us to conjugal 
relations as sites in which relations of inequality, subordination and domination 
between both women and men, and women and women, are played out. However, in 
opening up new avenues for research and political action, many scholars found the 
conceptual and analytical toolkits with which to undertake them wanting, as reflected 
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in an ongoing concern with how to locate agency within enduring inequalities and 
injustices (see for example Moore 1988, 1995, 2007 Alcoff and Potter 1993, Reader 
2007). 
For Ann Whitehead (1981) conjugality was framed by a notion of power relations as a 
tug of war between men and women over access to and control over resources; thus 
power was perceived as residing with those who captured the greatest share of 
household resources such as land and labour. Marriage was seen as an inequitable 
institution because it operated in favour of men, who enjoyed the greatest material 
benefits with the least expenditure. Whitehead’s example is illustrative of a number of 
problems that can be argued to pervade the scholarship of the era. 
First of all, early 1980s feminist accounts tended to frame gender inequality in terms 
of the material disadvantages faced by women. Clearly, within development studies 
material wealth and poverty matter. Many aspects of well-being are certainly more 
easily realised when one is not in poverty. However, Jackson (1996) and Cornwall 
(2002, 2007b) argue that although material wealth may be instrumental in realising 
equality, giving primacy to economic or material dimensions threatens to elide not only 
the wider social relations that underlie the multifarious means and modes of gender 
injustice, but also the spaces in which autonomy and freedom might be realised. 
This brings us to a second concern with this particular school of thought, and what can 
be argued as an overly structuralist approach. Even those who had emphasised 
symbolic rather than material dimensions of inequality tended towards reifying 
symbolic systems as transcendent structures. As Borneman (1996) argues, the efforts 
of 1980s feminist scholarship tended to displace rather than dissolve biological 
dualisms. For example, Ortner’s (1972) argument that male and female were cultural 
elaborations rooted in dichotomous notions of nature and culture, struggles to pull 
away from biological essentialisms by grounding such difference in biological 
reproduction84 (Macormack 1980).  
                                                          
84  A number of scholars have gone on to argue that notions of gender too often rely on 
the fixity of biological sex. Of course bodies and biologies are far from irrelevant to human 
social experience. However, ascribing biologies the status of originating principle threatens to 
elide the complex relationships through which epistemic certainties are constituted and the 
experience of dissonance and diversity within them. See for example West and Zimmerman 
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The question, then, is how to locate an escape route from the constraints of patriarchal 
social structures? The difficulty here is that women’s subordination is argued to reside 
in patriarchy as either symbolic and/or material structural arrangement, leaving us with 
women who are not only the victims of structural disadvantage and ill-being, but devoid 
of the kinds of subjectivity and agency that are necessary to influence marital practices 
in their favour (Kabeer 1997, Jackson 2012). 
Jackson (ibid) suggests that the absence of women’s agency in these narratives needs 
to be challenged. By presenting us with a case study of changing marital practices 
amongst Zimbabwean Shona, Jackson describes how changing economic conditions 
have made the bridewealth transactions, which formerly established and legitimated 
the conjugal contract, more difficult to achieve. She locates women’s agency in how 
they have made use of this situation to strengthen their bargaining positions relative 
to that of their husbands and kin in negotiating the conjugal contract, thereby gaining 
a degree of personal independence. By detailing the historical fluidity of marriage and 
the rights and obligations within it, Jackson (ibid) questions the extent to which it can 
be seen as an apparatus of structural constraint. By demonstrating how marriage has 
changed, she is able to ask what role women might have had in changing it, and to 
what extent these changes might work in their favour. Similarly, Kandiyoti (1988) and 
Kabeer (1997) have both described how Bangladeshi women, who have found work 
in Bangladesh’s garment industry managed to strengthen their bargaining positions 
within marriages, escape abusive marriages or postpone marriage altogether.  
These observations bring a concern with agency into view in a way that had been 
lacking in the accounts provided in earlier feminist scholarship. Crucially, this suggests 
that positions of ‘notional’ subordination may not be entirely devoid of possibilities for 
agency. I will return to this issue below, where I discuss the tensions between structure 
and agency in greater detail. Beforehand, I would like to turn my attention to men, who 
are after all the focus of this thesis, and how masculinity has been conceived of in the 
literature. 
 
                                                          
(1987), Foucault (1978), Csordas (1990), Grosz (1993), Lock (1993), Fausto-Sterling (1993), 
Moore (1994, 2007) Butler (2011). 
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3.5 Men, Masculinities and Marriage 
This thesis is explicit in its interest in men and marriage, but thus far I have made no 
mention of how men and masculinity have been thought about in the literature. This 
omission is in part a result of trying to roughly trace the chronological trajectory of 
anthropological thinking about marriage, within which men and masculinity as an 
explicit focus of analysis has only relatively recently emerged.  
As we have already seen, the major contribution of early 1980s feminist scholarship 
has been in locating women’s subordination in conceptions of gender as a set of social 
and cultural relationships. Clearly, though, it is not only women who inhabit this terrain, 
but also men. Efforts to unravel the social significance of men and masculinity have 
come from several angles. 
Gender analytical and feminist scholarship have drawn attention to the ways in which 
major social transformations, such as colonialism, slavery, neoliberalism and 
‘globalisation’ have reconfigured gender relations and identities in African societies. 
However, whilst women have emerged as a major research focus in development 
studies and increasingly in policy and practice, there had until recently been a 
tendency to leave men and masculinities by the wayside. This is hardly surprising, 
given that the political project of early 1980's feminism was to draw attention to the 
women’s experiences of social change, largely ignored by development studies and 
social analyses of Africa more broadly, which had left man as the 'unmarked' category 
(Morrell 1998).  
With the emergence of the field of men and masculinities, there has been an upsurge 
in interest in African men and their experiences of gender. Particular attention has 
been drawn to the ways in which relations with and between men and women, their 
identities, aspirations and desires have shaped and been shaped by large scale social 
change in Africa. A number of authors have examined how notions of manhood were 
reconfigured in colonial encounters.  
McKittrick (2003) describes how in Namibian Ovamboland precolonial manhoods were 
defined by control over the allocation of productive assets, including labour but in 
particular cattle, with 'fathers' who distributed cattle to sons at the apex of masculine 
hierarchies. These hierarchies were brought into tension with colonial efforts to extend 
wage labour, opening up new opportunities for young men to establish herds 
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independently of their fathers. Whilst paternal authority was seen to endure, albeit to 
a lesser degree, notions of adult manhood became less closely tethered to control 
over cattle, with greater emphasis placed on affective ties and filial loyalty as markers 
of masculine status. 
In the same volume, Mann (2003) explores the challenge of reintegration faced by 
Malian veterans from the French army in the 1950's. He describes how many veterans 
came home to find themselves held in disdain by their peers, who had by staying at 
home, marrying, establishing a household and becoming learned in Islam, achieved a 
socially accepted and valued adult manhood. Mann observes how religious fissions, 
sometimes leading to violent disputes, were broadly aligned with these differential 
statuses. He argues that the veteran's support for a reinterpretation of the Quran and 
religious practice was an act of rebellion against their social superiors, for whom status 
was in part vested in claiming knowledge of Islam, but was also an effort to establish 
an Islam through which they could assert terms of moral propriety amenable to their 
own status. As we shall see in this thesis, ideas about gender are not infrequently 
articulated through religious discourses and practices. In a manner consistent with 
Douglas (2010, 2013), notions of the sacred and profane can often be seen to mark 
out the boundaries of the normative. 
Analyses of men and masculinities in present day Africa have often been framed by 
the impact of neoliberalism. A particular emphasis has been on the ways in which 
neoliberalism has come to impinge upon many of the social practices and institutions 
seen as pivotal to the realisation of productive and responsible manhood – not least 
marriage, which in many African societies endures as the principle marker of 
manhood. For example, Silberschmidt (1999) and Cornwall’s (2002) accounts, 
situated in Kenya and Nigeria respectively, highlight how economic decline, brought 
about by neoliberal economic policies, has impacted upon established gender orders, 
specifically relations between women and men. Cornwall and Silberschmidt describe 
how masculine authority rests upon an enduring ideal of men as providers, and yet 
such ideals are increasingly difficult to achieve in contexts in which income earning 
opportunities for women have expanded whilst those of men seem to have diminished. 
One effect of this changing socioeconomic context is the calling into question not only 
the manhoods of those men who fail to provide, but the very ideology of men’s 
authority over women. 
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Similar themes can be seen in Miescher’s (2005) text, ‘Making Men in Ghana’, based 
on narratives of eight Akan elders in Kwahu Region. Miescher structures these 
accounts according to the various life stages of men, childhood, education, 
employment and marriage, eventually arriving at the status of respected elder. 
However, these life stages and the norms, ideals and expectations they imply do not 
occur in a vacuum. Miescher shows they have been shaped by major social 
transformations such as Kwahu’s breakaway from the Asante state, the arrival of 
Presbyterianism and Western education, colonialism, the demise of slavery and 
emergence of the postcolonial state. Through these accounts Miescher reveals an 
important dialectic; established gender orders are not merely flattened by large scale 
social institutions and major social events, but part of a complex tapestry of social 
arrangements, influencing how these institutions and events are received and shaping 
the trajectory of change. This is evident in the case of the ‘big man’, an elite masculinity 
grounded in the ability to distribute the spoils of political power in return for political 
support85. Miescher argues that though the means through which such a status is 
achieved have changed, for example warfare playing a less central role, the notion of 
big man remains a prominent form of elite masculinity in Ghana’s contemporary 
political landscape. 
Miescher also raises an important methodological concern as to what these accounts 
actually tell us about the history of men and masculinities in Ghana. He argues that 
the narratives provided by the men ought not be construed as prima facie accounts of 
the past, but self-conscious performances invested with the social exigencies of the 
present (Miescher 2005 p 152); in particular, the need to portray one’s past in ways 
that give meaning and value to one’s experience of being a man in the present. This 
resonates closely with my own interpretation of the accounts provided by my 
informants in Zongo and my motive for using Goffman’s (1956, 1974, 1980) 
‘dramaturgical self’ as an analytical frame. 
Men and masculinities have not gone unstudied in Accra. Much like Mckittrick’s (2003) 
analysis in Namibia discussed above, Akyeampong (2000) describes how 
urbanisation and migration presented both men and women with new opportunities to 
accumulate capital in early 20th Century Ghana. Gerontocratic authority was unsettled 
                                                          
85 See Chapter Five for a more substantial discussion of wealth-in-people. 
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as young men’s dependency on their elders was reduced. However, income earning 
opportunities also opened up for women. Women were able to trade in the colonial 
market economy, deploy their sexuality to gain access to the resources of wealthy 
men and assert a degree of autonomy outside established conjugal forms. Whilst 
senior men exerted less control over the marital affairs of their juniors, women were 
increasingly influential in establishing the terms of their marriages or even resisting 
marriage altogether. This presented a dilemma for men whose status relied on the 
accumulation of wives to assert their own status as ‘big men’. Disgruntled by these 
shifts in the balance of power, men bemoaned women’s accumulation as the product 
of an immoral and sexualised materialism. In Chapter Six of this thesis we will see 
how a similar narrative can be seen to frame the ways men in Sabon Zongo evaluate 
prospective brides. 
Writing in the context of Madina, a neighbourhood on the outskirts of Accra, 
Langevang (2008) describes how marriage is desirable as an important marker of 
adult manhood. In order to marry, young men must find the resources to pay for 
wedding costs and set up a household, but they must also engage in costly and 
uncertain courtships. Langevang shows us how hard it can be to meet these 
requirements in a context of economic instability and pervasive unemployment. 
Furthermore, young men are often disappointed when a promising courtship is 
usurped by a wealthier or more generous suitor. At the same time for many materially 
poor women, trade in a sexual economy, where material promises often go unfulfilled 
by the men that make them, is the least unviable option. 
A similar theme plays out in Overa’s (2007) analysis in contemporary Accra. Overa 
(2007) examines how structural adjustment has influenced the ways in which the 
informal economy is gendered. Overa describes how greater income earning 
opportunities for women have arisen alongside a demise in the opportunities for men. 
This has not only left women with the burden of providing for dependent children, but 
for adult husbands and sons unable to provide for themselves. Indeed, according to 
Overa, though marriage persists as a social and moral ideal for both men and women, 
many women have reached the conclusion that husbands might well be something 
they could do without. Conversely, men are left struggling to meet women’s costly 
demands for cash and goods or else lament their failure to meet social expectations 
of a productive and responsible manhood. 
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A number of scholars argued that far from the patriarchal dividend as a universal 
reward for all men, gender relations could be seen to present a number of well-being 
challenges specific to men. This was argued from the point of view of analyses of men 
and masculinity exploring the effects of particular representations of accepted and 
valued notions of masculinity and the pressures on men to live up to them. For 
example, a number of scholars observed how gendered labour practices presented 
specific challenges for men’s health, such as exposure to physically demanding, 
dangerous or risky labour (Jackson 1999, Walter and Bourgois, et al, 2004, Zseleczky, 
Christie et al 2014). Others have described how in contexts where physical and mental 
strength are seen as indicative of socially accepted and valued manhood, men endure 
ill-being and fail to seek healthcare in an effort to meet social expectations (Courtenay 
2000, Robertson 2007, Gough and Robertson 2009). These analyses draw attention 
to the particular vulnerabilities encountered by men as they seek to fulfil the normative 
expectations of masculine roles, but they also raise questions concerning which men 
can actually be seen to reap the rewards of patriarchy. This is not to say that there has 
been a levelling of the playing field, or women have gained the upper hand, but simply 
that the rules of the game have changed, presenting different opportunities and 
constraints for different people at different moments in time. 
Those working within post-colonial studies and queer theory have argued that there 
are multiple ways of experiencing or identifying with a notion of masculinity, which may 
be divergently accepted and valued (Connell 2005). The intersections of gender with 
other forms of social differentiation, such as sexual orientation, ethnicity and class 
could be seen to structure relations between men. For example, the institutionalisation 
of work place homophobia (Van de Meer 2003, Embrick and Walther et al 2007) and 
the rewarding of heteronormativity through higher salaries (Hodges and Budig 2010), 
were deployed as examples of how different forms of masculinity were differentially 
valued and hierarchically organised. 
For some time now, the idea that masculinities matter has been gaining momentum 
within development studies, as well as in policy and practice contexts. A recurrent 
theme has been a perceived ‘crisis of masculinities’, in which large scale 
transformations in political or economic relations are said to impinge upon men’s ability 
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to realise social recognised forms of masculinity (Silberschmidt 1999, Cleaver 2002, 
Cornwall, Edström and Greig 2011). The argument here is that there is an increasing 
disjuncture between the normative expectations associated with valued forms of 
masculinity and the everyday realities of young men’s lives, which present few 
opportunities for the attainment of acceptable manhood. Thus many men remain 
marginal to the social categories that accord men power and privilege. The argument 
has often been made that men’s participation in high risk sexual practices (Lindegger 
and Durrheim 2001, Bujra 2002, Izugbara and Okal 2011), in armed conflict (Dolan 
2002, Harris 2012), and other forms of physical violence (Kersten 1996, Akpinar 2003, 
Veit et al 2011, V4C 2015) emerge from an inability to fulfil social expectations of 
manhood and the frustration and uncertainty it produces. 
It is perhaps not surprising that the idea of gender as an axis of subordination and ill-
being for men as well as women was met with a degree of ambivalence. Within 
development studies some were concerned that this repositioning of men and 
masculinity might detract from the hard-fought and ongoing battle to bring the 
structural subordination of women to the development agenda; but there was also a 
growing awareness that men and masculinities needed to be better understood as part 
of the nexus of relationships through which gender injustice and inequality are 
sustained (Cleaver 2002, Cornwall 2011). A recent interest has therefore emerged in 
how to account for men and masculinity within the analytical frame of gender analysis 
and the kind of conceptual and analytical approaches needed to deconstruct men’s 
relationships to notions of masculinity whilst not losing sight of them as potential sites 
of power and privilege. 
The concept of ‘hegemonic masculinities’ developed by Carrigan, Connell and Lee 
(1985) grabbed the attention of those working within gender analysis, by arguing that 
it was the hierarchical organisation of forms of masculinity that established and 
reinforced the structures that came to subordinate women. Connell (2005) defines 
hegemonic masculinity as follows; 
“The concept of hegemony…refers to the cultural dynamic by which a group claims 
and sustains a leading position in social life. At any given time, one form of masculinity 
rather than others is culturally exalted. Hegemonic masculinity can be defined as the 
configuration of gender practice which embodies the currently accepted answer to the 
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problem of legitimacy of patriarchy, which guarantees (or is taken to guarantee) the 
dominant position of men and the subordination of women” (Connell 2005 p.77). 
“Hegemony relates to cultural dominance in the society as a whole. Within that overall 
framework there are specific gender relations of dominance and subordination 
between groups of men” (Connell 2005 p.78). 
From Connell’s point of view hegemonic masculinity is a term that can be applied to 
describe the cultural practices that sustain men’s domination of women and other men. 
Key to the notion of hegemonic masculinity is the idea that cultural ideals of masculinity 
operate as normative mechanisms that legitimate the dominance of some men over 
others (Connell 2005). Connell argues that, whether or not embodied by actual men, 
hegemonic masculinities represent cultural ideals concerning the qualities that men 
ought to possess and the kinds of relationships that they should have with other 
people. Thus hegemonic forms of masculinity serve as benchmarks against which 
men are defined, evaluated and ranked. There are norms that confer status and 
privilege to men when they are seen to conform to this ideal type, and sanctions when 
they deviate from it. 
Marriage has been a recurrent theme in these discussions, often described as a 
necessary but increasingly elusive requirement for the attainment of recognised 
manhood. For example, in the context of Hausaphone Niger, Masquelier (2005) 
describes how increasing bridewealth payments and declining incomes make the 
attainment of adult masculinity, for which marriage is a marker, difficult for many young 
men. Similarly, in her analysis of changing marriage practices in Kenya’s Kisii District, 
Silbershmidt (1999) observes how men’s inability to meet bridewealth payments has 
led to more tenuous unions in which men struggle to assert the control over wives that 
is central to idealised notions of masculinity. This she argues has led to men seeking 
to assert masculine identities through the pursuit of multiple sexual relationships and 
aggression towards women.  
What these examples demonstrate is that marriage can be an important part of the 
process through which idealised forms of masculinity are realised by individual men. 
These idealised masculinities might be described as hegemonic in that they provide 
the dominant representations of what men are supposed to be or do. However, whilst 
I recognise that the development of the concept of hegemonic masculinity has drawn 
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attention to a paucity of thinking about men and gender, I have some reservations 
about using the term to frame my own analysis. 
Connell and Messerschmidt (2005) argue that part of the value of the notion of 
hegemonic masculinity is that it remains open to interpretation and elaboration from 
various analytical perspectives. The flipside of this is that term has become somewhat 
slippery. Whilst use of the term hegemonic masculinity has proliferated, its applications 
have remained highly variable, and this has left the term open to a degree of ambiguity, 
perhaps even fungibility.  
One of the numerous critiques that has been levied at the term has been how it has 
often been used in ways that correlate with and/or confound idealised notions of 
masculinity, positions of social dominance and the mechanisms through which they 
are (re)produced (Beasely 2008). This can be seen in the tendency to use hegemonic 
masculinity to describe a typology of socially exalted masculine qualities and 
characteristics (Jefferson 2002, Moller 2007). When the term is deployed in this way, 
idealised or accepted notions of masculinity are seen as the basis for the ordinal 
ranking of men in terms of degrees of correspondence to normative ideals of 
masculinity. Such ranking is assumed to produce directly correlative relations of 
domination and subordination in which authority and privilege are distributed along a 
spectrum of masculinities (and femininities). Here, we find idealised masculinity as the 
most revered, desired and powerful form of masculinity at one end; and the most 
deviant, despised and subordinated form at the other. The problem here is the 
assumption that power and privilege are conferred by default to those who most 
closely resemble idealised or valued forms of masculinity and establish their authority 
over those who do not (Moller 2007)86. Consequently, the mere presence of idealised 
masculinities amid diversely recognised and valued masculinities is assumed to 
directly map onto relationships of subordination and domination. As we shall see 
below, from the point of view of De Certeau (1984), one might argue that this conflates 
representations of accepted and valued forms of masculinity as positions of 
                                                          
86  Connell (2006) herself asserts that the characteristics and behaviours of dominant 
men may not always correspond to idealised or valued forms of masculinity. However, as a 
number of authors have argued, Connell uses the term interchangeably to denote ideal types 
of masculinity, socially dominant men, and the mechanisms of men's social dominance 
(Beasely 2008). 
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dominance with actual relationships of domination and subordination and the 
mechanisms through which they are (re)produced. 
 
3.6 The Cock that Crows when the Hen Has Laid the Egg: What do Ideals Actually 
Do? 
“The fact that the codification of the rules and the supervision of their observance very 
often are male prerogatives should not lead us to make the mistake of the cock 
perched on the hedge crowing because the hen laid an egg”. (Van Baal 1975 
p.299/300). 
The above quote speaks to two of the concerns of this thesis: first, my concern with 
how subordination and domination, prestige and status are articulated through gender 
relations and identities, in particular notions of manhood; and second, the extent to 
which representations of who does and does not have power may or may not be 
congruous with actual social relationships. 
Van Baal (ibid) examines the case of Melanesian and Australian women who flee in 
apparent terror upon hearing the 'magic flutes' and bullroarers played by men in 
religious ceremonies. Van Baal is sceptical as to whether fear of the magic flutes can 
be interpreted as a symbolic manifestation of the subordination of women. He argues 
that women’s screams may not be expressions of terror but cooperative performances 
in male fantasies of power. From this jumping off point, Van Baal interrogates Levi-
Strauss’ (1969) emphasis on women as ‘objects’ exchanged between men through 
marriage. Van Baal questions the extent to which being an ‘object’ of exchange 
necessarily equates to a position of passivity. Though not denying that the terms of 
marriage and the marital process may often be largely unfavourable to women, Van 
Baal suggests that women may derive some advantages from adopting the position 
as an object of exchange and thus willingly choose to do so. For example, Van Baal 
argues that marriage establishes a debt between wife-giver and -receiver. It is the 
establishment of this debt that enables the wife-giver to make claims upon the 
recipient. However, the wife-giver relies in this exchange on the wife performing her 
duties as a wife should, such that the debt can be sustained. This in turn affords the 
gifted bride a degree of leverage over her paternal kin. The point here is that male 
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fantasies of power rely on female cooperation and so present a paradox: withholding 
a scream, or failing to acknowledge the performance at all, represents a latent power. 
We can observe a similar paradox within the context of Hausa conjugality. As 
discussed in Chapter One, Barkow (1974) describes how valued forms of masculinity 
amongst the Hausa emphasise a man’s sexual potency and the extent of his control 
over women. However, as can be construed from Salamone’s (1976) account, it is far 
more difficult for a man to assert his sexual potency or claim authority over his wife if 
she provides an account to the contrary. Consequently, a husband may at times have 
to subordinate himself to the demands of his wife if he is to secure her cooperation. 
Women might well have a low social position, but performing this position does not 
necessarily amount to an abject powerlessness in the face of male social control. This 
is not to say domination is illusory or that coercion (for example, by means of physical 
violence or intimidation) is not utilised by a husband to ensure his wife’s cooperation, 
but simply that to assume that this is always the case risks papering over the 
contradictions which inhere in representations of dependency and control. 
Within most societies the marital process is marked by a set of formalised social 
interactions or ‘rituals’, without which a marriage cannot be said to have taken place. 
Each interaction carries with it a set of norms that signal what is going on to 
participants and the kind of conduct that is appropriate. Clearly individuals may not 
always conform to such norms or even interpret situations in the same way. 
Nevertheless, some degree of consistency is necessary for marriage to operate as a 
coherent or meaningful institution within a society, even if only as a normative 
reference point against which the practices of individuals can be deemed as deviant 
or not. However, as can be seen in the example taken from Van Baal (1975), women 
are able to deploy their agency through a normative discourse that renders it invisible 
or at the very least unacknowledged. This idea resonates with De Certeau’s (1984) 
concepts of ‘strategies’ and ‘tactics’87. 
                                                          
87  De Certeau writes against the backdrop of Bourdieu (Bourdieu 1977) and Foucault 
(1977), who posit a structurally imposed rationality that determines the beliefs and practices 
that an individual follow. De Certeau does not entirely disagree with Bourdieu’s and Foucault’s 
assessments of the means of social control or discipline. He does however argue that such 
control cannot be seen as absolute. From this jumping-off point, he looks to examine the 
inverse of Foucault and Bourdieu. He argues that Foucault and Bourdieu’s emphasis on the 
production of discipline fails to account for and elucidate the productions of the people who it 
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Strategies can be thought of as the ways in which normative or naturalised discourses 
and practices operate as disciplinary techniques – the mechanisms through which 
large scale systems of social organisation or structures exert social control. In contrast, 
tactics are the unlabelled or unacknowledged everyday practices of social agents who 
make use of dominant discourses to evade or subvert them. De Certeau's (1984) 
concept of strategies and tactics avoids reducing individual action to structural 
impositions, be they symbolic or material, and so gives us a way of thinking about 
subordination, domination, agency and constraint that more adequately accounts for 
structure and agency as a relationship rather than as opposing forces. For instance, 
the discursive constitution of women as commodities, passive ‘objects’ exchanged by 
men through marriage, serves to censor acknowledgement of female agency, whilst 
providing a platform for its realisation. 
This idea should not be taken to diminish the fact that individual action is often subject 
to structural constraint, but it does suggest that such constraint is seldom absolute – 
that there may be pockets of space in which relations of domination and subordination 
can be negotiated. However perhaps the most important thing to be learned here is 
that the very representation of constraint may be of tactical utility in providing a veil 
behind which subversion and resistance might take place. Compliance or complicity 
may be imposed, but also performed in efforts to gain a tactical advantage.  
Of course such tactical manoeuvres are not solely the preserve of women. 
Masculinities – if we take this to mean the sets of ideas about what men should be or 
do – might well be a source of anxiety for men struggling to live up to them, and a 
means through which some men are able to exert control over others. Nevertheless, 
it is possible that representation of specific masculinities and indeed men as dominant 
                                                          
is argued to discipline. “…this "microphysics of power" privileges the productive apparatus 
(which produces the "discipline"), even though it discerns in "education" a system of 
"repression" and shows how, from the wings as it were, silent technologies determine or short-
circuit institutional stage directions. If it is true that the grid of "discipline" is everywhere 
becoming clearer and more extensive, it is all the more urgent to discover how an entire society 
resists being reduced to it, what popular procedures (also "miniscule" and quotidian) 
manipulate the mechanisms of discipline and conform to them only in order to evade them, 
and finally, what "ways of operating" form the counterpart, on the consumer's (or "dominee's"?) 
side, of the mute processes that organize the establishment of socioeconomic order”. Michel 
de Certeau. The Practice of Everyday Life (1984 p. xiv). 
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or subordinate might operate paradoxically as positions from which actual relations of 
domination can be negotiated.  
As was discussed in the case of the viewing of Maid in Manhattan, people actively 
engage with representation as agents, rather than passive recipients of pre-constituted 
systems of meaning. It is in line with this idea that my thesis focuses on the agency of 
consumption – the ways in which prevailing ideals of marriage and the marital process 
are made use of by men as agents. Thus my analysis seeks to open up the analysis 
of marriage, by examining marriage not only as a rite of passage through which 
particular forms of masculinity are achieved by men, but as a site of performance and 
representation in which relations between men and women are negotiated. 
Given a long tradition within anthropology of erasing, or at the very least failing to 
acknowledge, the diversity of masculinities that exist alongside heteronormative 
forms, often normalised within the literature, one can argue that there is a political 
imperative to account for and give voice to ostensibly ‘deviant’ masculinities. However, 
this is not my project. Not because I disagree with this political objective, but because 
I believe that further unpacking how people navigate and negotiate the 
heteronormative is an important part of achieving it. I do not deny that men may seek 
social and sexual satisfaction outside the prevailing heteronormative order. Clearly, in 
seeking to define the normative, it is important to draw out where boundaries lie and 
how they are policed. However, my aim is to identify the resistances within the 
normative, and so it is both necessary and inevitable that greater emphasis is laid 
upon those men who, at least at first glance, would seem to conform to the established 
order. 
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Chapter Four: Transitions from Youth 
 
4.1 The Problem with ‘Youth’ 
The Imam called my research assistant and I to the front of the mosque and introduced 
me to the crowd which had assembled for Friday prayers. He briefly recounted the 
history of Zongo to his congregation, recalling in particular how the settlement had 
been founded by ‘strangers’. As strangers and Muslims themselves, it was both their 
duty and tradition to make me feel welcome. He advised them to treat me with courtesy 
and assist me in my research if they could. Once I had been introduced, the Imam 
directed my research assistant and I to one side of the mosque where we took a seat 
on the floor next to Mallam Hassan. 
Mallam Hassan lives in the southernmost part of Zongo known as Unguwa Makafi – 
'blind area' – so called after a former chief allocated a large plot of land to 
accommodate the blind beggars that come and go from Zongo and where many blind 
people reside to this day. Unguwa Makafi is about as far away as one can get from 
Kan Tudu, and is home to many mosques of its own. Nevertheless, Mallam Hassan 
attends prayers in Kan Tudu at least once a day, making the journey with the aid of a 
walking stick and his ten-year-old grandson’s shoulder. Getting to Mallam Hassan’s 
house is not easy. Once you step off the unpaved road that marks its boundary, 
Unguwa Makafi is a claustrophobic and chaotic place. Its buckled and warped timber 
structures are crammed tightly together, much like the residents who slumber inside 
of them. The twisting passages are seldom wider than the outstretched arms of those 
who rely upon tactility to navigate them. I lack the grace and agility of the women who 
swing through the alleyways with baskets atop their heads. I have to concentrate if I 
am to keep my footing whilst negotiating the young men squatted over charcoal stoves 
and gaunt faced ‘junkies’ who sway and clatter from the doors of the ‘bunkers88’, 
guarded by the stern-eyed area boys that serve them. 
                                                          
88  Unguwa Makafi is home to a number of ‘bunkers’, rooms that are used for the sale 
and consumption of drugs. It was not possible to verify the nature of what was being 
consumed, but they were described by their users as cocaine, crack, heroin, cannabis and 
‘gadagi’ (a tea brewed from various herbs and pharmaceutical medicines). 
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Mallam Hassan’s two concrete rooms are sparse, but relatively spacious and orderly 
when compared to others in the area. He sits in an old armchair that faces towards the 
door. Mallam says that he is sixty-five, but he appears much older than other men in 
Zongo of a similar age. Mallam Hassan is suffering with a sickness he calls ‘piles’, but 
the symptoms and their severity seem to be at odds with those that might be 
associated with such a condition in the west. He swills down a cup of dark brown liquid. 
He tells me it is “black medicine” or “Africa Medicine”, which he takes to soothe 
stomach cramps and ease diarrhoea. He says that his sickness has weakened him. I 
observe that his frame is wiry and movements weary, except during occasional 
moments of agitation when he vigorously stabs at the air with a walking stick. 
"You see these youth. The youth these days, doing nothing. Just sitting, roaming, 
smoking this thing… this thing wee [cannabis]. It is not good to sit all day. What good 
are you doing just sitting? Nothing. You see yourself they are just doing nothing. 
Nothing I tell you… They don't respect. These days there is no respect. They don't 
respect their fathers. Smoking this wee… They don't like work. They are lazy. They 
are lazy. Go and do something. They are not active. It's not hard [if] you are well. You 
understand. You have strong. Strength. Try to get small money. Buy things and sell. 
Even paper, sell. It's a job. Go to spare parts, go to scraps. Go sell the iron rod. There 
is money. Only see they are lazy. They are lazy. They don't move". 
I had asked Mallam Hassan about how Zongo had changed over the years. The 
response was largely negative – a narrative of moral decline, of a community falling 
apart, ridden with social and moral degeneracy. According to Mallam Hassan the 
cause of this problem has been “modern life”. He explained how Zongo had once been 
a peaceful and orderly village far from Ghana’s emergent capital. The only thing that 
they had had to worry about were the hyenas that occasionally wandered into the 
village at night. But Accra had urbanised and expanded, swallowing up the marshlands 
and rivers, until eventually consuming Zongo itself, and transforming it in the process 
from rural community to urban enclave in the heart of Accra. As Zongo had been drawn 
into this “modern” world, its traditions and values had become corrupted by new 
temptations and desires. According to Mallam Hassan, this was most apparent in the 
behaviour of Zongo’s young men. He claimed that young men respected neither their 
elders nor their traditions. They no longer went to mosque or did their duty for their 
families and the community. They were only interested in mobile phones and 
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motorbikes and the “easy money” that could be used to obtain them. Islam was fading 
in Zongo, as young men sought to indulge their desire for consumer goods, casual sex 
and an easy meal, through criminal and occult practices such as drug dealing, stealing 
and sorcery. 
Substance abuse and violence in Zongo are relatively rare, or at least are well 
concealed; but what there is of it is disproportionately concentrated in Unguwa Makafi. 
I found it easy to empathise with Mallam Hassan’s discomfort. Throughout fieldwork I 
struggled to cope with what felt like an endless barrage of noise that whittled away at 
my sleep and my sanity. Unguwa Makafi’s narrow passages had the advantage of 
limiting the motorbike noise. Nevertheless, my own room in Zongo’s Kan Tudu area 
seemed positively serene when sitting within Mallam Hassan’s modest living room and 
the whirlwind of noise that seemed to engulf it. His drug addled neighbours scrapped 
and shouted to a distorted soundtrack of gangster rap, reggaeton and hip-life, which 
rumbled through the cinderblock walls. 
Mallam Hassan’s surroundings no doubt inform his account and the fervency with 
which it was delivered. However, his narrative is far from unusual in the sense that the 
idea of youth is frequently framed in terms of being an immoral condition. There is a 
prevailing discourse of young men as being a problem, as conducting themselves in 
a manner that threatens the social and moral well-being of Zongo as a whole. Many 
of Zongo’s inhabitants insist that it is in a state of moral decline. This decline is seen 
as being not only manifest in, but driven by the immorality of its young men. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, morality and its purported decline is often articulated in terms of Islam, 
the dominant religion in Zongo. 
“Allah ya taimake mu. Ya Zongo ba da lafiya,” – “God help us. There is no longer 
peace in Zongo” – my neighbour would say when she had heard news of someone 
caught stealing, fighting, performing “rituals” or some other moral transgression. 
“Where is Islam”, lamented another man. “Me myself I don’t see it. In Zongo there is 
no Islam. We the Hausas we are the ones who are bringing it to Ghana. Senegal, 
Nigeria there is Islam, but in Zongo we don’t do it. These youth they don’t know Koran. 
They don’t pray. They are only thinking in money. In motorbike”. 
Such narratives of young men as reneging on their Islamic duties in pursuit of the facile 
trappings of modernity were common. Young men were described as spending their 
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days shouting, stealing, fighting and fornicating. They were said to occupy themselves 
with thundering through Zongo's narrow lanes on motorbikes, or else “dodging” work 
and “chasing shadows”89 whilst failing to attend mosque, observe Ramadan and 
abstain from extra-marital sex and the consumption of drugs and alcohol. ‘Lafiya’ – 
peace, balance and order (Wall 1988) – was seen as being unsettled by the 
behaviours of young men, who lacked patience ‘hakuri’, humility ‘kunya’ and respect 
‘girma’ for their elders. If the narratives of elder men like Mallam Hassan are to be 
believed, immorality and deviance brew at the bases of young men like hot tea. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly this discourse of youth as an immoral condition is most 
prevalent amongst elder men and women; but there are many young men who, to 
various degrees, reproduce this discourse. Take for example Farouk, one of Zongo’s 
Sarkin Samari or ‘Youth Chiefs’, who stressed the need for Islamic youth organisations 
to counter the problems brought about by increasingly wayward youth90. Even the 
young men at Oakville Town Hall remarked upon the demise of morality amongst 
Zongo’s youth. This perception of youth as a problem can be seen to extend beyond 
the confines of Sabon Zongo itself. Television, radio and newspapers often feature 
stories about the latest efforts to combat the indiscipline and immorality of youth in 
Zongos throughout Ghana91. 
 
4.2 The Moral Meanings of Youth 
Two key points emerge from the above narratives that help us interpret the social 
interactions that take place at Oakville Town Hall. Amongst the first things that we can 
learn from the accounts provided above is that for people in Zongo the notion of youth 
is meaningful. The term implies a set of widely accepted expectations and 
assumptions about the individuals or groups that are associated with it. When one 
                                                          
89  To 'chase shadows' is to spend a lot of time in the same place, only moving so as to 
stay in the shade and avoid the heat of the sun. 
90  Farouk seemed to hope that I would fund such organisations, and believed himself to 
be the ideal custodian for their administration. 
91  See for example PeaceFM (2012). “Centre to tackle indiscipline among Zongo youth 
inaugurated”. Salam/Joy Radio (2013) “Muslims urged to respect authority”. Daily Graphic 
(2012) “Chief Imam warns Zongo youth against electoral violence”. Daily Graphic (2013) “Dr 
Nsor calls for crusade against indiscipline”. 
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person uses the term to describe another, he can be reasonably confident that his 
audience will have a rough idea as to the sort of person he is trying to describe, the 
things that they say and do, and the relationships that they are likely to have with 
others, without the speaker needing to go into detail. This is not to say that the term 
will always be understood in exactly the same way, nor that such understandings are 
necessarily conscious, but simply that as with any term, there must be some level of 
agreement as to what is implied by it or else it ceases to be useful in social interaction. 
In the Gananci Hausa of Zongo the words most frequently used to signify 'youth' are 
'samari' (plural) and 'saurayi' (singular)92. What is interesting for this thesis is that there 
is no feminine singular form of the word. There is considerable variation across Hausa 
dialects as to how particular nouns are gendered (Newman 1979, Jaggar 2001)93; 
however, in this instance the gendered form of Gananci Hausa words for youth is not 
merely a case of grammatical construction. Young women are referred to as yarinya, 
meaning girl, up until marriage. The masculine equivalent yaro, meaning boy, is 
reserved for preadolescence. Upon adolescence they are referred to as saurayi. On 
occasion the plural form 'samari' may be used to refer to a group of men and women, 
but it is never used to describe a group comprised only of women. Samari is an almost 
uniquely masculine notion. 
The second point which emerges from the narratives of moral decline recounted above 
is one that has already been touched upon in Chapter One: not all categories of the 
person are accorded the same social value. An individual might be accorded lesser or 
greater prestige, status or authority depending upon the particular category of the 
person that they are associated with. Such hierarchical ordering is often articulated in 
terms of differences in social practice and the social value that such practices are 
accorded (West and Zimmerman 1987, Butler 1988, 2011). This is to say that status, 
privilege and authority arise from the entanglement of who you are with what you do.  
This thesis is concerned with elaborating the ‘mutumin kirkii’ in Zongo: the terms 
against which the man of social and moral standing can be defined. Though I have as 
                                                          
92  This is consistent with the translations found in both Bargery’s (2002) and Awde’s 
(1996) dictionaries. 
93  For example, Kananci - Kano Hausa - tends to make much greater use of gendered 
noun constructions than does Sakkwatanci – Sokoto Hausa (Jagger 2001). 
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yet to establish what constitutes the good man in Zongo, the key point here is that for 
many people in Zongo – and indeed beyond – young men are a problem. The notion 
of youth is often articulated in negative terms, seen as embodying undesirable 
qualities and carrying associations with problematic anti-social behaviours. Mallam 
Hassan expresses disdain for youth and characterises them as lazy; their activities 
are portrayed as meaningless, immoral and even dangerous. If the good man is to be 
thought of as a man of social and moral standing, the notion of youth is at odds with 
it. 
These narratives of miscreant youth seem to be at odds with my experience of social 
life in Zongo and my own observations of young men’s behaviours, not least in the 
case of Abu and his friends at Oakville Town Hall. Though one of Abu’s friends told 
me that he very occasionally smoked cannabis to relax, the men at Oakville Town Hall 
could hardly be described as moral deviants on anyone’s terms. Certainly the serious 
and studious conversations about religion and morality that take place at Oakville 
Town Hall seemed to be at odds with the kind of social and moral delinquency 
described by many as characteristic of young men. When asked, most people in 
Zongo concede that not all young men can be tarred with the same brush. People 
often talk about individual young men in positive terms. Indeed, there are some youth, 
such as Mallam Farouk, whose behaviours are described as exemplary. Nevertheless, 
in popular discourse, good youth remain the exception rather than the rule, such that 
the notion of youth appears antithetical to mutumin kirkii. 
 
4.3 ‘Lafiya’: Perceptions of Order 
In Zongo, notions of social and moral order are expressed through a discourse of 
Islam. However, as has been observed elsewhere of Hausaland94, Islam is just one 
element in a syncretic setting, in which we find a range of beliefs and practices with 
diverse cultural antecedents brought to bear in the act of social and moral judgement. 
Here, the notion of lafiya is significant. In general parlance the term functions in much 
the same way as ‘good’ or ‘well’ in English. For example, ‘kwa lafiya?’ is a standard 
greeting in Gananci Hausa meaning ‘how are you?’. ‘Lafiya lau’ is the appropriate 
                                                          
94  See for example Wall (1988), Last (1976, 1979, 1981, 2004).  
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response, and broadly equates to ‘very well’. Similarly, when asking after somebody’s 
family (‘ya iyali?’), household (‘ya gida?’), or work (‘ya aiki?’), one can expect the same 
reply. Lafiya however is a noun, rather than an adjective or adverb, and thus perhaps 
more precisely translated as wellness or goodness. To form the negative, lafiya is 
conjugated with ‘ban da’ and implies an absence of wellness and/or goodness. For 
example, the phrase ‘ba shi da lafiya’ can mean either ‘he is sick’ (without wellness) 
or ‘he is a bad person’ (without goodness). 
As has been observed by anthropologists in a variety of cultural settings95, notions of 
wellness and goodness seldom constitute discrete and unrelated categories. This is 
well illustrated in Hausa understandings of health and illness. For the Hausa, wellness 
is firmly rooted in moral goodness, and ill-being is generally the result of wrong-doing 
(Last 1976, 1981, Wall 1988). During my time in Zongo I often heard people attribute 
sickness or injury to an envious rival’s curse, or neglect of the prayers through which 
God’s protection is secured. As I came to know Zongo’s inhabitants, it became clear 
that evaluations concerning lafiya or its absence were often motivated as much by the 
commentator’s personal politics as they were by the moral conduct of another 
person96. Indeed, as is evident in Wall’s (1988 p.334) definition of lafiya as “the 
fundamental, proper order of things”, it is a concept with profoundly political 
connotations. Social orders and their boundaries are encoded in narratives of moral 
danger. The attachment of immorality to specific people and things makes social 
orders concrete: the threat of moral transgression and destabilisation marks out where 
social boundaries lie (Douglas 2010). For the Hausa, this order is articulated through 
the notion of lafiya. Those whose behaviours are aligned with received norms of moral 
and social conduct are rewarded by God with lafiya. Conversely, those who transgress 
or deviate from such norms incur God’s wrath, or at the very least fail to gain his favour; 
they experience a lack of lafiya, either as direct punishment from God, or in the 
absence of his protection are left vulnerable to the malevolence of others. 
                                                          
95  For examples from Africa, see Moore and Sanders (2003). For analysis from America 
and the Middle East, see Good (2003). Hausa-specific examples include Wall (1988) and Last 
(1976, 1981, 1979). 
96  This has been similarly observed by Murray Last (1979) in his analysis of an 
ambiguous condition known as ‘gishiri’, meaning ‘salt’ amongst non-Muslim Maguzawa 
Hausa. Last argued that the increasing prevalence of gishiri was derived from its utility as a 
‘cognitive catch-all’ that prevented moral speculation. 
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Implicit to this notion is the perception that order and stability are the positive ideal 
state of things, whilst disorder and instability are highly undesirable. When lafiya is 
lacking, this underlying order is unsettled and disorder prevails. This is to say that 
moral orders imply social orders. Furthermore, if as Douglas (2010) suggests, moral 
dangers are necessary if moral orders are to be made concrete, then the notion of 
‘mutumin kirkii’ – the man of social and moral standing – necessarily requires socially 
and morally dangerous persons as constituent referents. As is evident from the 
account provided above, in Zongo young men are amongst those dangerous and 
destabilising persons that might make the notion of the mutumin kirkii meaningful. 
 
4.4 Behaviour in Public Places 
It is hard to imagine that the young men at Oakville Town Hall are unaffected by this 
discourse. We might reasonably assume that few individuals would wish to be 
accorded the status of youth and would see it as more desirable or advantageous to 
be considered otherwise. This goes some way towards explaining why Abu and his 
friends valued watching and discussing Maid in Manhattan together. At this point it is 
necessary to remind ourselves that narratives or discourses cannot be reduced to their 
descriptive content, but must be examined in terms of their social effects. That a 
particular discourse seems to be at odds with reality does not mean that it is without 
social implications. As Goffman (1974, 1980) argues, to enter a social situation is to 
subject oneself to social evaluation. Others will make judgements as to the kind of 
person one is and how one is to be regarded on the basis of the information they have 
available to them at the time, including how one behaves in public. Consequently, in 
the knowledge that their reputations are at stake, people (consciously and 
unconsciously) monitor and adjust their behaviours so as to create a positive 
impression of themselves to others. There may be greater or lesser incentive to 
produce a given self-presentation in particular circumstances. It would make little 
sense for Abu’s pot-smoking friend to smoke in the presence of others whom he 
suspects might form a negative impression of him on the basis of such behaviour. The 
effects of a particular self-presentation are seldom confined to the social situations in 
which they occur. Hence, even when in the company of other smokers, who might look 
more favourably upon his smoking, our smoker endeavours to undertake his smoking 
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discretely, such that word of his smoking does not spread and discredit the reputation 
he has created for himself elsewhere. Conversely, when a specific impression is 
broadly regarded as positive an individual might seek to foster it in a context in which 
it is most easily achieved in the hope that it will carry over to another. 
As a relatively conspicuous social interaction, the collective activity of viewing and 
discussing Maid in Manhattan provides a stage for impression management. The 
movement of benches from inside the shack into the relatively public space of the 
opening makes their conversations audible and visible to others whose social 
evaluations they might seek to influence. Though I am reluctant to reduce rearranging 
the furniture to an impression management strategy exclusively, it is clear that 
conducting conversations out of view within the shack or indeed watching the show 
alone in the privacy of their own rooms would not yield the same advantages. In their 
relatively public, serious and studious conversations, Abu and his friends not only 
condemn the immorality of Victor, Sara and other characters in Maid in Manhattan, but 
also implicitly demonstrate their eschewal of the immoral behaviours ordinarily 
associated with youth, and therefore distance themselves from the low status 
accorded such a category. 
Of course, that a particular set of norms are widely accepted does not mean that all 
men make an effort to conform to them. Every culture has its deviant subcultures, with 
norms and values diverging from those that are most prevalent in wider society; 
Unguwa Makafi, with its drug takers, noise makers and shadow chasers, is by no 
means an anomaly. However, if a young man wishes to be regarded as mutumin kirkii 
– and most men in Zongo do – then he might logically seek to create distance between 
himself and the notion 'youth' by behaving in ways that foster an alternative definition 
of his character. It is thus not surprising that the behaviours of Abu and his friends 
seem to be at odds with received discourses of youth. In Abu and his friends' viewing 
of Maid in Manhattan we can see an effort to distance themselves from the low prestige 
status of youth. Though we have seen that the category of youth is constituted in 
relation to socially and morally questionable behaviours, the central question remains: 
what constitutes mutumin kirkii and the moral behaviours it is associated with? As the 
following chapters unfold it will become apparent that the discourse that links 
immorality to youth is crucial for making sense of young men’s marital aspirations as 
a process through which accepted and valued manhood is achieved. 
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4.5 Marriage and Social Maturity 
As has been argued above, categories of the person operate as designations of 
sameness and difference. This is to say that there must be other types of people who 
are not youth from which those who are designated as such can be distinguished. It 
thus follows that the notion of youth might be elucidated through an elaboration of the 
categories of person that are constituted in opposition to it. At this point the narrative 
of Abdulahi is useful, in that he defines youth in terms of what it is not and exemplifies 
a notion of ‘manhood’ that is frequently expressed in Zongo. 
I met Abdulahi through a group of butchers from Niger who gathered at a rusting 
shipping container in Unguwa Kariki. The young men worked together at the meat 
market near to the lagoon and referred to Abdulahi as “boss”. When I asked the men 
what they meant, they explained that Abdulahi was their ’’father’’ in Zongo. Abdulahi 
had been born in Zongo, but his father had come from Maradi in Niger. Abdulahi 
maintained many connections with his paternal village. Many of the young men who 
gathered at the container were the sons of Abdulahi’s friends or relatives in Niger. 
They had come to Accra to work and Abdulahi would help them find work and a room 
to live in. 
In my interviews in Zongo I often asked people whether they thought Zongo had 
changed; I posed this question to Abdulahi. He told me about how when he was 
younger he had gathered with other young Nigerien boys at Zongo’s Market Square 
to participate in wrestling contests. Abdulahi was now in his fifties, but remained a 
large, thick-set man. I imagined that he would still make a formidable wrestling 
opponent and so asked him whether he still wrestled. Abdulahi gently rolled his head 
and smiled as if to signify the absurdity of a question with such an obvious answer. 
"I don't wrestle now. I have cow(s) and goat(s). I am serious. Wrestling, that is matter 
for samari, for the youth…. Ina girma ne. You understand me. I am grown. I have 
respect. I am married. I have four children all boys. I must to put the food on the table. 
I don't have time for wrestling, for ball, for those things." 
It is understandable that my question is somewhat absurd for Abdulahi. From the point 
of view of most people in Zongo, he is obviously not the kind of person that would 
wrestle. He no longer wrestles because he is no longer a youth. He asserts that he 
has "grown", implying that he has become something more than samari. He imbues 
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the notion with transience, as a condition or period in life that he once occupied but 
has now exceeded, passed through or left behind. In this respect Abdulahi claims a 
social maturity for himself that he and indeed others in Zongo regard as being superior 
to that of samari. He has “respect”, girma. He is too well thought of by others to be 
considered a youth. 
Abdulahi's account can be seen to exemplify many others produced during my 
fieldwork encounters in Zongo. Abdulahi mentions a number of characteristics that 
differentiate him from youth, including his status as a father, the gender of children, 
his responsibility for putting "food on the table" and that he no longer wrestles or plays 
football. Consistent with my hypothesis presented in Chapter One, and observations 
made in other Hausa-derived societies, marriage and the domestic relations it implies 
are central to accepted and valued notions of manhood. 
It is notable that neither age nor physical stature were amongst the qualities mentioned 
by Abdulahi. There would appear to be no necessary contradistinction between the 
notion of samari and ‘tsufa’ (agedness). Indeed, I came to know a number of men who 
were senior in years and yet were referred to as samari. Moreover, for a man to be 
tsufa and samari can be a source of considerable stigma and ridicule. In Zongo there 
are few elder men who have never married, but those I came to know complained of 
taunting and bullying by other men. Indeed, it would seem to be the case that 
regardless of age, a low status – even stigma – is accorded to those men who have 
yet to marry. Take for example the case of Mallam Malolo. 
Mallam Malolo lived a life of self-imposed seclusion, seldom venturing outside of the 
small room he had inherited from his father. I came to know Mallam Malolo after 
encountering him on midnight visits to one of Sabon Zongo’s public toilets. My own 
desire for relative privacy in what can be a very noisy, crowded and filthy environment 
meant that I favoured the middle of the night for bathroom visits when fewer people 
would be around. Mallam Malolo would visit the bathroom at similar times. I learnt that 
Mallam Malolo’s bathroom habits were informed by a more general aversion to social 
encounters. 
As I gradually got to know Mallam Malolo and came to observe him on those few social 
occasions in which he would venture into public, it became apparent that his self-
imposed seclusion was a result of endless taunting and bullying by other, many of 
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them younger men, who would mock his unmarried status, heckling him with the 
derogatory ‘tuzuru’, meaning bachelor. Several of my neighbours claimed that Mallam 
Malolo was engaged in witchcraft and cautioned against spending time with him for 
fear that I might be cursed or become the victim of one of the evil spirits he spent time 
with. 
Mallam Malolo was in his sixties, but garnered limited respect from men his own age. 
He was not regarded with the respect normally accorded an elder, and he was 
excluded from political functions. He was never reserved a seat at the high table, or 
even a plastic chair, at important social events such as Mawlid, or the opening of a 
new mosque, that men of his age and lineage would ordinarily receive. There was one 
event, a campaign for peace during the elections held at Gaskiya Cinema, when 
Mallam Malolo had ventured out. When I visited Mallam Malolo after the event he was 
explicit in his frustration and sadness at observing his married kinsmen, some younger 
than he, sat atop a large stage, while he was forced to struggle for a view with other 
‘youth’ at the back of the building. When Mallam Malolo did socialise, it was with the 
younger and somewhat more sympathetic men at a base near to his room. Despite 
his senior years, Mallam Malolo remained a samari on account of his unmarried status. 
Though the vast majority of elder men in Zongo have at some time been married, it is 
not unusual for those who have never married to be treated with disdain. As was 
evident in the discussion of Chieftaincy in Chapter Two, status varies between men in 
a number of ways, but the distinction between married man and never married youth 
is an important one. It is only through marriage that the accepted and valued 
manhoods are achieved. 
 
4.6 Conclusions: In Search of Respect 
This chapter began with Mallam Hassan’s account of change in Sabon Zongo. Like 
many people in Zongo, Mallam Hassan described Zongo as undergoing a moral 
decline, driven by the immoral proclivities of young men. Work-shy and unproductive, 
young men were said to have turned to criminal and occult practices as a means to 
satiate their desire for the trappings of ‘modernity’. They disregarded Islam and the 
traditional authority of their elders. Lacking patience, humility and respect, they 
conducted themselves in a manner antithetical to lafiya – the ideal of peace, balance 
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and order. Though this narrative was pervasive in Zongo, it seemed inconsistent with 
my own experience, not least my time spent with young men like Abu and his friends, 
who similarly lamented the degeneracy of youth. 
In seeking to make sense of this apparent disjuncture, I drew upon Douglas’ (2010) 
idea that moral discourses imply social orders. The notion of lafiya – the social and 
moral order ordained by God – was important here in that the idea of youth as not only 
transgressive, but destabilising of lafiya, could be seen as a way of marking out social 
boundaries and making social orders concrete. I posited that the notion of youth might 
be important as a constituent referent of mutumin kirkii; that the notion of youth as 
immoral might operate as ‘Other’ against which the man of social and moral standing 
could be distinguished. 
I sought to examine how this idea might be brought to bear on my interpretation of the 
events that took place at Oakville Town Hall. Given the extent to which young men are 
the subjects of such considerable moral ire, I though it unlikely that anybody would 
want to be associated with such a category of the person. I argued that the relatively 
conspicuous viewing of Maid in Manhattan might be conceived of as a stage for 
impression management in which the young men assert their morality through their 
commentary on the show. This chimes with the idea of imagination as a social practice 
of self-making, first raised in Chapter One. Drawing on Appadurai (2005) and Weiss 
(2009), it might be argued that Abu and his friends make themselves through the 
‘imagining’ of Maid in Manhattan and Sabon Zongo as occupying the same moral 
universe. By imagining affinities and enmities with heroes and villains whose 
behaviours can be condoned or condemned, they create a platform from which to 
publicly reject conduct widely regarded as immoral in Zongo and thus disassociate 
themselves from a notion of youth framed by a discourse of a propensity to immorality. 
The notion of youth could be seen as a socially and morally reprehensible category of 
the person, and so in opposition to the mutumin kirkii. However, this merely served as 
a statement of what the mutumin kirkii is not. The question remained as to what 
constituted mutumin kirkii and the moral behaviours it is associated with. Within 
Abdulahi’s narrative it was possible to discern a notion of manhood constituted in 
opposition to youth. Amongst the various qualities and characteristics deployed by 
Abdulahi in distinguishing himself from youth were a set of domestic relations in which 
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marriage was implicated. This would appear consistent with my suggestion in Chapter 
One, and observations made in other Hausa derived societies, that marriage and the 
domestic relations it implies are central to accepted and valued notions of manhood in 
Zongo. 
From this point of view, we can see why Abu and the other men at Oakville Town Hall 
seem to be so preoccupied with marriage. Marriage is a normative ideal. It is 
something that all men are expected to achieve, but the impetus for conformity to this 
norm is provided by the low prestige accorded to those who have not as yet achieved 
it. To be an unmarried youth is to be negatively evaluated by others. Marriage is a 
mechanism through which an individual distances himself from the less desirable 
condition of being a youth. Getting married connotes an improvement in one's social 
standing, to be better thought of by others than if one remains an unmarried youth. 
However, given the concept of the dramaturgical self, as a reflexive and reflective self-
image constituted in social interaction (Goffman 1956, 1974, 1980), one might argue 
that marriage is the subject of intensified desire amongst young men because its 
absence serves to impinge upon their sense of self-worth. 
In the following chapter I seek to take this idea further, by elaborating the ideological 
underpinnings of mutumin kirkii as a man of social and moral standing and the ways 
in which marriage might be at play in it. As was discussed in Chapter Three, marriage 
has often been seen as a rite of passage, initiating significant transformations in men’s 
social relations within and beyond the domestic space. Therefore, the next chapter 
takes as its jumping off point the social organisation of domestic space in Zongo. Here, 
I explore how marriage and the domestic relations associated with it are implicated in 
notions of manhood in Zongo. 
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Chapter Five: Responsible Manhoods 
 
5.1 Marriage and Household Morphology in Zongo 
The stack of concrete blocks outside Dauda’s room grew as the four young men ferried 
them one-by-one from the back of the taxi into the compound. Dauda stood watching, 
occasionally snapping at the men to be careful, to drop the blocks gently so as not to 
break them. Dauda was soon to be married. His father had made the necessary 
prestationary payments to the bride’s father. Only the ‘sadaki’ or bridewealth to be 
exchanged at the formal wedding ceremony remained outstanding. Dauda’s room was 
within his father’s compound. He had hoped to find a tenant for his room and rent a 
larger chamber and hall for him and his wife elsewhere in Zongo. However, money 
was short and so he had decided to remain where he was and use the blocks to build 
a chamber onto the front of the single room given to him by his father. He explained 
that once he had married and his wife had come to live with him his room would be 
out of bounds to all except he, his wife and eventually his children, and so it was 
necessary to build a chamber so that he could continue to entertain visitors. Dauda 
had already begun the internal renovations. He had concealed the wiring in plastic 
tracking and painted the walls a lurid green. A 2011 calendar featuring a photo of Sheik 
Ibrahim Niass97 was pinned to one wall, and a poster of Michael Essien98 with his wife 
and several cars to the other. Dauda explained that there was a lot left to do for the 
house to be ready for his wife, but “small small” – little by little – he was making 
progress and things ought to be set in time for the wedding when she would be brought 
to his room. 
Marriage in Zongo is patrilocal. Upon marriage a wife leaves her paternal residence 
and moves into a room provided by her husband and his kinsmen. A bride’s residence 
is but one change in domestic arrangements amongst many brought about by 
marriage. As is the case elsewhere in Hausaland, notions of relatedness and the 
                                                          
97  A notable leader in the Tijaniyyah order. 
98  A former Chelsea player from Ghana. 
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various rights, obligations and entitlements they imply are at the heart of social 
organisation. Marriage, as an articulation of relatedness, initiates a number of changes 
in domestic relations with social consequences extending beyond the walls of the 
conjugal living space and into the realm of public politics. 
As discussed in Chapters One and Three, gender analyses have often examined 
domestic relations as a key site in which the social constitution and organisation of 
gender takes place. Domestic arrangements amongst the Hausa have not been 
excluded from such analyses. The work of Smith (1952), Hill (1972), Callaway (1987), 
Cooper (1997) and Pellow (2002) represent just a few examples of analyses which 
have sought to examine domestic relations amongst the Hausa. Anthropologists have 
often argued that the ways in which space is organised tells us a lot about the 
organisational principles of a society (see for example Bourdieu 2007, Low and 
Lawrence-Zúñiga 2007). In his analysis of Hausa domestic economy Smith (1952) 
argues that understanding the physical space of the compound is a necessary 
precursor to making sense of the position of men in the domestic economy that is at 
the heart of Hausa social life (Smith 1952). This idea is clearly pertinent to the Hausa 
‘gida’ – a term referring to both a physical domestic space and system of domestic 
organisation defined in terms of kinship. Therefore, the ‘gida’ or household makes for 
a logical starting point in my effort to make sense of how marriage and the domestic 
relations associated with it are implicated in notions of manhood in Zongo. 
I begin by examining how these relationships have been elaborated in the wider Hausa 
studies literature, and the extent to which continuities can be found with my own 
observations in Zongo. The form and structure of Hausa domestic relations have been 
observed and described in great detail. This is not to assume that these observations 
are directly transferable to Zongo, nor does it position this thesis as a comparative 
analysis. Many of these observations have been found to be broadly consistent across 
the Hausa cultural world. It thus follows that the terminology and structure of the 
household as has been observed in Hausaland is a logical point from which to launch 
my enquiries, even if only to conclude that their insights may not be entirely applicable 
in the context of Zongo. 
Let me begin by presenting the ‘gida’ and ‘iyali’ as distinct levels of kinship grouping, 
how they map onto the physical space of the compound, the different rights, 
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responsibilities and statuses of the men who inhabit it and what they reveal about 
notions of manhood in Zongo. As we shall see, the physical structure of the compound 
plays out the normative principles governing relationships between the constituents of 
a co-residential kin group, particularly in terms of gender, generation and marital 
status. 
 
5.2 The Hausa Gida 
Residential spaces and the relations that they imply have been a mainstay of the 
Hausa studies literature. The diagram of the typical Hausa compound below is taken 
from Smith’s (1952 p.17) analysis of domestic economy in rural Zaria, a study 
undertaken in 1949-50, when Northern Nigeria was under British colonial 
administration. As is evident in the literature, residential formations amongst the Hausa 
have remained remarkably consistent over space and time99. Many of the essential 
elements of the compound’s physical structure, as recorded by Smith (ibid), endure in 
present day Hausaland and other locales where significant Hausa populations can be 
found.  
The term gida denotes the physical space of the Hausa compound, which is composed 
of several partitioned habitations or ‘sassa’ as illustrated in the diagram below. A 
compound is ordinarily enclosed by a surrounding wall, with entry via the ‘zaure’ – a 
small room, hut or enclosure. The zaure is a relatively public – though predominantly 
male – space, where the household’s senior men entertain guests and undertake their 
day-to-day affairs. Beyond the zaure is the ‘kofar gida’, or forecourt in which the 
sleeping quarters of unmarried men and male visitors can be found. The kofar gida is 
separated from the ‘cikin gida’, or inner forecourt. The cikin gida is a primarily female 
space, generally off-limits to male non-kin. Within the cikin gida are the sassa 
partitions, as well as cooking spots, and when wife seclusion or ‘auren kulle’ (see 
below) is practised, a latrine and well (Smith 1952, Pellow 2002). 
                                                          
99 See Smith (1952) for an account relating to Zaria; Hill (1972) for Katsina; Cooper 
(1997) and Manvell (2005) for Maradi; Cohen (1969) for Ibadan; Arnould (1984) for Zinder; 
Moughtin (1964) and Werthmann (2002) for Kano; and Pellow (2008) for Accra. 
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The compound is typically, though not always, inhabited by patrilineal kin. The general 
congruity of kinship and co-residency means that the term gida may also be used to 
refer to the patrilineal kin group itself (Smith 1952, Pellow 2002)100. Each sassa is 
occupied by an individual ‘iyali’. The iyali can be thought of as nuclear conjugal unit: a 
husband, his wife, their dependent children, and sometimes the husband’s elderly 
mother (M G Smith 1952, Hill 1972, Arnould 1984, Pellow 2002)101.  
There are rigid norms concerning the division and use of space within the gida. Who 
has access to where, when and for what reason is defined in terms of gender, 
generation and marital status, often articulated through a discourse of Islam (Moughtin 
1964). At its most extreme such gender segregation involves the seclusion of married 
women, or ‘auren kulle’, within the domestic compound. Kulle is not universally 
practised amongst the Hausa, and what the seclusion actually involves varies; 
nevertheless, it remains an ideal to which many people, both men and women, aspire 
(Callaway 1987, Sule and Starratt 1991, Pellow 2002). However, whether or not some 
form of kulle is practised, the spatial segregation of gender is an important feature of 
the compound’s internal structure. It is divided into separate spaces for males and 
females with marriage mediating the spaces in which inter-gender interactions are 
acceptable.
                                                          
100  So as to avoid confusion I will use the term gida for the kin group rather than the 
compound unless otherwise specified. As we shall see this distinction is most necessary in 
the context of Zongo where residential patterns within the patrilineal kin group are perhaps 
more variable, but the compound remains an important social, political and economic 
institution. 
101  Though patrilineality is emphasised in compound composition, kinship amongst the 
Hausa is widely acknowledged as bilateral. Affective ties with maternal kin are valued and 
encouraged and may have considerable social and political significance (Smith 1965, Manvell 
2005). 
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Figure 3. The Typical Hausa Gida 
 
Smith (1952 p.17). 
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Figure 4. The ‘Gida’ Co-residential Kinship Group 
 
At the apex of the diagram are the mai gida (head of household) and his wife the uwa gida. The level 
below is composed of their two married sons, who are the mai iyali heads of their respective family 
units. The lowest level is composed of the young children of the iyali. Each iyali, occupies a partition or 
‘sassa’ within the compound. Married daughters are not shown as marriage is generally virilocal 
meaning that upon marriage daughters form part of their husband’s iyali and relocate to his compound. 
When marriage is monogamous, the husband will sleep with his wife in an individual 
room within the sassa. In the case of polygamous marriages, each wife will have her 
own room. She will not be expected to share her quarters with anybody other than her 
husband and children (Sule and Starratt 1991). Though a wife might entertain female 
visitors in her room, it is off-limits to all men other than her husband and pre-adolescent 
sons102. A polygamously married man is expected to regard his wives equally and so 
sleeps in the rooms of his various wives on a rotating basis103. Children tend to enjoy 
free reign of the compound and may or may not sleep in their mothers’ room. However, 
it is regarded as taboo for a son to sleep in his mother’s room once he has reached 
adolescence. Therefore at least one room within the compound, ordinarily within the 
kofar gida, is allocated to unmarried men, samari and male visitors. A room within the 
cikin gida is often allocated to unmarried daughters; but daughters may sleep within 
                                                          
102  It is noteworthy that adoption (‘tallafi’) is common amongst the Hausa; and though 
consanguinity is not a precondition for adoption, it is generally restricted to members of same 
kinship group. 
103  For a husband to sleep in the room of one wife more frequently than he does another 
is interpreted as a sign of preference and thus is ill-thought of.  Such preference may be 
considered legitimate grounds for a wife to seek a divorce (Hill 1972, Cooper 1995). 
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their mother’s room until marriage when they will move to their husband’s compound 
(Cooper 1995, Pellow 2002). 
As described above, the zaure is primarily a male space, but senior men in wealthier 
households – in particular the ‘mai gida’ or head of household – may have rooms of 
their own that are set apart from their wives’ quarters known as turaka. The turaka 
provides a space for men away from the relatively public space of the zaure (Smith 
1952). 
 
5.3 The Gida in Zongo 
In Zongo as in Hausaland the iyali is thought of as a cohabiting conjugal unit with its 
unmarried children (though the term sassa is not part of common parlance in Zongo). 
The iyali’s dwelling usually consists of at least one room for sleeping104, generally off-
limits to male non-kin, and a living room used for eating and entertaining visitors105. 
Though the iyali seems to take by-and-large the same form in Zongo and Hausaland, 
there are major differences in the structure of the compound, the division and use of 
space within it, and its relationship to the gida kinship group.  
In Zongo the term gida is also used to denote a physical compound. However, there 
is less frequently correspondence between the compound’s residents and gida kinship 
group. Instead, a compound is composed of various habitations occupied by people 
who may or may not identify with one another in terms of kinship. My own room in 
Zongo was within a larger compound that had been built by one of Zongo’s founding 
patriarchs. Many of the compound’s residents claimed to be descended from his 
lineage, but there were equally many – if not more – who did not. For example, 
included amongst my immediate neighbours were several Tuareg beggars, four 
Zabrama men who had recently migrated from Niger and an Ewe lady whose Hausa 
husband rented the room for her, but seldom spent time there.  
It is often the case that a compound is inhabited by a variety of people with vastly 
different backgrounds and relationships to each other, as well as to Zongo. A 
                                                          
104  Referred to as dakin kwana – literally 'sleeping room'. 
105  Referred to as dakin taruwa – literally gathering room. 
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correspondence between compound and gida is most often found in households 
belonging to Zongo’s wealthiest and most politically powerful men. These men are 
often the descendants of Zongo’s founding patriarchs whose landholdings are largest 
and constitute what Pellow (2002) has described as a landlord class. However, even 
in these compounds there are a large number of tenants, and long- and short-term 
visitors. 
As described in Chapter Two, the Zongo compound would have at one time more 
closely resembled those typically found in Hausaland106. Land scarcity, in tandem with 
population pressures, leaves residents with few options to increase their living space 
– a scenario not uncommon in many of Accra’s Zongos (Pellow 2002). A handful of 
wealthier households have built a second story on top of an existing structure. If there 
is space, residents might build additional rooms extending further into the compound, 
as in the case of Dauda, or sometimes even the street. Given the difficulties of securing 
space to build outwards, a more common scenario is the partitioning of existing rooms 
into smaller and smaller subdivisions. 
One long-term elderly resident recalled how my room was one of several that had 
been constructed within what had once been the cikin gida. Many people referred to 
the cluster of dwellings that occupied the same area as the cikin gida, but the term 
implied neither the social nor spatial relationships that one would expect to find in 
Hausaland. The term was instead little more than an echo of the compound’s historical 
inhabitants and patterns of residency, which had come to serve as a means of 
orientation.  
My own room was a mixed concrete, timber and metal construction about three metres 
by three metres. In Zongo I often felt suffocated, and my small room offered little 
respite from the heat and noise. I had once moaned about the size of my living space 
and its lack of a window to Muntaka, one of my informants. With good reason, Muntaka 
laughed at me and then took me to his own room. Muntaka’s room was a baking hot 
concrete oven without windows. When it rained it was water rather than speckles of 
daylight which crept in through the gaps in the rusting corrugated iron rooftop. The 
floor was covered with a piece of foam with a pillow at one end. The room was not 
                                                          
106  Pellow (2002) observes that this is a consistent feature of Zongos in Accra. 
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quite long enough to lay down in and too small to accommodate Muntaka and his few 
personal possessions at the same time. If there wasn’t a small pile of clothes and 
shoes outside his door when I called round to visit, I would know he wasn’t at home. 
Muntaka and his three brothers had each been given a room by their father within the 
same portion of the compound. His father now lived in Kasoa, a more recently 
established and less densely populated Zongo about an hour by tro-tro107 from Accra. 
He owned five or six other rooms in Zongo, most of which were rented to tenants. 
Muntaka’s situation is not unusual in Zongo, as new living quarters are squeezed out 
of ever-shrinking spaces. Muntaka, however, by his own admission was fortunate in 
that at the very least he had his own room. Most young men in Zongo share a room 
with other unmarried male kin or else rent a room with friends. Shared rooms are 
generally larger, though it is not unheard of for a room to be too small to accommodate 
all of its inhabitants, and for the issue of who sleeps where and when to be the subject 
of some negotiation. 
Throughout Sabon Zongo. the original compound structure has dissolved into small 
rooms and narrow alleyways. Zaures are few; turaka are non-existent. Many if not 
most iyali have only one room, and the communal spaces of the compounds are 
shrinking. As described in Chapter Two, one effect of this pattern of residential 
development is that a great deal of male-male social interaction takes place in the 
street or other relatively public spaces, such as at Zongo’s many bases. Mallam 
Hassan’s account of Zongo as a disorderly place108 is perhaps not surprising, given 
that men’s social lives have moved out of the compound and in to the street. Young 
men also complain about the lack of space in Zongo. Most young men say they enjoy 
living with friends or kin, but they also look forward to having a room of their own. 
Private accommodation has the obvious benefits of peace and privacy, but its principle 
value resides in being a necessity for marriage. When a man marries for the first time, 
his senior kin are expected to help him find suitable accommodation. There is no moral 
principle that stands against a man renting a room without their support if he has the 
means to do so. However, given the scarcity and relatively high cost of renting or 
                                                          
107  Mini-bus. 
108  See Chapter Four. 
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buying a room, unmarried men generally rely on their senior kinsmen to provide them 
with a room or the means to rent one. 
Dauda’s room had been a single room when his father had given it to him and he had 
inhabited it quite happily for several years. Now that he was about to marry he felt that 
he needed a larger room more suitable for a cohabiting couple. Though his father 
agreed to this, he had been unable to provide Dauda with alternative accommodation, 
and so instead granted him permission to extend the existing dwelling into the 
compound’s communal space. As far as I am aware, Dauda’s kin had been supportive 
of his endeavours. His uncles and older brothers had provided him with materials, and 
the youngest men in the household had been ordered to contribute their labour. 
However, it is not always the case that things run so smoothly.  
The allocation of rooms is frequently the cause of tensions within a kin group. A mai 
gida is generally regarded as custodian rather than owner of a gida’s property. He is 
simply responsible for distributing land amongst those who are entitled to it. Thus it is 
generally ill-thought of for a mai gida to sell land, even if he holds the legal title. A 
young man with a very small room or no room at all will likely protest when a mai gida 
rents out a room to tenants or allocates it to one of his other kin. Take for example the 
case of Danladi, whose sale of land has become something of an enduring saga in 
Zongo. Danladi was the mai gida of a large and prestigious lineage in Zongo and the 
custodian of the household’s property. Danladi had refused to give any of his three 
sons a room. He had instead decided to secretly sell all the land and use the money 
to build a house for himself elsewhere. Needless to say Danladi’s own sons were 
greatly angered by his actions, but he was also thoroughly despised by his other 
kinsmen, who felt similarly entitled to a share of the property. 
 
5.4 Gida as Kin Group 
Within the gida, the term ‘mai gida’ is used to denote the most senior male in terms of 
generation, age and social maturity (Hill 1972). Marriage in Hausaland is patrilocal, 
and so the mai gida is related to the other men in the gida as either father, grandfather, 
uncle or eldest brother. Depending upon their marital status these men will be either 
mai iyali or samari. The former being a married head of an iyali unit, and the latter an 
unmarried youth. These terms are relative and may often overlap. A mai gida is 
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necessarily mai iyali of his own conjugal unit and in certain circumstances, such as in 
the presence of a yet more senior kinsmen, the term mai gida is reserved for his senior. 
The mai gida is the formal point of contact between external authorities, such as the 
Chieftaincy or State, and the compound’s inhabitants. For example, he is generally 
responsible for collecting and paying taxes that relate to the compound. Much like 
Schwerdtfeger (1982) described in the Northern Nigerian city of Zaria, compounds in 
Zongo are often referred to by the name of the mai gida as a reflection of this formal 
status. However, for the time being it is the mai gida’s relationship to others within the 
gida, specifically junior men that is my focus. 
Within the Hausa studies literature, the practice of ‘gandu’ has often been observed 
as the idealised form of household relations of production, exemplifying the 
organisational principles that hierarchically organise men within the gida (Hill 1972, 
Cooper 1995).  Gandu therefore offers itself as a useful starting point for the current 
investigation. I draw much of the following analysis from Hill (1972) and Smith (1952), 
whose accounts of gandu are arguably the most thorough. My description below 
arguably presents an overly stable image of gandu. The institution has changed both 
in terms of the prevalence of its practice and broader social significance. One would 
struggle to find incidence of gandu in the present day. Nevertheless, the social and 
moral underpinnings of gandu resonate closely with domestic organisation in 
contemporary Hausaland (Cooper 1993, 1995). Thus gandu provides a frame through 
which to examine inter-generational relationships in Zongo. 
As described above, the iyali can be thought of as a husband and his dependent wives 
and children, including his unmarried sons regardless of age. In its simplest form, 
collective agricultural practice takes place at the level of iyali, with the iyali’s various 
constituents undertaking farming and food preparation together under the authority of 
the mai iyali. When the first of a mai iyali’s sons marries, the structure of the household 
changes. A son establishes his own conjugal unit such that his father, whilst remaining 
mai iyali of his own conjugal unit, becomes mai gida – the head of a multiple iyali 
household (Smith 1952). Upon marriage, a son is provided with a room for him and 
his wife, and a parcel of land or ‘gayauna’ to farm so as to sustain his newly established 
iyali. However, married sons may continue to farm with their fathers, such that the unit 
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of production is the gida. When farming is undertaken at the level of the gida it is 
referred to as ‘gandu’ (Hill 1972). 
In its ideal form, gandu involves the pooling of labour from the various iyali that 
constitute the gida to meet their combined subsistence needs during the rainy season. 
Other forms of economic activity often take place alongside gandu, including own 
account farming, wage labour and numerous other occupations and trades (Smith 
1955, Hill 1972, Arnould 1984). 
The basic precept of gandu is that it is a collective exercise ostensibly undertaken in 
the interest of the gida as a whole (Cooper 1995). As far as the Hausa are concerned 
deference to one’s seniors and duty to one’s kin are central tenets of Islam and thus 
important characteristics of mutumin kirkii (Smith 1959, Barkow 1974, Salamone 
2005). Consequently, there is a strong normative pull towards participation (Hill 1972, 
Cooper 1995). Though gandu is a collective endeavour, this is not to say that it is 
egalitarian. There are significant differences between individuals in terms of their 
access to and control over resources, including labour, and the goods that are 
produced from them (Hill 1972, Cooper 1995). This can be seen as the basis upon 
which men are hierarchically organised within a kinship group. At the apex of this 
hierarchy are mai gida, who exert the greatest control over the gida's productive 
activities and resources, and who make decisions concerning how the outputs of 
production are to be distributed between the various iyali and other individuals who 
may have participated. Within the iyali, the hierarchical structure of the gandu is 
replicated at a smaller scale. The mai iyali has a right to the labour of his wives and 
unmarried sons, and is principle decision maker in terms of the allocation of resources 
derived from gandu (Hill 1972). 
Generally speaking, it is the mai gida who is responsible for mobilising and organising 
the gida’s labour for gandu, and who distributes the outputs amongst the various iyali 
units and unmarried sons that have participated. This may take the form of grain, or 
cash from its sale, but also clothing, the payment of taxes, and crucially contributions 
towards wedding expenses. Such expenses include the necessary prestationary 
payments such as bridewealth or ‘sadaki’, a room for the newly married couple and 
land to farm as gayauna (Hill 1972). I will go into these costs in greater detail in 
Chapters Seven and Eight, but for the time being it is enough to say that marriage is 
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a costly endeavour and sons rely heavily upon their fathers to meet the expense. In 
this respect gandu is important to the gida’s morphology, in that it is through gandu 
that a son finds the resources to marry and establish his own household. 
Gandu is typically limited to the rainy season when most agricultural activity takes 
place. Once the rainy season has come to an end, production undergoes a shift in 
emphasis from the gida to the iyali. During the dry season it is the mai iyali who is 
normatively responsible for meeting the subsistence needs of its various constituents. 
The iyali will subsist from their own land holdings and/or ‘gayauna’ – land allocated to 
them by the gandu head or mai gida which is distinguished from that which is 
collectively farmed by the gandu unit. Farming may take place alongside other trades 
or occupations should such opportunities exist. Alongside food, cash, payment of 
marital expenses and taxes, a gandu head is obliged to provide junior men with 
gayauna during the farming season (Hill 1972).  
In this sense the gandu can be seen as an intergenerational contract in which junior 
men provide senior men with labour in return for the resources necessary to establish 
and sustain their own households. However, this relationship is seldom a voluntary or 
equitable exchange of labour for resources. Though gandu land and its outputs are 
notionally the collective property of a household, senior men derive considerable 
authority from their control over how its outputs are distributed. This control means 
that an unmarried man seeking a bride must gain the favour of his senior kin by 
submitting to their authority if he is to secure the resources necessary for marriage 
(Hill 1972, Solivetti 1994). 
Though a father is obliged to make a contribution to his son’s wedding expenses, the 
eventual sum will largely be a function of his generosity and ability to muster further 
contributions from friends and kin (Hill 1972, Goddard 1973). The relatively high cost 
of marriage means sons are often dependent upon their fathers to meet wedding 
expenses. This informs the balance of incentives motivating participation in gandu. A 
son’s dependence on his father’s assistance provides the incentive for a son to submit 
to his father’s demands, even if his father’s efforts to fulfil his wider gandu obligations 
are lacking. However, material wealth is of only limited value in terms of a man’s 
prestige and status, and as such other social imperatives are brought to bear on how 
resources ultimately come to be allocated. 
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5.5 ‘Arzkin Mutane’: Wealth in People 
“Kowa ya bi a bi shi - Whoever follows in loyalty will also be followed” (Hausa 
proverb).109 
At this point it is necessary to introduce the notion of ‘arzikin mutane’ – a concept that 
broadly equates to wealth in people. Wealth in people refers to the notion that the 
number of one’s dependants or followers mediates prestige, power and status (Miers 
and Kopytoff 1979, Bledsoe 1980). Anthropologists have observed that in many parts 
of Africa, wealth in people is so fundamental to the attainment of status, and that status 
is so greatly desired, that the accumulation of people often takes precedence over the 
accumulation of things (Guyer 1995, 2004). This is certainly the case for the Hausa. 
High social recognition is reflected in the notion of arzikin mutane, making it of 
fundamental importance to this study (Smith 1952). 
The possession of material wealth is only related to status insofar as it is converted 
into arzikin mutane. Indeed, it has often been argued that wealth in people and the 
status derived from it is valued so highly amongst the Hausa that many men are willing 
to forgo personal material wealth in pursuit of it (Smith 1955, Kirk-Green 1974). For a 
man110, arzikin mutane is demonstrated by his ability to mobilize labour and control 
and subordinate a large number of persons as dependants (Arnould 1984, 1989, 
Cooper 1995). Both marriage and gandu can be seen as mechanisms through which 
a man cultivates wealth-in-people. 
Gandu can be seen as an archetypal form of arzikin mutane and therefore as an 
important source of prestige and status for men. Thus there is an incentive for gandu 
heads to sustain as large a gandu unit as possible (Goddard 1943, Hill 1972). Though 
in some cases a gandu unit may be composed of non-kin, an important mechanism 
by which a mai gandu enlarges his gandu unit is by having sons and recruiting them 
into the gandu unit. In line with the moral norms of Islam, extra-marital sex is frowned 
upon such that a man’s reputation is diminished by sons born outside of wedlock 
(Solivetti 1994). Thus marriage is necessary if a mai gandu is to enlarge his gandu, 
whilst at the same time keeping his reputation as a man of moral standing intact. 
                                                          
109 Aminu (2003 p.12) 
110  Arzikin mutane has slightly different connotations for women. 
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Marriage is not only a means to enlarge a gandu, but is in and of itself a manifestation 
of arzikin mutane. The notions of family ('iyali'), household ('gida') and the married 
man's status within them as master or owner ('mai'), make explicit the contingency of 
men's statuses on their relationship to a household unit composed of their putative 
dependants and subordinates. To be mai iyali or mai gida is to be responsible for 
providing for a family or household of dependants. Broadly speaking, greater prestige 
is conferred upon mai gida than mai iyali. The relative depth and breadth of the kinship 
groups that depend upon them, and over which they exert authority, imply differential 
arzikin mutane to different mai. It is not surprising that at the bottom of this hierarchical 
ordering of men are samari. By virtue of their unmarried status they have no formal 
dependants over which they can be seen to hold authority. They are themselves the 
dependants and subordinates of mai iyali and mai gida. Elder men who have yet to 
marry are for the best part disdained (Solivetti 1994). These status effects explain why 
sons are often eager to participate in gandu. In order to improve his status, to become 
mai iyali, a saurayi needs to marry. Participation in gandu is a means through which 
samari access the resources, held by senior lineage men, with which to establish their 
own households and cultivate arzikin mutane. This is reflected in household 
morphology in that for a man to marry is to move from a room shared with other 
unmarried men to one shared with his wife. This reflects a change in his position 
relative to the gida unit. Though once married a son may continue to participate in 
gandu, he is no longer solely defined in terms of his dependency on the senior men 
within the gida, but establishes his own iyali comprised of his notional dependants. 
When their fathers die, brothers may continue to farm in fraternal gandu, with the 
eldest married brother as mai gida. However, it is more often the case that junior men, 
irked by the idea of submitting to a brother’s authority, claim (in line with Islam law) a 
portion of their father’s land as inheritance and choose to farm on their own account 
(Hill 1972). 
There are several key points that I would draw out from the above before moving on 
to examine some of the issues presented by this analysis. First of all, arzikin mutane 
is important to male prestige and status. Though material wealth matters for many 
reasons, its social value is principally as a means to accumulate wealth in people 
(Smith 1952). At the centre of arzikin mutane are relations of dependency and 
subordination. Being mai gida – the head of an extended kinship group composed of 
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dependants – is to occupy a position of prestige and status. Conversely being saurayi, 
an unmarried youth, or worse still an elderly bachelor or ‘tuzuru’ – neither of whom 
have formally recognised dependants – is a position of low social status. This brings 
me to my second key point. Marriage serves as both a demonstration of and means 
to cultivate arzikin mutane. Upon his first marriage, a man ceases to be a youth and 
becomes mai iyali. He is no longer solely identified as his father’s dependant, but is 
the head of his own conjugal unit with dependants of his own. However, in pursuing 
the marriages which bring about this change in status, young men depend heavily 
upon the senior lineage men, who control access to the necessary resources. 
Expressions of deference are thus necessary if junior men are to secure the support 
of their seniors. 
At this point it is important to highlight a key issue in the account of gandu provided 
above. As Cooper (1995) argues, the emphasis in accounts of gandu has often tended 
towards production. A particular issue arising from this narrative is the assumed 
congruity between units of production and consumption – that the individuals within 
the iyali unit ‘eat from the same pot’ (Cooper 1995)111. However, there are significant 
differences between the individual constituents of the iyali in terms of the obligation to 
contribute to, and entitlement to consume from such a pot.  
Normative expectations concerning men’s and women’s contributions to household 
upkeep are defined and differentiated within the terms of an Islamic conjugal contract. 
Husbands meet their wives’ consumption needs – defined as cooking, cleaning, 
childrearing as well as sexual services – in return for reproductive labour. A husband 
or wife’s failure to fulfil these normative obligations is regarded as legitimate grounds 
for divorce (Hill 1972, Solivetti 1994, Cooper 1995). Whilst often underplayed by men, 
the productive activities of Hausa women have been well documented112. 
Nevertheless, regardless of their actual incomes, women remain under lesser 
obligation to make the product of such activities available for consumption by other 
members of the household (Hill 1969, Callaway 1987, Cooper 1997, Robson 2000, 
2006). 
                                                          
111  See for example Schwerdtfeger (1982), Ross et al (1996), Etkin (2002). 
112  See for example Hill (1969), Barkow (1972), Jackson (1978), Schildkrout (1982), 
Callaway (1984), Coles and Mack (1991), Cooper (1995), Pittin (2002). 
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Similarly, young men might engage in a range of economic activities quite apart from 
those undertaken at the request of senior lineage men. For example, many young men 
combined work on household land with waged agricultural labour, trade or a craft such 
as butchery, leatherwork or metalsmithing (Hill 1972, Solivetti 1994). Senior men are 
normatively expected to provide for junior men, but unlike women, junior men are 
required to make a contribution to a household’s productive efforts. As long as a father 
fulfils his obligations to his sons, he has a right to their labour. When a son’s 
independent income is significant, contributions in the form of cash or goods may be 
given in lieu of labour (Hill 1972, Yusuf et al 2003, Robson 2004, Clough 2014). 
Key here is that the productive apparatus and outputs under the notional control of 
mai gida and mai iyali do not constitute the sum total of economic activities. They may 
not even be the principal means by which a household sustains itself. They are, 
however, those to which each and every member of a household, including young 
men, can claim an entitlement. 
A mai gida may use his monopoly of the outputs of gandu to fund further marriages 
for himself and enhance his status by recruiting dependent wives and children. 
However, the incentives for a son to remain in gandu are diminished when a father is 
unwilling or unable to contribute to wedding expenses. Thus mai gandu must also 
meet junior men’s demands for wives and the land, accommodation and prestationary 
payments required to obtain them. If a gandu head fails to fulfil his obligations to junior 
men, then they may withdraw their labour leading to the dissolution of the gandu and 
the mai gida’s status with it (Hill 1972, Solivetti 1994). 
The demise of gandu has been explained by the relative availability and viability of 
agriculture versus more lucrative off-farm economic activities (Hill 1972, Goddard 
1973, Yusuf et al 2011). Though opinions differ as to the particular composition of such 
push and pull factors, it is generally accepted that the incentives for young men to 
participate in gandu have diminished significantly. Gandu’s decline has been 
associated with a reconfiguration of inter-generational relationships within the 
household and the structure of socio-economic structures that underpin them. Young 
men’s reduced dependency on senior men is seen as unsettling gerontocratic 
authority. The balance of normative entitlements and responsibilities and an 
individual’s capacity to meet them can be seen to inform the extent to which a head of 
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household can exercise his authority. Nevertheless, the notion of senior men as 
providers responsible for dependant and subordinate others endures as an idealised, 
if illusory, standard to which men are expected to aspire and remains central to the 
hierarchical ordering of manhoods. What emerges here is a disjuncture between 
notional and actual dependencies. This reveals a paradoxical interweaving of 
dependencies, in that the arzikin mutane of senior men and the status it confers relies 
upon the deference and subordination of dependant others, including junior men. 
Something that junior men may withdraw if senior men fail to provide adequate 
incentives to cooperate. These ideas can be seen to similarly frame inter-generational 
relations and the tensions that permeate them in Zongo. 
 
5.6 Inter-Generational Relationships 
In terms of kinship, Hausa notions of mai gida, mai iyali and saurayi remain extant in 
Zongo. As described above, the iyali can be thought of as a co-residential conjugal 
unit and its unmarried children, and the gida a group composed of multiple iyali of the 
same patrilineage. The mai iyali and mai gida are the senior males of the respective 
kinship units. As in Hausaland, the mai iyali is described in no uncertain terms as the 
person responsible for providing accommodation, clothing and food for his wives and 
children. This norm is perhaps most evident in the apparent failure of many men to 
conform to it. 
Like many married women, Hawa often complained that her husband was failing to 
fulfil his "duty" as provider and that her husband was "not a good husband". Hawa 
earned sufficient income from her 'chop bar' to participate in an extensive biki network 
and was able to purchase relatively expensive goods such as jewellery and perfume. 
Nevertheless, Hawa and her husband Musa frequently fought. Hawa would chase 
Musa from her room into the shared compound, publicly ridiculing Musa with 
complaints that he was so useless that she had had to clothe and feed her children 
herself. Though people disapproved of Hawa’s lack of ‘shame’, it was Musa’s neglect 
and inability to control his wife that caused the greatest consternation. Complaints 
such as Hawa’s are not unusual in Zongo. Many married men might publicly regard 
such complaints as ill-founded, or derived from their wives’ failure to recognise the 
difficulties they faced finding the "daily bread" in the "modern world". Nevertheless, a 
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central preoccupation for married men is to be seen by others as fulfilling their 
obligation to provide for dependant wives and children. As we can see in the above 
example, the mai iyali is normatively responsible for providing for his iyali unit in much 
the same way as he would be in Hausaland, even if many men fail to fulfil this role to 
their wives’ satisfaction. 
For most people in Zongo, the term gandu is meaningless. One respondent told me 
that he knew a man in Kumasi by the name of Alhaji Gandu, but made no mention of 
it as an agricultural practice or indeed any other form of household organisation. 
Gandu was familiar to some of the recent Hausa and Zabrama migrants and itinerant 
workers from Niger, who tended to live in a cluster of rooms in Unguwa Zabrama and 
Unguwa Makafi. A number of these young men explained that they would return to 
Niger for ‘damina’ – rainy season, sometime in April or May – to farm land in their 
home villages and spend Ramadan with their families113. As an agricultural practice, 
gandu is clearly untenable in Zongo, whose location in Accra’s urban heart means that 
there is no land to farm. Though some wealthier Fulani men keep cattle which are 
grazed down at the lagoon, there is little in the way of an agricultural economy and its 
associated seasonal variations in production. This perhaps explains why the mai iyali 
remains responsible for the iyali’s upkeep throughout the year.  
Furthermore, for the best part the iyali’s economic activities are independent of the 
gida as a whole. Important exceptions to this are the most well-established butchers 
and a number of Zongo’s scrap dealers. For example, most of the men from Gidan 
Aliku live with their families in a cluster of dwellings, which although not all within the 
same compound centre on a single workspace, where animals are slaughtered.  
These men make their living from butchery or various related trades such as tanning, 
sandal making, cooking and selling kebabs. Similarly, Alhaji Mohammadu’s sons and 
grandsons all play a part in in his scrap dealing business. They live with their wives 
                                                          
113  Regrettably, I did not gather specific data on the population of migrant workers from 
Niger and their periods of residency in Zongo. However, I did notice that one of the rooms 
generally occupied by young Nigerien nail cutters in Unguwa Makafi became noticeably less 
crowded between May and November. Samaila, an older man who lived permanently in the 
room, told me that the young boys had gone to Niger for farming and Ramadan. I was unable 
to confirm the destinations of most of these men and the reasons that they had departed, 
except in the case of one young man who returned to Zongo and told me that he had gone 
home to marry. Nevertheless, this fluctuation in population would seem to be broadly 
consistent with Manvell’s (2005) observations in Niger. 
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and children in several rooms built around a large pile of scrap metal. Alhaji 
Mohammadu is a second generation migrant with ancestral roots in Nigeria. He tells 
me that he prefers to have his kinsmen nearby so as to ensure that there is always 
somebody to keep a watchful eye over the assembled goods.  
It is important to note that, compared to other forms of economic activity in Zongo, 
these are relatively profitable, large scale enterprises, requiring large amounts of 
labour. The demand for labour and the ability to pay means that both households 
employ a large number of men not limited to their own kin. However, most economic 
activities in Zongo take place on a much smaller scale such that these cases represent 
the exception rather than the rule. Sometimes sons inherit their father’s trade or 
occupation, but in most cases they carry out such activities independently. In short, 
there is little in the way of collective economic activity at the level of the gidagida. The 
implication here is that the mai gida retains limited involvement and thus control over 
the household’s economic activities. It thus follows that the economic dependencies, 
which in Hausaland shore up the mai gida’s authority over junior men, would seem to 
be lacking in Zongo. This situation is bolstered by the relative rarity of the gida as a 
co-residential unit. 
Though a mai gida nearly always lives with his own wives, unmarried daughters and 
young children, the same cannot be said for his other kin. Spatial and economic 
constraints often mean that individual iyali and older unmarried sons are scattered 
across Zongo’s neighbourhoods. This informs relationships within the gida and the 
scope of the mai gida’s authority. Wives from the same gida, even the same iyali, are 
seldom co-resident in the same compound. Women can and do share activities such 
as cooking, cleaning and childrearing. A mai iyali’s wife may prepare food for his father 
or other senior kinsman, especially if he or his wife is elderly, infirm or deceased. 
Children may sleep in the room of his father’s kinsmen and eat wherever they choose. 
Men can and do eat at the homes of their kinsmen. A man ought not to refuse his 
brother, father or their children food. If her husband is absent, though, a wife might 
turn his kinsmen away or claim that there is no food, particularly if his visits become 
too regular. 
Every other day Sadat would come and visit his wife, Halima, who lived in a room near 
to my own. When Sadat came by he would often invite me to eat with him, and 
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sometimes his brother Suwallam. Halima was a great cook and with the permission of 
her husband, Halima said that she could cook for me in the evenings. I would give 
Halima money to buy ingredients, which she would use to prepare food for me and 
any visitors I might have. Suwallam regularly came to visit and we would eat the food 
Halima had prepared together. As his visits became more frequent, Halima started to 
claim that there was no food. Knowing full well that there was food, I was confused; 
but I thought it better to raise the issue with Halima when Suwallam was not around. 
When I asked her why she had declined him food, she explained that Suwallam was 
not giving money to his own wife for food, and that he would make more effort to do 
so if he could not find food for himself elsewhere. She advised me against refusing 
him food myself as this would be disrespectful. She said that it would be better for her 
to talk to her own husband, who would in turn tell his father, whose duty it was to make 
sure Suwallam was not neglecting his domestic responsibilities, and to help him to 
meet them if need be. 
Some days later, Suwallam came to visit and told me that his daughter was suffering 
from malaria and asked whether I might be able to give him money for medicine. I had 
no money to hand but said I would come to see him the following day. I was unsure 
about the veracity of Suwallam’s claims and so felt ambivalent about giving him 
money. Nevertheless, my sensitivities about being duped were outweighed by the 
possibility that his daughter might well be sick.  
The next day I called by Suwallam’s room to give him some money only to find that he 
was not around. However, I found his brother Sadat nearby. I enquired after the health 
of Suwallam’s daughter, and asked if Sadat could give the money to his brother. 
Sadat’s face went from confused, to angry, to ashamed. He told me that Suwallam’s 
daughter was not sick and apologised profusely for his brother’s dishonesty. Sadat 
explained that Suwallam had already been told by his father to stop eating food at my 
house; that I should not give Suwallam anything; and if he came asking for food, 
money or medicine then I should tell either him or his father immediately. I tried to 
alleviate Sadat’s anguish by telling him he ought not to worry and it was not a big deal. 
He explained that Suwallam’s dishonesty was no small matter. He had brought shame 
on his kin by allowing others to think they did not support him. Even if Suwallam’s 
daughter were sick and he didn’t have the means to support her, it would not be a 
matter for strangers. His father would be the one to take care of things. 
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A number of insights emerge from the above example. As is the case in Hausaland, 
the upkeep and well-being of the iyali is primarily the mai iyali’s responsibility. As is 
evident in the case of both Musa and Suwallam, men who fail to meet the obligations 
of their position tend to be ill-thought-of by others. However, in the event that a mai 
iyali is unable to meet these responsibilities then the mai gida is expected to assist 
him. In the event that it is a lack of means that is the problem, then the mai gida is 
obliged to assist him. If, however the mai iyali is unwilling to meet his responsibilities, 
a mai gida is expected to intervene and encourage him to adjust his behaviour 
accordingly. 
Much like in Hausaland, the mai gida retains notional authority over the mai iyali within 
his gida. The mai gida is responsible for coordinating the various iyali’s efforts towards 
sustaining the gida’s lafiya. Sickness, poverty and quarrelling are the antithesis of 
lafiya, and thus indicate that a mai gida has lost his grip on a household’s affairs. When 
an individual or iyali is seen to be suffering, the gida’s lafiya is called into question; 
people wonder as to the extent of peace, balance and order within a household. Doubt 
is cast over the social and moral standing of the household and the conduct of the 
individuals who constitute it. It is thus not surprising that Sadat was upset by 
Suwallam’s behaviour: Suwallam not only calls into question his father’s willingness 
and capacity to support him, but the responsible manhoods of his kinsmen, including 
Sadat himself. However, keeping an eye on one’s subordinates and imposing one’s 
authority is not always easy. As is evident in Suwallam’s visits to my room to ask for 
money having already been told not to by his father, it is often difficult for a mai gida 
to keep tabs on the activities of those under his authority. Much of a iyali’s activities 
take place out of sight of the mai gida who relies on others to inform him of what goes 
on within them.  
Whether or not successful in exercising his authority, a mai gida is regarded as 
normatively responsible for the well-being of the various iyali that constitute the gida, 
and is expected to hold at least a degree of authority over the conduct of his sons. A 
key difference between samari, mai iyali and mai gida are their entitlements and 
obligations to others within a household, and the status and authority that is derived 
from them. Whilst mai iyali and mai gida are subject to a range of obligations which 
may not always be easy to achieve, they derive prestige and status from being 
notionally responsible for dependent others and the authority they hold over them. 
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Samari, as unmarried men, with no formal dependants, stand upon the lowest rung in 
the hierarchical ordering of men within the iyali and gida. Thus underpinning the 
differential status of men is the social value accorded to the act of providing for others. 
Mallam Hassan and Abdulahi’s narratives, which we encountered in Chapter Four, are 
linked as expressions of the particular social value accorded to different forms of social 
practice and the categories of the person with which they are associated. Abdulahi’s 
marital status, his responsibility for ‘putting food on the table’, and his rejection of 
wrestling can be seen as assertions of responsible manhood and the qualities that are 
required for realising it. Conversely, Mallam Hassan’s claims that Sabon Zongo's 
youth are lazy, and their activities meaningless, can be seen as an expression of the 
low social value accorded the status of youth relative to that of the married man in his 
provider role. In contrast to mai gida and mai iyali, samari – unmarried ‘youth’ – are 
said to have few responsibilities to others, and the activities that they engage in are 
regarded as less meaningful, being as they are centred on personal gratification and 
whim rather than the patience, self-discipline and sacrifice required for maintaining a 
household in its proper condition. Even when a person who is not a mai iyali or mai 
gida does contribute materially to the provisioning of the household – for example, 
junior men, wives or daughters who through their personal incomes contribute food or 
other provisions voluntarily – it does not count. These material contributions are not 
recognised as provisioning, and are not taken to constitute an identity of provider – 
junior males and women remain ‘consumers’. 
 
5.7 Conclusions: The Domestication of Men 
I began this chapter with an elaboration of the domestic space in Hausaland. In 
Hausaland, household organisation centres on two levels of kinship. The basic kinship 
unit is referred to as the iyali. The iyali consists of a man, his wife, their unmarried 
children, and sometimes the husband’s elderly mother. The extended kinship group is 
referred to as the gida, and is composed of multiple patrilineally related iyali. The term 
gida also denotes the physical space of the compound and the extended kinship unit 
which inhabits it, which are co-extensive: within the compound each conjugal unit and 
any dependent children inhabit their own dwelling space or sassa. A separate area of 
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the compound is set aside for unmarried men. When a man marries, he and his newly 
established iyali move into their own sassa. 
Kinship in Zongo broadly conforms to the same organisational principles as are seen 
in Hausaland: patrilineally related iyali form the basis of the extended gida kinship 
group. However, perhaps due to population pressure and the scarcity of land, the gida 
kinship unit is seldom congruous with the compound. The various iyali and individuals 
which constitute the gida reside in disparate locations throughout Zongo. 
Nevertheless, the normative expectations concerning the role of men within the 
household remain broadly consistent with those found in Hausaland. 
The conjugal contract is articulated through a discourse of Islam in which a husband 
has a moral duty to provide for his dependent wives and children, who are on account 
of their dependency his social inferiors. The married man’s authority is reflected in his 
position as mai iyali or mai gida. A mai iyali is responsible for maintaining lafiya within 
the iyali – for providing all that is necessary for peace, prosperity and order to prevail. 
Similarly, the mai gida is the senior male within the gida and ultimately responsible for 
the various iyali within it. The mai gida is typically the most senior male within the gida 
in terms of age, generation and marital status. A mai gida is expected to intervene 
when a mai iyali is unwilling or unable to fulfil his responsibilities. Thus within a 
household, men are differentiated on the basis of their normative responsibilities to its 
constituents. This ideology finds its expression in the notion of arzikin mutane, or 
wealth in people. A man’s status is a function of his arzikin mutane, demonstrated by 
the extent of his political and social control over his dependants. Within this moral 
discourse, sex outside of wedlock is considered morally reprehensible. Consequently, 
though an unmarried man can work, father children and support dependants, he only 
derives status from doing so when within the bounds of marriage. 
Marriage and the domestic relations it implies are central to accepted and valued 
notions of manhood. Marriage is crucial in reconfiguring the position of men within the 
iyali and gida, and underpins their status and authority relative to others. Upon 
marriage a man ceases to be a dependent youth and becomes mai iyali. He 
establishes his own conjugal unit comprised of his notional dependants and asserts a 
productive and responsible manhood. 
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Furthermore, marriage is the institution through which the ideal qualities and 
characteristics of socially accepted and valued notions of manhood – such as wisdom, 
self-discipline and piety – are made manifest. Marriage defines and enacts significant 
change in the life of a man. It brings into being different social relationships, requiring 
and ascribing different personal characteristics to those that are expected of an 
unmarried ‘samari’ or youth. Wrestling, football and other such ‘batu maras 
muhimmanci’ – ‘trivialities’ – are displaced by more serious matters: work, provisioning 
and maintaining ‘lafiya’ – peace, balance and order – in the household. Thus marriage 
brings about an improvement in a man’s social and moral standing. It is thus not 
surprising that young men like Abu and Dauda are so keen to marry, and elder 
unmarried men like Mallam Malolo lament their failings so deeply. 
As was observed through the lens of gandu, in Hausaland inter-generational 
relationships are central to young men’s efforts to realise their marital ambitions. The 
mai iyali and mai gida enjoy privileged access to resources and control how they are 
distributed between the household’s various constituents. Unmarried men often rely 
heavily upon the contributions from senior kinsmen to meet their wedding expenses, 
not least the relatively high cost of providing a room for his bride and the various 
prestationary payments. This dependency underpins the authority of senior men over 
their junior kinsmen. For junior men to secure the resources needed to marry they 
must often subordinate themselves to the authority of senior kinsmen. This scenario 
raises questions concerning the authority of senior men in Zongo. Given the relative 
absence of economic production undertaken at the level of the gida, and the apparent 
incongruity of compound and gida as a residential unit, one might expect the gida to 
be less cohesive in Zongo than in Hausaland, and the authority of the mai gida less 
relevant. In fact, the inverse is true. The mai gida remains a position of considerable 
prestige and authority within a kinship group. As we shall see in the following chapter, 
this is partly explained by the significance of the position in social and political relations 
beyond the kinship group. 
However, perhaps the most important point here is that male authority does not rest 
on production and command of productive resources like land, but instead on the 
command of social reproduction. In Zongo, social reproduction, specifically marriage, 
requires space – rooms for marriage to be conducted in, and to house married women, 
who will go on to produce wealth in people through biological reproduction. Thus, the 
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mai gida’s authority is derived from his influence over the processes through which 
men secure residential property and marriage. I return to this point in Chapters Seven 
and Eight, where I examine the marital process in greater detail. I ask; How do men 
go about getting married and realising the idealised provider masculinities which form 
the basis of socially recognised competent manhood? I find that in Zongo, as in 
Hausaland, young men’s pursuit of responsible manhoods involves the negotiation of 
intergenerational relationships and the interweaving dependencies that frame them. 
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Chapter Six: Brides 
 
6.1 Virgin Brides and Home-Used Televisions 
This chapter is about who men want to marry. It links the last two chapters, which were 
about why men want to marry, to the next chapter, which is about how they go about 
doing so. In Chapters Four and Five we saw how marriage is important for men 
because it is by becoming married that they realise accepted and valued manhood. 
This chapter is important because when I later come to interpret the marital process 
in terms of how men try to cultivate particular self-images by representing their 
marriages in particular ways, we need to have at least some idea of what kind of image 
they might be aiming for. This chapter is about how and why brides fit into this image. 
In Chapter One I described how my viewing of Maid in Manhattan had contrasted with 
that of the men at Oakville Town Hall. Where I had perceived a disjuncture between 
the world of Maid in Manhattan and life in Sabon Zongo, Abu and his friends had 
woven their viewing of the show into a narrative allied with their own realities. This is 
not to say that the young men saw Maid in Manhattan as a mirror image of life in Sabon 
Zongo. They often remarked on obvious differences such as in clothing and language, 
the cars people drove, the clothes they wore and the houses they lived in. 
Nevertheless, this did not seem to undermine their interpretation of the show as 
occupying a common social and moral universe. Clearly I cannot know what the men 
talked about in my absence, but it seemed that my concern with how they identified 
with the show shifted the territory of conversation towards disjuncture. However, the 
discontinuities that most interested Abu and his friends were not those between their 
own lives and Maid in Manhattan, but how the account I gave of my own life seemed 
to be at odds with their expectations.  
Of course, people in Zongo are aware that people from different places inhabit different 
cultural contexts. They are receptive to the idea that ‘Others’ elsewhere may or may 
not share their values. There were many times when the men at Oakville Town Hall 
and I disagreed on things, such as the social and moral implications of same-sex 
marriage, drinking alcohol or evolution. But these differences of opinion did not 
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surprise them, aligned as they were with their perceptions of the “West”. However, 
amongst the things that did surprise them114 was my lack of a wife. I was in their eyes 
a man who had “capacity” – wealth and influence. Yet I had not realised, nor even held 
what they had assumed were universal aspirations for men. The men were polite 
enough not to publicly question my own character, resolved that my unmarried status 
must surely have been down to a lack of suitable women and that they would “give” 
me one of their “sisters”. I explained that my girlfriend and I had been together for 
some time and that we were quite happy as things stood. “I think if you look in your 
heart of hearts you know why you don’t marry your girlfriend”, advised Abu’s friend 
Shaifu. “Your heart know she have some problem, but your mind is not seeing it. 
Maybe you know what I am saying is true but you don’t want to say”. I was somewhat 
unnerved by Shaifu’s remarks and the direction the conversation might be going in. I 
wore laughter as a cloak for my uneasiness, buying time to forage for a question that 
might deflect their attentions – something relevant that would keep my discomfort 
concealed in conversational continuity. 
“So which kind of women are good to marry?” I asked. “How do you know if a bride is 
suitable or not? What should a man look for when he’s thinking about who to marry?” 
The men greeted my question with the deep breaths, tilted heads, and furrowed brows 
that might be worn by a mallam giving a particularly solemn sermon to a naive 
congregation. Abu and his friends explained that there were two kinds of bride: 
‘amarya’ and ‘bazawara’, of which the former was most desirable. Abu described the 
process of finding a bride as akin to purchasing a television115. If you are a rich man 
you can go to Accra Mall or Osu and buy a brand new television. When you buy the 
television you receive a receipt and proof of import from Japan or America. These 
kinds of televisions are the most desirable, but because of their cost also the most 
difficult to acquire. Abu explained that amarya brides were like these new televisions 
in that they were virgins who had not been married before.  
                                                          
114  Amongst the other things that surprised Abu and his friends was that I did not own a 
car or know how to drive, that I did not have a ‘house boy’, did my own washing and cooking 
and supported a football team that almost never won. 
115  At the time I assumed that this analogy had been devised especially for my benefit, 
as a means to translate complex matters into simpler terms, but I later learned that this was 
not the case. 
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Though every man hoped to marry an amarya bride, not all would have the means to 
do so. In contrast, bazawara brides were akin to the “home-used”116 – second hand – 
televisions, which men of lesser means bought from the electronics market at Zongo 
Junction. Abu explained that the bazawara bride differed from the amarya bride 
because "a man has had enjoyment with her before you". Alongside amarya and 
bazawara, Abu referred to a third category 'test'117, which was also used to describe 
electronic goods like televisions. Items described as test were sold as seen, usually 
broken and bought for spare parts. The women he described as ‘test’ were unmarried 
and highly promiscuous. According to Abu, these women were 'karuwai'118, a term he 
translated as "prostitutes" and “bitches”. "You give them something small and they let 
you fuck them", he said. In exchange for a few Cedis or perhaps a piece of cloth men 
could “use” these women and then just “forget about them”. "Nobody want to marry 
this kind of woman", asserted Abu. 
Not all men in Zongo would speak about women in quite the same terms as Abu, and 
if they did so it would be out of earshot of senior men or women who might reprimand 
them for using ‘foul language’. Nevertheless, it is true enough to say that most men I 
spoke to in Zongo agreed that amarya brides were more desirable than bazawara 
brides, at least in the case of a man’s first marriage119, and only the foolhardiest man 
would even begin to entertain the idea of marrying karuwai. 
 
                                                          
116  Though part of popular parlance, most people would consider the term ‘home-used’ 
to be foul language when speaking about women. In contrast, amarya and bazawara are 
frequently heard and acceptable. It is considered improper to directly address an older woman 
as amarya or bazawara as to do so would be to speculate as to her sexual or marital history. 
The exception being on wedding days and the various ceremonies associated with the marital 
process where the bride is invariably referred to as amarya regardless of her actual marital 
history. 
117  Though the term ‘home-used’ has entered the vernacular as a derogatory term for 
bazawara, this was the only time I heard the term ‘test’ used in this way. 
118  Though in Zongo the term karuwai is unambiguously associated with prostitution, the 
meanings and moral implications of the term are subject to historical and geographical 
variation. For example, in Kano the services provided by karuwai are not and never have been 
exclusively sexual. Nor has the status of being karuwai always been considered quite so 
morally reprehensible as it is in the present day (Gaudio 2009). 
119  See below for a discussion of how the importance of a bride’s status as amarya or 
bazawara varies for a man’s later marriages. 
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6.2 The Moral Value of Virginity 
Men generally agreed that the ideal bride was an amarya bride on account of her 
virginity120. This would seem to be consistent with observations made elsewhere in the 
Hausa studies literature, where a number of scholars have argued that the value 
accorded a woman’s virginity is reflected in the transfer of marriage goods and in the 
efforts expended to curtail women’s engagement in pre-marital sex (see Callaway 
1987, Masquelier 2004, 2005, Yusuf 2004). For example, in Nigerien Hausaland, 
Masquelier (2005) describes how for many men the bridewealth demanded for virgin 
brides had become prohibitively high. This meant that marriages were delayed, 
fostering parental anxieties that the virginity and virtue of as yet married women was 
at risk of being lost to pre-marital sex. This fear was echoed by religious leaders who 
advocated a reduction in bridewealth, claiming it would enable earlier marriages and 
keep women from losing their virginity prior to marriage. The Nigerien state responded 
by attempting to impose a cap on the bridewealth that could be paid for an amarya 
bride. 
The above example speaks to anthropology’s long standing concern with the moral 
discourses that surround sexual conduct, the social relations they imply and the kinds 
of social evaluations that emerge from them. A number of anthropologists have 
described how retaining one’s virginity is often considered a state of moral virtue or 
purity such that virgins are particularly valued as brides (see for example Berger and 
Wenger 1973, Saadawi, 007, Odeh 2010, Mahadeen, 2013). This is echoed by 
observers of Hausa society and culture who have described how the preservation of 
                                                          
120  One might speculate that this is a reflection of men’s sexual preferences – that men 
value amarya brides as objects of sexual desire. This idea is problematic for a number of 
reasons, not least the fact there is little evidence men in Zongo find virgins any more sexually 
desirable than non-virgins. Not once during my fieldwork did men express anything that could 
be construed as a sexual preference for virgins. There are many reasons why men may or 
may not express particular sexual desires, not least the innumerable taboos and injunctions 
that surround them. Nevertheless, when men did talk about their sexual preferences, it was 
sexually experienced, previously married women who were the objects of desire rather than 
virgins. Indeed, a number of my informants, men and women, claimed that men who had 
married amarya brides were more likely to be adulterous, because their wives lacked the 
experience or skills necessary to satisfy them. My data is such that I am unable to say an 
awful lot about what men’s actual sexual desires might be. Nevertheless, I think it a reasonable 
supposition that the perceived value of the amarya bride has little to do with men’s sexual 
preferences. There is also a more fundamental problem here, in that reducing men’s ‘sex talk’ 
to expressions of sexual desire alludes to the kind of suspect and unhelpful essentialisms 
which have long been contested by gender analysis (See Chapter Three). 
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an as yet unmarried woman’s virginity is seen as imperative if her moral integrity is to 
be maintained (Schildkraut 1982, Masquelier 2004, 2005, Yusuf 2005). However, as 
highlighted by Schildkraut (1982) in her analysis of wife seclusion in Kano, virginity or 
its absence does not seem to matter in quite the same way for married women. Indeed, 
most people in Zongo would say that a wife is morally obliged to provide her husband 
with sexual gratification and bear his children. Failure to fulfil either is considered 
legitimate grounds for a husband to divorce his wife121. Furthermore, children are 
considered to be God’s reward for moral virtue, such that in the case of married 
women, it was those who had not as yet given birth who were subject to moral 
speculation. For example, a number of my informants claimed that it was adulterous 
women or those who meddled in occult practices antithetical to proper Islamic conduct, 
such as sorcery or witchcraft, who were most likely to be afflicted with infertility or 
‘dormant pregnancy’. 
As is evident from the above, a concern with pre-marital virginity must be situated 
within wider anxieties about female sexuality and the perceived social and moral 
consequences of failing to regulate it. In Zongo, it is women’s extra-marital sexual 
relations which seem to attract the greatest moral ire. Alongside the immoral 
propensities of young men, young women's sexual conduct was often cited as an 
example of Zongo's moral degeneracy. Many of my informants lamented a perceived 
increase in the number of never-married women with children as being indicative of a 
general moral decline. One of Abu's friends claimed that under the influence of 
telenovelas such as Maid in Manhattan, women in Zongo had become increasingly 
materialistic. This desire had become so powerful that many women had been 
seduced into a life of prostitution as a means to acquire wealth.  
As seen in Abu’s account above, karuwai were highly undesirable as brides. Many 
men claimed that the karuwai’s appetites for sex and money were such that they were 
inherently adulterous and would almost certainly be carrying sexually transmitted 
diseases. Other informants asserted that karuwai performed “sikaduro”, “magani da 
                                                          
121  When asked about marital violence, most men would say that it was only ‘weak’ men 
who beat their wives, and that it was legitimate for a wife to divorce a husband who beat her 
‘excessively’. However, the obligation of wives to fulfil their husbands’ sexual wants meant 
that the notion of marital rape was in the view of many men a contradiction in terms. It is hard 
to know the extent of marital violence in Zongo. 
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laya” 122 and other occult practices, which gave them magical powers, such as the 
ability to shapeshift, or use magic words to ‘capture the minds’ and money of men. 
The victims of such practices are possessed by a spirit under the control of another 
person. The perpetrator makes a kind of Faustian pact with ‘jinn’, spirits which expect 
sacrifices in return for their help. The rituals alleged to be involved in sikaduro are 
particularly grotesque, often involving human sacrifice, bathing in blood and sleeping 
with the dead. Such behaviour was generally accepted as being prohibited in Islam. 
 
6.3 Marital Histories and the Evaluation of Brides 
I began this chapter by asking Abu which kind of women were good to marry. Abu 
emphasised the amarya brides’ virginity when explaining what made them more 
desirable than the bazawara brides. The bazawara bride differed from the amarya 
bride because "a man has had enjoyment with her before you”. Even less desirable 
were the women that Abu described as “test”, highly promiscuous women who 
provided men with sexual services in return for money or “gifts”. Abu’s account was 
framed by sex and sexuality and so I began to excavate this frame through the 
significance of women’s sexual conduct.  
As we have seen, perceptions of a woman’s sexual conduct invoke judgements about 
her moral character. An amarya is by definition a virgin, and a virgin’s sexual conduct 
is by definition virtuous. However, virginity and virtue are not mutually exclusive. This 
is apparent in the fact that though marriage implies the absence of virginity, such 
absence does not necessarily equate to sexual deviance. Indeed, when men spoke 
about bazawara brides, the emphasis on sex and sexuality was variable. Thus the 
idea that the relative value of bazawara and amarya brides is foregrounded in norms 
of sexual conduct is problematic in that it offers little explanation as to why the 
bazawara bride ought to be any less desirable than her amarya counterpart. However, 
though sexual conduct was less consistently mentioned as being amongst the qualities 
                                                          
122  'Magani da laya’ refers to the practice of charming. Magani is the Hausa word for 
medicine or magic; laya are written charms or spells, usually verses from the Quran. 'Sikaduro' 
is a Twi term which literally translates as 'money medicine'. ‘Sakawa’ – the use of charms to 
make money from foreigners by ‘capturing their minds’ via chat rooms, dating sites, skype and 
other forms of social media – has become particularly notorious in Ghana and Nigeria alike. 
(See also Wendl 2007, Armstrong 2011). 
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that made bazawara brides less desirable, men were consistent in framing their 
evaluations of both amarya and bazawara brides in moral terms. 
Kabiru gave an account of a man he knew, who had married a bazawara bride. Kabiru 
told of how the man had fallen in love with a bazawara woman and wanted to marry 
her. The man’s friends advised against the marriage, warning him that they knew her 
character and she was not a good woman. His parents, disapproving of their son’s 
choice, tried to find him an alternative bride, but the man defied his parents’ guidance 
and remained insistent that he would only marry the bride of his choosing.  
As time passed, his father became worried his son was getting too old and so 
eventually agreed to let him “choose his choice” and marry the bazawara bride. At first 
everything seemed normal and the man was content. However, with the passage of 
time the marriage began to sour. His wife became aggressive and greedy. He had to 
work very hard to satisfy her demands for money, clothes and gifts. According to 
Kabiru, the man became very sick. “He look like he was sleeping, but his mind have 
left his body”. The man’s parents sought advice from a Mallam, who said “his wife 
have done something spiritual to him, like charm him”. The Mallam wrote some verses 
from the Quran onto a wooden tablet. He then washed the tablet clean and used the 
ink stained water to bathe the afflicted man123 whilst reciting the Quran. The man 
suddenly woke up. He realised that his wife had been using “rituals to control his mind” 
and divorced her immediately. 
Though Kabiru’s story would be regarded by most men as an extreme case, it is 
nevertheless consistent with many accounts in the sense that the undesirability of the 
bazawara bride is framed in terms of a proclivity for occult practices antithetical to 
Islam. It is not that all bazawara women are inherently immoral or dangerous; but the 
fact that they have by definition been divorced was seen to raise concerns as to how 
a particular woman had conducted herself in her previous marriage and the extent of 
her culpability in bringing the divorce about. 
The men at Oakville Town Hall claimed that when considering a bazawara marriage, 
one has to take a similar approach to buying a home-used television. You can see 
                                                          
123  This practice is referred to as ‘rubutu’, literally 'writing', and is a common form of 
medicine in Zongo and elsewhere in Hausaland (See Stock 1987, Tocco 2010, James 2014). 
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home-used televisions that appear to be in very good condition when in the shop. The 
picture and sound might appear to be as good as a new television, but when you get 
it home you might discover that it has many flaws or it might break after a short period 
of time. Consequently, one has to temper one's expectations: to know and understand 
that one is taking a risk, and to be prepared to suffer the consequences.  
Just like buying the home-used television, marrying a bazawara bride was in the eyes 
of Abu and his friends a risk: she could be infertile, sexually promiscuous, carry 
sexually transmitted diseases, practice blood rituals or have a “bad attitude”. 
Consequently, a man needed to know a lot about a bazawara bride’s background 
before deciding to marry. One of the things that struck me about Zongo, is that people 
seem to be acutely suspicious of one another, even those who appear to be good 
friends or family. Many of my informants insisted it was impossible to know a person’s 
‘true character’, that the general character of most people in Zongo was bad, and that 
people often presented themselves well whilst harbouring malign intentions124. This 
anxiety is especially acute in attitudes towards bazawara brides. Again, this idea is 
expressed neatly in Abu’s television analogy. 
According to Abu, home-used televisions can look so good when on display it is hard 
to tell them from new. As a result, an unscrupulous salesman can "use his words to 
catch your mind"; deceive you into believing that a faulty television is in fact in perfect 
working order. Blinded by optimism and the salesman’s words, an old television that 
nobody would ordinarily buy appears irresistible. In the same vein, a bazawara can be 
very beautiful, speak in such a way as to make you feel good about them, and after 
not very long come to love them. However, there are no guarantees that the perception 
you have of them is not a deception to try and "catch" a husband. Sometimes even 
using witchcraft or charms to "catch your heart", to "want them too much". But when 
you finally marry them, they change. You discover that they have a “bad character”. 
The woman might be mad – "have bad connection" and receive "only one channel". 
She might not listen and may be argumentative. She might not do her work or she may 
shame you in front of your friends. Consequently, those who wanted to marry a 
bazawara bride had to resist their impulses, exercise patience and caution. They 
                                                          
124  This idea is captured in a popular adage ‘farin hakora amma bakin ciki’, which literally 
translates as ‘white teeth but black inside’. White being associated with moral propriety. 
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would need to do a lot of research. Take time to observe her behaviour for clues as to 
the "true attitude" she might try to keep concealed. 
I asked the Abu and his friends whether amarya might not be subject to the same 
flaws. How could you know that an amarya was any less prone to such problems? 
Abu's response was that in contrast to bazawara, the amarya bride had not known 
“life”. She had not had the chance to be corrupted by life, by hardship, by a previous 
husband. All women had the potential to be immoral, but divorce makes it more likely 
that this potential has been realised. Maybe if her husband had mistreated her, beaten 
her unnecessarily or failed to support her, she would have pursued immoral paths 
such as prostitution or witchcraft as a means to try and survive. The amarya is a tabula 
rasa upon which immorality would be inscribed by life beyond the paternal home 
unless tempered by a good and proper husband. A man marrying a bazawara would 
have to work hard to re-educate through appropriate discipline and teaching in the 
ways of Islam as a means to correctly orientate her moral compass. Amarya and new 
televisions share the quality of newness; they have no background, and thus are 
known to be unsullied.  
Whilst these views are clearly indicative of the normative judgements men make of 
women in Sabon Zongo, they can also be read as expressions of anxiety by men as 
to their own capacity as husbands. There were men who claimed that bazawara 
brides, having already been married, would have different expectations to amarya 
brides. A bazawara bride was more likely to complain at her husband’s failings than 
an amarya bride, who knowing no different would put up with her lot. 
As argued in Chapter Two, moral orders imply social orders. Social hierarchies are 
articulated and legitimated through moral commentaries concerning which kinds of 
people, practices and things are and are not morally acceptable (Douglas 2010). This 
idea speaks to the moral discourses surrounding women’s sexual conduct125. An 
important observation to be drawn out from the examples above is the linking of sexual 
and moral deviance to the occult and transgressive forms of consumption and 
                                                          
125  Indeed, Gaudio (2009) describes how in Kano, the sustained persecution and 
eventual criminalisation of karuwai in 2001, has been justified by the idea that transgression 
of sexual norms poses a threat to social and moral stability. 
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exchange126. The argument that exchange is embedded in and reflects wider 
moralities is well-established in social anthropology (see Bloch and Parry 1996, 
Geschiere 1997, Comaroff & Comaroff 1999, 2001, Masquelier 2009a).  
In Zongo, the idea of consumption and exchange as moral domain is evident in the 
notion of ‘bakin Kuɗi’ – literally black money. Bakin Kuɗi refers to the money obtained 
via immoral means, such as sikaduro, sakawa as well as prostitution. This resonates 
with the larger concern of this thesis; namely the ways in which notions of masculinity 
are situated in relations of production, consumption and exchange. In Chapters Four 
and Five I described how notions of accepted and valued masculinity emphasise a 
productive and responsible manhood. Categories of the person do not exist in 
isolation, but require constituent referents in order for them to be meaningful. This is 
to say that the notion of productive and responsible manhood necessarily implies that 
there are other kinds of people who are not productive or responsible men. I argued 
that the notion of youth as immoral, irresponsible and unproductive was significant in 
this respect. In the same vein, the legitimacy of men’s authority over women is derived 
from the notion of men as providers, and so necessarily requires a notion of women 
as dependants. This idea is given expression in the moral speculation that surrounds 
women whose dependency on men is uncertain; as we see, for example, in the idea 
that women who live independently of men, or whose means are judged to exceed 
those of the husbands and fathers normatively expected to provide for them, must by 
virtue of their productive inadequacies be engaged in prostitution or occult practices. 
The very possibility of independent women is troublesome for the notion of female 
dependency upon which masculine status and authority rely. From this point of view, 
the moral speculation that is attached to female sexuality might be seen as a 
manifestation of the prevailing social order and wider anxieties about the legitimacy of 
masculine authority, but also as a mechanism of social control. This idea is well 
illustrated in the case of Ladi. 
I had been introduced to Ladi’s father by one of my research assistants when I first 
arrived in Zongo. My research assistant felt that as one of Zongo’s mai gida he was 
                                                          
126  Again this resonates with the wider Hausa studies literature where the convergence 
of sexual and spiritual deviance is perhaps most keenly represented in the association of ‘bori’ 
– spirit possession and ‘karuwai’; both of which have come to be regarded as antithetical to 
Islam and so morally reprehensible (Gaudio 2009). 
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an important man for me to know. Though my conversations with his daughter Ladi 
were generally fleeting, I did learn that she had been divorced a few months prior to 
my arrival in Zongo and so had returned to her parental compound. Every time I went 
to visit Ladi’s father, she seemed to be perpetually sweeping and scrubbing the area 
around the entrance of her father’s compound. At the time I thought the sweeping to 
be of limited significance, other than Ladi perhaps being a little neurotic. Indeed, I 
made a joke that if she swept the floor any more she would wear it away. To this she 
responded that it was important for the house to be clean as a means to preserve 
‘girma’ – respect or honour. 
Such an attitude chimes with the notion of ‘dirt’ as matter out of place presented by 
Douglas (2010). Seen in this light, cleanliness can be taken as an expression of order. 
The cleanliness of the compound was important as a reflection of ‘lafiya’ – the social 
and moral integrity of the household from which girma is derived. I am reticent to 
suggest that Ladi’s sweeping was solely motivated by a concern with the moral 
integrity of the household. Nevertheless, one can see how Ladi’s status as an 
unmarried non-virgin could be considered a potentially polluting force that threatens 
to destabilize the household’s lafiya, and the sweeping a possible means to maintain 
it. The sweeping has symbolic power as a public performance of her morally 
appropriate gender identity. In sweeping she performed a domestic role and an 
associated dependent identity within a household provided for and under the authority 
of men. This ‘presentation of self’ served to counter possible speculation as to her 
social and moral integrity. Being a dependent of men she would have no need or 
inclination to support herself through immoral means such as prostitution. 
 
6.4 How Brides Make Men 
Marrying amarya is most desirable, but also most difficult. One needs to be a 'big man' 
and to have money. In contrast, marrying a bazawara is considered a last resort; 
something that only poor men or those that "have no option" would pursue. The relative 
desirability and difficulty in marrying an amarya versus a bazawara woman means that 
the category to which one's prospective bride belongs influences a man's social status. 
Whereas marrying amarya is considered ideal, even normal, marrying bazawara as a 
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first bride is suggestive of a man's limited social and material means and thus an 
inferior status. 
While there tends to be a consensus that marrying an amarya as a first bride implies 
higher status, bazawara women are not altogether rejected. Indeed, many elder or 
previously married men actively pursue bazawara wives. Although he currently has 
only one wife, Gariba told me that he had been married three times. The first wife, he 
said, had been amarya, chosen by his parents. He didn't really love her but he needed 
to marry and it was his duty to follow his father's choice. After a year she had borne 
him a child, but he felt like he needed someone that he truly loved. He chose the most 
beautiful woman he could. She was also amarya. She bore him two sons, but was very 
demanding, always wanting expensive cloth. She also argued with his first wife and 
refused to work. He decided to divorce her. Seeing as he already had children, he 
decided that a cooperative wife, who could support herself and do her work would take 
a priority over fertility. He decided to marry an older woman who had already been 
married. This woman was the one that he had come to love and with which he said he 
had the most "understanding". He liked that she had experience of life and her own 
income; he was able to talk with her and even ask for financial help from her when he 
needed it. His first wife became very jealous because he was so close with his third 
wife. He felt that he could not support both his wives equally and so divorced his first 
wife. 
Similar sentiments were echoed in interviews with young men who stated that though 
the first wife should be amarya, it was less important in the case that one took a second 
or third wife. They did however all agree that one's first wife ought to be amarya. 
Marrying amarya was most desirable, but also most difficult. One needed to be a 'big 
man' and to have money. In contrast, marrying a bazawara was considered a last 
resort; something that only poor men or those that "have no option" would pursue. The 
relative desirability and difficulty in marrying an amarya versus a bazawara woman 
meant that the category to which one's prospective bride belonged would influence a 
man's social status.  
The key point here is that amarya women are perceived as having greater social value 
than bazawara. Whereas marrying amarya was considered ideal, even normal, 
marrying bazawara as a first bride was suggestive of a man's limited social and 
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material means and thus an inferior status. The important point here is that marrying 
an amarya bride shows capacity. It expresses a man's productive capacities and 
responsible manhood. Though it was better to marry a bazawara bride than to never 
marry at all, they were described by men as less desirable. They were not merely 
morally perilous, but had the potential to undermine a man’s efforts to present himself 
as responsible provider. 
What men describe as the ideal bride is articulated through a normative ideology of 
household relations. In Chapter Five I elaborated the conventions that frame the 
normative position and conduct of women within the domestic economy. Women are 
the notional dependants and subordinates of the married men within their household, 
including both their husbands and fathers. Women are expected to dutifully perform 
their domestic roles and tasks, such as preparing food, cleaning and caring for 
children, and to express deference towards men. When a woman's conduct deviates 
from these norms, it is seen to reflect badly upon the men to whom she is subordinate; 
she is seen as a reflection of a failure to exert social control over their dependents and 
maintain a household in lafiya. This can be seen to inform notions of the ideal bride in 
Zongo. The ideal bride is one that is seen as being most likely to conform to the 
normative role that is designated to women within the household.  
This is reflected in the notions of amarya and bazawara. The term amarya is used to 
denote a woman who has never previously been married. In contrast the term 
bazawara is used to describe women who have previously been married and are now 
divorced. While these two categories might be defined in terms of marital status, it's 
not as such whether a woman has been married or not that determines her suitability 
as a bride, but rather the kinds of judgements that are made about her character and 
conduct on the basis of her marital history. In the case of a bazawara bride it is not 
being divorced that is problematic as such, but the speculation that surrounds her role 
in bringing it about. Divorce is a manifestation of an absence of lafiya in a household 
and thus casts doubt over the conduct of its constituents, in particular women. In many 
cases divorce was seen to result from a wife's failure to conform to her normative role 
within the household, or to adopt an appropriately deferential disposition towards her 
male superiors. 
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However, marital histories are inevitably particular, and the actual circumstances of a 
divorce difficult to ascertain. Individual men and women often produce conflicting and 
competing accounts in efforts to absolve themselves of blame and represent their own 
character and conduct favourably. However, men do sometimes acknowledge that a 
bazawara might not be entirely culpable for the breakdown of her previous marriage. 
Indeed, in the event of divorce, speculation can and does arise as to a husband's 
conduct and capability in performing his conjugal obligations. Nevertheless, 
uncertainty often remains, such that the character of a bazawara women and their 
suitability as brides are subject to considerable doubt. Furthermore, marriage is 
regarded as the socially and morally proper condition of a woman and so it follows that 
the bazawara is associated with social and moral deviance. This is often articulated 
through discourses of consumption, production and dependency. In Chapter Five, I 
elucidated how notions of gender difference in Zongo are situated in relations of 
production and consumption. When divorce takes place, a woman's dependent status 
becomes unclear. Regardless of women's actual productive activities, the idea that 
women can support themselves independently of men is seen as counter to the proper 
social and moral order. When a bazawara fails to convincingly assert her dependency 
upon a socially and morally appropriate provider, such as her father or other senior 
male kin, speculation arises as to the morality of the means through which she meets 
her consumption needs; for example, she might be subject to accusations of witchcraft 
or prostitution. This comes to shape the evaluations that are made as to the suitability 
and desirability of a bazawara bride. By virtue of having been divorced, the moral 
propriety of the bazawara bride is often seen as uncertain. Thus the notion of 
bazawara describes not only the marital status of the divorcee, but also alludes to a 
potential for social and moral deviance. 
Though clearly all bazawara have at some point been amarya, men see the moral 
status of the amarya bride as less ambiguous. The amarya has remained under the 
watchful supervision of her kin and her dependent status is more easily affirmed. 
Unlike the bazawara, she has not been compelled to provide for herself. She remains 
uncorrupted by the immoral means of subsistence that the absence of a socially 
appropriate provider necessitates. 
The social and moral uncertainties that surround bazawara women mean that 
marrying a bazawara bride is regarded as an inherently foolish or risky endeavour, 
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best avoided by the man as yet experienced in conjugal affairs. Consequently, opting 
for a bazawara bride for one's first marriage is often seen as an act of last resort when 
a man lacks the resources or wherewithal to acquire an amarya bride and thus calls 
into question the viability of his manhood. 
 
6.5 Who do Men Actually Marry? 
Thus far we have seen how it is not only getting married that matters to men, but also 
to whom. I elaborated the notion of the ideal bride as described by men in Zongo. I 
showed how an important feature of the ideal bride was her marital history. This 
discourse categorised prospective brides as either amarya – as yet unmarried women, 
presumed to be virgins – or bazawara – those women who had already been married 
and their status as virgins uncertain. Those women accorded the status amarya were 
described by men as possessing inherent qualities that meant they were regarded as 
superior, higher status brides and eventual wives relative to those described as 
bazawara. The differential statuses of these categories were in turn invoked in the 
status of men themselves. A man who marries an amarya could be regarded as of 
higher status than a man who married a bazawara. In turn this was said to influence 
men's marital pathways. Young men would pursue amarya rather than bazawara 
brides as it is from marriage to the former from which the greatest prestige and status 
relative to other men can be derived. Given the ubiquity of this discourse, we might 
expect it to be reflected in actual marital practices. However, as has been persistently 
argued throughout this thesis, discourses cannot be reduced to descriptive content, 
but need to be examined in terms of their wider social effects. In seeking to examine 
the implications of the amarya/bazawara discourse, I will now turn my attention to who 
men actually marry. Do men manage to fulfil their expressed desire for an amarya 
bride? To what extent is the dominant narrative that expresses preference for amarya 
brides reflected in actual bride selection?  
Consistent with the proposition of this thesis, marriage is important to men in Zongo. 
It is a standard feature of greetings between people who know each other well, as well 
as with strangers. It is a common topic of casual conversation and gossip; and as 
described previously, it is a central preoccupation for young men who have yet to 
achieve it. This makes it relatively straightforward to enquire as to a man's marital 
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status, both in informal interactions or within the formal structure of an interview. It 
didn't take long to know the marital status of many of those men who I came to know 
or greet outside of an interview. Questions concerning marriage were staple in all my 
interviews. None of these interactions was specifically intended as a means to extract 
numerical data; however, it was nonetheless possible to quantify some of the 
information produced in these encounters. Understanding men’s marital practices 
perhaps logically begins with an examination of who men actually marry. From the 
data extracted we might gain insights into marital practices and how the 
amarya/bazawara discourse is invoked in them127. Let us begin by setting the scene 
with some basic information concerning the people from which the data subject to 
analysis is gathered. 
 
Figure. 5. Frequency of Married Respondents by Age-Group. N= 63. 
Figure 5illustrates the composition of the sample by age group. Though fieldwork was 
undertaken with both married and unmarried men, my focus here is on those men that 
are or have been married and the categories of bride that they have married, hence 
never-married men are not included in this sample. The total sample consists of 63 
married men across seven age groups128. Men under 20 are not included as no 
                                                          
127  Whilst I present the following data quantitatively, the methods employed in producing 
it are firmly grounded in qualitative data collection methods. 
128  Though I have grouped men decennially this is simply as a means of organising the 
data for convenience and presentation purposes rather than corresponding to any particular 
age grading system in Zongo. I do not believe that this particular scheme interferes with the 
integrity of the data nor the results that are derived from it. The conclusions that I draw from 
my data are not contingent upon the particular age grouping applied in its presentation.  
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married men under the age of 20 were identified during fieldwork. I have also grouped 
4 men together in a category of 80+, even though these men were aged 82, 83, 88 
and 90. Creating a separate category on the basis of a single case seemed 
unnecessary, and in any case this omission does nothing to detract from the analysis. 
Table 3. Reported Status of First Wife by Age Group. 
Age Group Number of men who reported 
first wife as bazawara. 
Number of men who reported 
first wife as amarya. 
20-29 4 5 
30-39 1 9 
40-49 0 11 
50-59 0 14 
60-69 0 7 
70-79 0 8 
80 + 0 4 
 
Table 3 illustrates the number of bazawara and amarya wives at a man's first marriage 
by age group. The first thing to note is that 55 out of 63 married men said that their 
first wife had been amarya with only five saying that they had married bazawara. What 
is immediately striking in the table is that of the five men who disclosed that they had 
married bazawara as a first wife, four of them were under 30 and the remaining one 
was 32 years old; placing them at the lower end of the samples age range. Age would 
also seem to broadly correlate with the number of marriages as demonstrated in table 
3 above. 
Table 4. Reported Number of Marriages by Age Group. 
Age Group Frequency Total Number of 
marriages. 
Mean (Marriages per 
Person) 
20-29 9 9 1 
30-39 10 14 1.4 
40-49 11 15 1.5 
50-59 14 34 2.4 
60-69 7 15 2.1 
70-79 8 26 3.25 
80 + 4 13 3.25 
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In Table 4 above, we can see that the more marriages a man has the older he is likely 
to be and vice versa. Although in one case one man had married four times and 
divorced once by the time he had reached 34129, and another had married twice and 
divorced once by age 39, the next youngest man to have more than one wife at the 
time of fieldwork was 43 years old130. 
Table 5. Reported Status of Wives by Marital Order. 
 1st 
Wives 
2nd 
Wives 
3rd 
Wives 
4th 
Wives 
5th 
Wives 
Total 
Amarya 58 27 14 3 1 103 
Bazawara 5 7 5 5 1 23 
Unknown/did not say 0 0 1 1 0 2 
Total 63 34 20 9 2 128 
 
Table 5. illustrates the number of bazawara and amarya wives across all marriages. 
What immediately emerges as interesting is that although in the case of first marriages 
few men stated that their first wife had been bazawara, the situation dramatically 
changes when additional wives and marriages are accounted for. Of the total 128 
marriages of the 63 men in the sample, 23 were to bazawara. Placed in this context, 
the five men who disclosed a bazawara as a first wife account for a relatively small 
proportion relative to the total. 
 
                                                          
129  It is not entirely unusual for men in Zongo to maintain household’s elsewhere, such 
as in Nima or Madina. However, in some ways this man represents an anomaly in the sample 
as his presence in Zongo was relatively infrequent. Although he had a wife in Zongo, he spent 
most of his time in Nima, where two of his wives lived. Ordinarily his wife would travel to Nima 
to spend two nights with him, but occasionally he would come to Zongo, where he had some 
business interests and stay in his wife’s room. 
130  At this point it is important to note the first of the methodological issues alluded to 
above. The extent to which my sample can be taken as representative of Zongo as a whole is 
questionable. The absence of formal survey data concerning the demographic make-up of 
Zongo as a whole means that it is impossible to know the extent to which my sample 
corresponds with the population. Nevertheless, my concern is with process and possibility 
rather than . I am not so much interested in describing the totality of ways that all men in Zongo 
navigate marital pathways, but rather gaining insights into the possible mechanisms at play 
as demonstrable by specific young men's navigation of them. Even if my sample were 
representative, in isolation such statistics would at best provide a snapshot of the status of 
men's brides, not the processes through which such a status is established, nor how men 
relate to it. 
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6.6 Looking at the Numbers 
As we saw in the previous chapter, marriage to a bazawara is described as being of 
inferior prestige to that of amarya. As a result, one might expect that men might favour 
amarya over bazawara marriage and thus amarya marriages would be more prevalent 
in the data. This would appear to be the case. As shown in figure 3, 103 of 128 
marriages were reported as being to amarya, and 23 to bazawara, with the remaining 
unknown or undisclosed. 
However, two observations are of interest here. First of all, the majority of marriages 
reported as being bazawara were second or subsequent marriages. Secondly the five 
men who reported a bazawara first wife were all towards the lower end of the age 
spectrum. This presents two questions. Why do the men who disclosed a first marriage 
as bazawara marriage fall towards the lower end of the sample range? Why are there 
no elder men who report marrying a bazawara first wife, whilst more than a third (23 
of 65) of the same men took bazawara wives in subsequent marriages? 
Several possibilities need to be explored here. First of all, we have already discerned 
a prevalent discourse that describes marriage to an amarya bride as according greater 
prestige and status to men than that of marriage to a bazawara bride. Given its 
prevalence we ought to expect men’s responses, and the statistics that are derived 
from them, to be framed by this discourse. To put this in concrete terms, we might 
expect men to be reticent about disclosing a bazawara marriage, even if one had taken 
place. This presents a methodological issue in the possibility that neither group of men 
is likely to report a first marriage as bazawara under ‘normal conditions’. However, that 
bazawara marriages were disclosed in a large number of cases amongst elder men 
and in the case of five younger men would seem to preclude this notion. 
This suggests a second possibility: that the data presented above does not as such 
accurately represent men’s actual marital practices, but rather the circumstances of 
its production. Perhaps there was something about the specific circumstances in which 
the data was gathered from the five young men, who were exceptional in marrying 
bazawara in their first marriages, which produced these specific accounts. I argue that 
my positionality as a researcher and relationships with particular informants are salient 
here in producing specific responses. 
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First of all, we ought not to assume that an informant is without investments in 
cultivating a particular presentation of self to a researcher. Indeed, as described in 
Chapter Two, interactions between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ are framed by the cultural 
legacy of Zongo as a community of ‘aliens’, in which relationships with strangers are 
seen as socially, politically and economically important. The interactions with 
informants from which my data is derived are framed by my social identity as a 
particular sort of baturi in Zongo, and thus people’s judgements as to the kinds of 
social costs and benefits that can be derived from particular self-presentations. This 
is to say that there is no necessary reason why the encounter between researcher and 
researched should be any more conducive to ostensibly factual or honest 
representations than any other kind of interaction. People may adapt or realign their 
self-presentations to different ideals, norms or scripts, but they do not discard the need 
or desire to be favourably evaluated simply by virtue of interacting with an outsider. 
Furthermore, as with any social encounter, people will always be wary of leakage – 
that information exchanged in even the most private or secretive of contexts may find 
its way into the public domain. In concrete terms, my fieldwork was primarily amongst 
young men. I was explicit about this interest, and my associations with such young 
men were clearly visible. Knowing who I spent my time with, and how, may have 
influenced the things that people decided to say or do in my presence. For example, 
a young man formally interviewed would know that I would later be spending time with 
his peers, and so might be concerned that his account be shared with them. 
Regardless of my best efforts to assert and maintain confidentially, trust between 
researcher and informant is something that takes time to establish and its achievement 
is never guaranteed. Nevertheless, that it was younger men that disclosed the 
bazawara status of their first marriage suggests that these particular men perhaps did 
not perceive a risk of disclosure or other negative consequences should such 
disclosure occur, despite falling into the category of men that would perhaps have 
most reason to do so. 
An understanding might be derived from my relationship with the specific young men 
in question. Though many men were cautious in the extent of their disclosures, those 
that did report a bazawara marriage were amongst those that I knew best. They would 
have been more familiar with my research and its objectives and perhaps trusted me 
more than others. Additionally, the relatively familiar relationships that I had with these 
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men might have meant that they perceived it as more difficult to conceal their wives' 
statuses, or perhaps secondary to the potential benefits that might be derived from a 
franker and more open relationship. For example, several young men assisted me as 
research assistants. Two of these were amongst those who reported a bazawara first 
marriage. Other men with whom I had a relatively close relationship may have 
perceived opportunities of employment, or the potential to derive status or resources 
from a relationship with me and this may have influenced the kind of information that 
they were prepared to disclose. 
This issue of the extent to which men’s reports of their first wives’ status corresponds 
to their actual status is compounded by the fact that it is sometimes difficult to verify 
the status of a bride131. At times representations of a bride are inconsistent. Some men 
appear uncertain as to the status of their brides or maintain the status of their brides 
as ambiguous, through ‘misrepresentation’ or evasion. For example, when I formally 
interviewed Nasir prior to his marriage, I asked him whether Fiddausi, his prospective 
bride, was bazawara or amarya. I was initially frustrated that he would not answer the 
question directly; especially as I had already met Fiddausi and her children from a 
previous marriage. Nasir evaded the terms amarya and bazawara, but described 
Fiddausi in terms consistent with that of amarya – a woman without experience of men 
or marriage. He explained how marriage would mean that she would need to learn lots 
of new things – the needs and wants of a man and how to care for him and their marital 
home. He explained that this was understandable as she wouldn’t know much about 
being a wife. He would have to be patient with her and help her understand what was 
required of a wife. What is important here is that Nasir doesn’t dispute his wife’s status 
as bazawara, but that the narrative he provides is consistent with the notion of amarya 
rather than bazawara. As I got to know Nasir he seemed to become less reticent in 
discussions concerning the status of his bride. He often shared with me his concern 
that his elder brother might find out that his bride was bazawara and how other men 
might view him if they knew the ‘true’ status of his bride. 
That Nasir seemed to divulge this information might be attributable to greater trust 
within our relationship. Under certain circumstances researcher and researched can 
                                                          
131  As we shall see later, the ambiguity that is derived from the difficulty of verification is 
a central point of analysis. 
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build a trusting relationship in time. The longer I spent in Zongo, the more socially 
precarious information was revealed to me by informants who seemed to lower their 
guards, thus yielding more accurate data concerning the status of men’s wives. This 
would seem to be the case for the five young men who disclosed bazawara first 
marriages. However, there were many elder men with whom I felt I had equally frank 
and open relationships132 and yet none reported a bazawara first marriage. Hence, 
whilst trust might be necessary in enabling such disclosures I am not convinced that it 
is sufficient as an explanation for their distribution. This does not mean that bazawara 
first marriages are more common than reported in the data, but it does mean that we 
cannot be certain of their actual prevalence amongst men, be they young or old. 
Bearing in mind the methodological difficulty of empirically demonstrating how trust, or 
the absence of it, might shape the data produced, I am reluctant to claim that the 
numerical data presented above accurately represents the status of men’s brides. 
Furthermore, the question remains as to why men who have married more than once 
report the bazawara status of second or subsequent wives, but still not that of a first 
wife? 
As shown in table 3, more young men reported bazawara first marriages than elder 
men. This may or may not be explained by my specific relationship with the men in 
question. However elder men do report bazawara marriages, but only in the case of 
marriages subsequent to their first. This would present the question: Why is the 
amarya/bazawara status of one’s bride most significant in the case of first marriages? 
Three possibilities emerge: First of all, that the amarya/bazawara discourse is 
exclusive to first wives and does not apply to second or subsequent wives. Second, 
that although applicable to second wives, its importance is diminished relative to other 
factors which mediate male social status.  Third, that it is less a case of disclosure and 
more about men’s ability to frame marital pathways in specific ways. 
                                                          
132  I resist complacency in this regard. I believe that 'gut feeling' is often a good guide to 
evaluating the extent of trust in any relationship, but I cannot and should not rely upon the 
reader's gut feeling to take my word for it. Moreover, it is inherently complex to demonstrate 
empirically. Whilst this is more of a problem than a solution, it does provoke areas of further 
examination that might be useful in the analysis. 
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It is relatively straightforward to discount the first of these possibilities with a degree of 
certainty. At no point during fieldwork did an informant explicitly or implicitly allude to 
age or number of marriages as exempting a wife from amarya/bazawara 
categorisation and the associated ranking and status implications. Of course, one 
must remain open to the possibility that this is attributable to a gap in the data. 
However, the persistence of the amarya/bazawara discourse in men’s narratives and 
yet complete absence of any sort of age or marital order qualification would seem to 
make this unlikely. 
While at the level of discourse the constitution of the categories of amarya and 
bazawara and their broad implications for a man’s status remain unchanged, the 
effects of this discourse appear less significant for men who have had multiple 
marriages. If the amarya/bazawara discourse effected subsequent marriages in the 
same way as the first, then we might expect fewer men who have married more than 
once to report bazawara marriages. The intersection of the amarya/bazawara status 
of one’s wife with other forms of social differentiation is significant here in mediating 
the effect of a wife’s status on a man’s social status. Marriage represents the rite of 
passage through which the transition from youth to manhood is achieved. All things 
being equal, a man married to a bazawara might well enjoy lower social status relative 
to that of a man married to an amarya, but as has been shown in Chapters Four and 
Five, he will nonetheless be of higher status than the as yet unmarried man. 
As we saw in the example of Mallam Malolo discussed in Chapter Four, tremendous 
emphasis is placed on a first marriage as demarcating youth from manhood 
irrespective of other forms of social differentiation such as age or lineage. This 
emphasis is not present in subsequent marriages as manhood has been achieved 
upon one’s first marriage. Marriage plays out as a binary opposition between youth 
and manhood. For older, already married men, their manhood is not at stake in their 
marital pathways in the same way as it is for men marrying their first wives because 
they are ranked relative to other married men rather than the category of youth, a 
status which upon marriage to a first wife men have left behind. 
Whilst clearly status varies between married men, the distinction between unmarried 
youth and married man is exceptionally powerful. This is not to say that the 
amarya/bazawara status of marriages subsequent to a first marriage is without the 
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potential to impact upon a man’s status. However, entry into manhood, via marriage, 
opens up a series of intersecting, status-conferring relations and qualities not available 
to unmarried men – such as title, wealth and legitimate paternity – that take 
precedence over, or at the very least diminish the significance of, whether one's 
additional wives are bazawara or amarya. This is especially the case for men in 
polygamous marriages. As described in Chapter Five, polygamy is seen as an 
indicator of powerful manhood. The polygamously married man is the Mai Gida par 
excellence; the epitome of man as provider, as ordained and revered in Islam. He is 
the embodiment of mutumin kirkii and thus of respect and prestige. That a 
polygamously married man’s wives might be bazawara is by and large socially 
irrelevant relative to the superordinate achievement of obtaining and providing for 
multiple wives. Despite this reverence for polygamy, it is seldom achieved in Zongo. 
Hence elder polygamously married men are of such a high status that they constitute 
Zongo’s elite and are to some extent immune from the negative effects of the 
amarya/bazawara discourse133. 
Bearing in mind that my sample as presented is limited in the variables it takes into 
account, one of course has to be cautious in interpreting this data. It might be that the 
elder men sampled happened to be inordinately wealthy, for example. It is certainly 
the case that all of the men with three or more wives at the time of fieldwork could be 
described as belonging to Zongo’s elite – belonging to prestigious lineages and 
occupying formal and informal positions of power. Nonetheless, it is a fairly safe 
assumption that multiple marriages, be they polygamous or successive, tend to be 
more prevalent amongst elder men who are likely to have greater resources, in terms 
of time and wealth, with which to acquire wives than younger men. However, the 
reasons that one man might have more wives than another is not the issue at stake in 
this chapter, but rather how these marital pathways might be framed relative to the 
amarya/bazawara discourse. 
 
 
                                                          
133  Multiple divorces and marriages are perhaps not as frequent as in Hausaland proper, 
but they are nonetheless not nearly as rare as polygamous marriages in Zongo. 
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6.7 When the Numbers Don’t Add Up 
As we have seen a key problem in evaluating men’s actual marital practices is the 
extent to which a bride’s reported status corresponds with actual status. While the 
building of trust over time has been raised as a possible factor in influencing 
disclosure, this ought not to be overstated relative to the pressure time exerts on efforts 
to sustain particular self-presentations and performances, particularly when they might 
be at odds with ‘realities’. I believe that as Nasir and I spent more time together we 
developed a friendship and came to trust one another. However, the amount of time 
that we spent together meant that it also became increasingly difficult for Nasir to 
conceal the status of his bride, and the costs of misrepresentation might for Nasir have 
felt outweighed by the benefits of sustaining openness in our relationship. 
The absence of elder men’s reports of bazawara first marriages might be similarly 
shaped. One might argue that elder men also attempt to redefine the status of their 
brides. Indeed, the ‘rewriting’ of one’s marital history to conform to a high status marital 
pathway ought to become easier as time passes and memories fade. Equally, for 
younger men who have married more recently, such rewriting might become more 
difficult, subject as it is to public memory. Therefore, a key variable influencing reports 
of a bride’s status is perhaps not so much number of wives or age, but how recently 
the marriage has taken place. 
 
Figure 6. Marriages Reported as Amarya and Bazawara by Years since Marriage. N = 103134. 
                                                          
134  Where the number of years since a marriage was either not reported or unclear, this 
data has not been included. Hence of the total 128 marriages reported, in 25 cases there was 
no data available or given for the time since marriage. 
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Looking at Figure 6 we can see that, of the 103 marriages in which the time since 
marriage was stated, the number reported as bazawara declines as the number of 
years since a marriage has taken place increases. Of the 72 marriages that had taken 
place more than five years ago, just 8 marriages were reported as being bazawara; 
whereas 17 of the 31 marriages to have taken place in the last five years were reported 
as bazawara. Whilst clearly correlation does not equal causality, there does seem to 
be a relationship between time since marriage, or a time associated variable, and the 
likelihood of a marriage being reported as bazawara. This appears to add weight to 
the proposition that the ‘rewriting’ of one’s marital history to conform to a high status 
marital pathway becomes easier over time. This does not altogether preclude the 
influence of the ‘back-grounding effects’ of other factors which mediate male social 
status for elder men, but suggests that representations of marital pathways are subject 
to a range of factors that influence the social cost of specific representations. For 
example, reporting a bazawara marriage might have less effect on the status of an 
elder, polygamously married man of title than on a younger recently married man, but 
it might also be easier for an elder man to sustain favourable representations of a first 
marriage that is more distant in public memory than that of a younger man. 
The problem here is that it is not possible to verify this proposition from the quantitative 
data set out above in isolation. First of all, one needs to be cautious of making claims 
about specific correlations, let alone causality, on the basis of a relatively small sample 
size. Second, and perhaps most significantly, the data gathered is subject to the 
contingencies that shape the production of specific accounts as set out above. This 
points towards the need for deeper qualitative analysis of specific cases. 
 
6.8 Conclusions: (Un)Revealing Answers to Unsatisfactory Questions 
“Zuma da zaki da harbi - The bee has both sweetness and a sting” (Hausa Proverb)135. 
Clearly, a man cannot get married without a wife; but as we saw in the first part of this 
chapter, it is not simply the case that any bride will do. Men broadly categorise and 
evaluate brides in moral terms. Men say they want virtuous brides and that it is the 
                                                          
135 Meaning there are two sides to every story (Merrick 1905. P.63). 
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‘amarya’, never-married virgin bride, that most keenly embodies such virtue. 
‘Bazawara’ brides, women who have already been married and divorced, are 
somewhat less desirable. Though not necessarily without virtue, a bazawara bride is 
a more uncertain prospect. The fact that a bazawara bride has been divorced raises 
questions about her character and conduct, which men say are difficult, if not 
impossible to answer.  In Zongo, the belief is that only God can know a person’s ‘true 
character’, such that malign intentions may often be concealed behind a veil of 
propriety. 
Men claim that the value of bridewealth paid to an amarya bride’s father is a reflection 
of the fact that virtuous brides are in high demand and hard to come by. A man who 
marries an amarya bride is generally considered a man of capacity, but men of lesser 
means must necessarily settle for bazawara brides. Thus who a man marries matters 
because it is indicative of his ability to produce and provide which, as described in 
Chapters Four and Five, are the bedrock of masculine prestige and status. 
However, the moral discourses through which notions of the ideal bride are articulated 
reflect more fundamental anxieties about masculine self-image and personal 
significance. Much like we’ve seen in the case of junior and senior men, having 
authority over women is central to the idea of responsible manhood. Men’s authority 
over women is considered legitimate by virtue of women’s notional dependency on 
men. The flipside of this notion is that the realisation of accepted and valued manhoods 
relies upon the dependency of women. 
What we see within the moral discourse of the ideal bride is a commentary on the 
ways in which the idea of independent women is troubling for individual men and 
masculinity at large. When men make judgements as to which kind of women are or 
are not morally virtuous, they are marking out which kind of women are and are not 
going to fall into line. This is important for individual men, who require appropriately 
behaved brides if they are to successfully establish and sustain their manhoods. 
Where a virtuous bride is a symbol of competent and responsible manhood, a wanton 
and wily wife signifies a husband’s lack of control. The women men describe as 
virtuous brides are those they perceive as being most amenable to – or perhaps more 
precisely, the least likely to undermine –, the kinds of self-images they would like to 
cultivate. Though independent women present a problem for individual men’s efforts 
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to establish their manhoods, there is a much larger issue at stake. The very possibility 
of independent women calls into question not only the legitimacy of male social control, 
but the very terms that make the category 'man' socially meaningful. Thus, who men 
marry matters not only as a marker of individual status, but for the significance of and 
value of manhood as a whole. 
I was interested in the extent to which this discourse could be seen to inform men’s 
actual marital practices. Through the use of quantitative data extracted from field notes 
and interviews, I attempted to draw a clearer picture of who men actually married. 
However, in the analysis of this data several methodological issues arose that made 
the answer to this question difficult to ascertain. I argued that the extent to which men’s 
accounts can be seen accurately represent their actual marital practices is uncertain. 
Within the context of a discourse that accords greater prestige and status to men who 
marry amarya than bazawara brides, there is an incentive for men to claim their brides 
are amarya, such that it is difficult to reliably ascertain who men actually marry solely 
on the basis of their own reports. Thus one might argue that the data presented above 
tells us little about men's actual marital practices. However, I would argue that the 
ambiguities of men’s representations are an interesting social phenomenon in their 
own right. Although the issue of disclosure remains, that men's reports are framed by 
the amarya/bazawara discourse only reinforces the suggestion that it matters to men. 
In perhaps more concrete terms, how a bride is perceived by others might well be 
more important than her actual status. 
Furthermore, I argued that representations of brides are subject to a range of 
influences that affect the social cost of specific representations. For example, reporting 
a bazawara marriage might have less effect on the status of an older, polygamously 
married man of wealth and title than on a younger recently married man, but it might 
also be easier for older, less recently married men to sustain favourable 
representations of a first marriage that is more distant in public memory than that of a 
younger man. 
Drawing on this idea, I posit a change of emphasis in the analysis. Rather than 
examining marital practices in terms of who men 'actually' marry, the following 
Chapters examine the marital pathways of specific men to ask how men (re)produce 
specific representations of their marital pathways. I elaborate the social forces that 
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come into play in shaping them, including men’s ability to curate and choreograph their 
marital pathways and manage the perceptions of others. This is achieved through an 
analysis of the marital process as defined in terms of a series of prestationary 
exchanges that formally demarcate the marital process and the relationships, 
personhoods and statuses of the individuals who participate in it. I argue that the 
marital process can be seen as a stage for impression management – performances 
oriented towards cultivating specific self-presentations in which the amarya/bazawara 
discourse is a framing element. Through this exposition of the marital process I 
demonstrate how perceptions of a bride's status are subject to a man's ability to 
(re)produce and sustain (mis)representations favourable to his social status. 
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Chapter Seven: Prestations in Zongo 
 
7.1 Husseini’s Sadaki 
This thesis is concerned with how manhoods are mediated by marriage. In this 
chapter, we will see how it is the fulfilment of specific prestationary requirements that 
formally confirms and sanctions the marital status of a man and woman as married, 
and thus confers the status of manhood. 
In the following I examine how the fulfilment of prestationary processes and the 
achievement of accepted and valued forms of masculine personhood are interwoven. 
This means unravelling the normative discourses, structures and relationships in 
which prestations are embedded and given meaning in terms of their social 
consequences for men.  
As described in Chapter Three, a consistent observation in the anthropology of 
marriage has been how marriage operates to establish, reconfigure and reinforce 
particular social relationships. In the following section I argue that in Zongo 
prestationary exchanges play an important mediating role in these processes in three 
important respects. First of all, prestations can be seen to initiate the processes 
through which particular social relationships are established. Second, because 
prestationary exchanges require an audience, they serve to make these relationships 
and their normative entailments visible to others. Third, this visibility opens up the 
relationships established in the prestationary process to public scrutiny, which in turn 
serves as a disciplinary mechanism, encouraging conformity to normative rights, 
obligations and conduct within them. 
In formal discourses of the marital process, it is sadaki - bridewealth- that is regarded 
as most important and thus that which I turn to first in my analysis. Let me begin with 
an account of a not untypical sadaki exchange, before the complex sequence of 
prestations, and then analysing how they work to make social relations and persons. 
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It is a Saturday afternoon, a couple of weeks from the anticipated commencement of 
Ramadan, and high season for weddings136. I gather along with perhaps two hundred 
men at Mallam Bako’s mosque, for the formal confirmation of Husseini’s wedding. 
Husseini and his bride are both absent: he is waiting in the marital home, while his 
future bride is at her father's house ready to be taken to her new husband, via 
celebrations with her friends and family. At the front of the mosque, Mallam Danjuma 
sits crossed legged encircled by various elders. On either side are the bride and 
groom’s male kin. Husseini’s younger brother circulates, offering Tom Tom cough 
sweets and kola nuts to the assembled men. 
Despite the formality of the occasion, it is far from quiet. The atmosphere is boisterous 
and jovial. Men chatter amongst themselves, tease and chase one another, and 
converse loudly on mobile phones. Some get up and down, wander in and out of the 
mosque, returning with sachets of cold water bought from a stall set up by a shrewd 
young Ewe woman outside137. I am sat with my research assistant Garuba and another 
young man, who shows me pictures of the woman that he is planning to marry, and 
asks that I greet her on his phone138. 
Mallam Danjuma begins the ceremony with prayers, followed by the elders of the bride 
and groom. Husseini’s father hands a white envelope of money to Mallam Danjuma 
which he in turn passes to the bride’s uncle. The brother of the bride’s father takes the 
envelope and opens it to reveal the money enclosed. He counts the money out aloud, 
holding each note up one-by-one for the congregation to see. The money is then 
placed on another silver tray and a male member of the bride’s family circulates with 
                                                          
136  During Ramadan, a fatigue sets in derived from tiredness and hunger meaning men 
work less and spend more on luxury foods such as dates, fresh fruit and masara. They will be 
preoccupied with the innumerable Tafseer (readings from the Quran) and late nights spent 
feasting after the breaking of fast at sundown, thus they will have less time and money 
available for marriages and the accompanying expenses. 
137  It is considered as essential to prayer that the supplicant is neither hungry nor thirsty; 
however, to consume any food or drink during a formal Islamic rite is prohibited. 
138  I was often asked by young men, even those that I didn’t know, to speak with a woman 
that they were courting on the phone. Sometimes I would be asked to accompany them on a 
visit to the woman in question. On one occasion, when I asked an informant why he wanted 
me to accompany him to visit his girlfriend, he explained that because I was a ‘baturi’ it would 
give him "power" and so she would see him as a "big man". 
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the tray for all the men to bear witness it. 200 Cedi’s worth of crisp 20 Cedi notes are 
visible. Some younger men laugh amongst themselves as one of them gestures as if 
about to steal the money and run away. 
Meanwhile, the bride’s elders quietly discuss something between themselves. My 
research assistant Garuba interprets events for me, giving me an overview of the 
procedure and the conversations taking place as he sees them. Garuba tells me that 
the bride’s elders are discussing the amount of money that has been offered as sadaki. 
The brother of the bride’s father turns and speaks to Mallam Danjuma. The bride’s 
father’s brother says some prayers and gives thanks for the offering. He states that 
the bride’s father is pleased that the groom’s family are seeking marriage to his 
daughter. However, he continues to state that his brother’s daughter has many suitors 
and that she is bound to make an ideal wife for her groom. On this basis they feel that 
a more generous sum is needed – an amount more fitting for a bride such as his 
daughter. 
The groom’s elders turn to one another and converse in the same hushed tones as 
the bride’s kin before them, eventually turning to Mallam Danjuma and the bride’s 
elders. The groom’s uncle states that they are a prestigious family, well thought of in 
Zongo, and that the daughter will be treated well. He describes a series of feats and 
favours that the family has performed for the benefit of the bride’s family and the depth 
of the relationship between the two families. He says that already their families were 
united when his eldest daughter married one of their sons, and that the monies given 
are merely a token, intended to formalise a marriage that has long been on the table 
and to reiterate the enduring bonds between the two households. 
The bride’s uncle turns to Mallam Danjuma. He reiterates the close relationship 
between the two families and his gratitude for the relationship. However, he says his 
brothers have gone to considerable expense in raising their daughter and ensuring 
that her behaviour has been proper. Despite her many suitors she has not considered 
a man before and has remained honourable. They have spent a lot of money, he 
continues, on the things that they will need in the home to ensure that when she goes 
to her husband’s house she will not need anything to perform her duties as a wife and 
that this burden will not be assumed by her new kin. He suggests that a larger 
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contribution would be advisable so that the groom’s family can publicly show 
recognition through a contribution to these expenses. 
This statement is clearly anticipated by Husseini’s elders. They produce a second 
envelope with more money enclosed, which is again passed to the bride’s kin via 
Mallam Danjuma. Again the bride’s uncle counts the money out aloud and it is 
circulated amongst the guests. The total sadaki has now reached 300 Cedi’s, an 
amount towards the higher end of sadaki exchanges in Zongo. Garuba explains to me 
that this is a marriage between two prestigious families. The sadaki is high as a 
reflection of the pedigree of the two families that are about to marry and the 
auspiciousness of the occasion. He points out various prominent elders sat on plastic 
chairs at the southern side of the mosque: The Chief of Zongo Karfe, the Sarkin, 
Galadima and Madawaki of Zongo, and Mallam Danjuma. He explains that his father 
is present because it is an important. 
The bride’s elders converse amongst themselves once more, until after some minutes 
one of the uncles turns to Mallam Danjuma and informs him that his brother, the bride’s 
father is satisfied – indeed, he has been nodding his head throughout in agreement. 
Mallam Danjuma invites the bride’s father to say some prayers of thanks, who does 
so; and who is then followed by the father of the groom.  
Mallam Danjuma speaks. Quiet descends upon the mosque for the first time139; the 
atmosphere is solemn and attentive. The men present stand in a well-rehearsed 
unison, as if attached to a single set of puppet strings precisely coordinating their 
movements. They fold their arms across their chests and in low, soft tones recite Al-
Fatiah, the first surah of the Quran. The men kiss their thumbs and then gently place 
them over their eyes, before bowing their heads and descending to their knees. Once 
on their knees, the men place their heads, knees and hands to the floor and repeat 
the ‘takbeer’ – ‘Allahu akbar’, God is great – three times, raising themselves upright 
after each recitation. 
                                                          
139  Prayer clearly merits much greater attention than the sadaki negotiations.  
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The men eventually sit up, cross legs, and dip their heads to one side140. Mallam 
Danjuma recites ‘Kitbah-tun-Nikah’, a prayer traditionally recited at weddings in which 
God’s blessing for the marriage and ongoing guidance for the bride and groom are 
sought. At this point the marriage between the bride and groom is considered formally 
sanctioned.  
Mallam Danjuma concludes the marriage ceremony with a prayer for the bride and 
groom, their families and the ‘Jumma’a’ – the Muslim community. Garuba explains that 
Danjuma is giving a short lecture for the benefit of the men in attendance. He says 
that it is through marriage that the Jumma’a grows strong and prospers, and thus 
should be sought by all men; furthermore, that they should strive to preserve it in all 
its glory and not degrade it though hasty marriage or immoral practice141.  
The men remain seated for some minutes, reflecting on the prayers before standing 
and leaving. The quiet formality of the ceremonial prayers contrasts with the chaotic 
and noisy departure of the assembled men. Once the ceremony has drawn to an end 
I feel relief that it has reached a successful outcome. I had not expected the bride’s 
family to bargain over the sadaki, despite Husseini himself fearing the possibility. 
I knew Husseini reasonably well and he had shared some of his pre-wedding nerves 
with me as the day approached. He was concerned that the bride’s father might create 
difficulty when the sadaki was presented, or that he might even reject it altogether. I 
had numerous times visited the father of the bride with Husseini or his elders, including 
for the gaysua, when a groom’s senior male kin give a gift to those of the bride to 
formally initiate the marital process142,, and things had run smoothly. The bride’s father 
had appeared enthusiastic for the marriage and relations amiable between the elders 
from both the bride’s and groom’s sides. I naively offered Husseini my reassurance, 
reasoning that the bride’s father had appeared nothing but positive throughout his 
courtship and wedding preparations. Her kin had enthusiastically accepted the gaysua 
and made generous contributions towards the wedding expenses and preparation of 
                                                          
140  It is said that an angel sits on either shoulder; one making note of their prayers and 
adding it to the record of their good deeds, the other their bad deeds. 
141  Afterwards, Garuba says that Mallam Danjuma means fornicating outside of wedlock, 
but it is not correct to mention such things in the mosque. 
142 See page  
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the marital home. Surely having invested so much of his own time and resources into 
this wedding, the bride’s father would not sabotage it now? 
Despite the vast amounts of time, effort and money Husseini and his kin had poured 
into the day, he maintained a degree of uncertainty as to whether the marriage would 
be formally confirmed. As time passed and I came to observe other men prepare for 
their marriages, I learnt that, no matter how remote the possibility that a marriage fails 
to be confirmed, the uncertainty and angst that centred on sadaki were not entirely 
unjustified. Next I shall describe the elements of marriage prestations, to situate sadaki 
within the wider process of marriage exchanges. 
 
7.2 Dominant Accounts of Marriage Prestations 
A number of formal prestations take place throughout the marital process in Zongo. 
They are structured into stages and categories, defined by the items that constitute 
them, the moment in which they are exchanged, those who participate in them, and 
the direction in which goods flow. The most important formal prestations include 
sadaki, lefe, gaysua/goro and kayan daki. Such prestations are a necessary 
constituent of the marital process in Zongo, such that without them a marriage cannot 
be said to have taken place. Below I summarise the dominant accounts of each 
category of marriage prestation, before proceeding to discuss their meanings in 
greater detail.  
Sadaki 
Throughout much of Hausaland, sadaki is a normative payment made by a groom's 
father and elder male kin to the father of the bride. The sadaki money is the formal 
responsibility of the groom’s father; he can expect contributions from male kin and 
those with which he has economic, political and social ties, such as friends, business 
associates and men with title. Though it is often the case that neither the bride nor 
groom will be present at the point of exchange, the receipt of sadaki by the bride's 
family at the mosque formally confirms the bride and groom as husband and wife (Hill 
1972, Cooper 1997, Masquelier 2005). This is consistent with narratives identified 
during my fieldwork in Zongo. The sadaki is not usually agreed in advance and even 
when it is there is often disagreement over the amount of sadaki to be paid at the 
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wedding ceremony itself, such as is described in the example of Husseini's wedding 
above. In Zongo, sadaki is often described as being a form of compensation for the 
bride's father who has raised her. Ibrahim describes this process as akin to raising a 
cow.  
"Somebody can take a small cow and feed it and look after it. It is the same like the 
bride's family who spend money raising her and it is the husband who is going to get 
all the benefit". 
The price of the cow reflects the investment of time, effort and resources of the person 
who is selling it. Similarly, the sadaki is said to be a form of compensation for the 
resources that have been invested in a bride's upbringing by her kin. This transfer from 
groom’s to bride’s kin conforms to what has been defined in the literature as 
bridewealth (Goody and Tambiah 1973): the groom’s kin making a payment to those 
of the bride as compensation for the investment that they have made in raising her 
and from which the groom and his kin benefit. 
Gaysua/Goro 
If sadaki confirms a marriage it is gaysua or goro that formally initiates it. Gaysua is 
the first ‘formal’ prestation of the marital process. It is sometimes referred to as 
‘knocking money’ or goro – meaning kola nut – which was traditionally the currency of 
the gaysua (Hill 1972, Schildkraut 1982). It usually consists of kola nuts, sweets and 
a few Ghana Cedis, usually between five and 20, but sometimes as much as 50. The 
gaysua is given to a prospective bride's father by that of the groom when he visits him 
to formally ask that their son and daughter marry. Acceptance of the gaysua by the 
bride's father indicates that he commits his daughter to the marriage solicited and any 
approach from other men will be rejected. The groom is not present for the gaysua. 
The money is normally handed over in an envelope. The father of the bride will ask 
one of his junior brothers to open it, and the amount is counted aloud so as to be 
witnessed. Sometimes the gaysua may take place several times, the second gaysua 
being the time at which a formal date is set for the marriage. Though men explained 
that there were no guarantees that the bride’s father would accept the goro, it is seldom 
refused when the marriage is between two people from Zongo when the odds are that 
most people know that the marriage is on the cards and people have already evaluated 
the likelihood of the gaysua being successful beforehand. The likelihood of gaysua 
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being unsuccessful increases when there is an absence of common social network 
between the bride and groom’s kin. 
Kayan Daki 
As has been observed elsewhere in Hausaland (Cooper 1995, 1997, Masquelier 2004, 
Manvell 2005), the kayan daki, or 'things for the room', is described as a wedding gift 
from a mother to her daughter that includes the items needed to prepare the marital 
home and perform her marital duties.  
In Zongo, the kayan daki is constituted of two components: kayan aiki ('work things'), 
and kayan gara ('foodstuffs'). The kayan aiki usually includes cooking and cleaning 
products and utensils such as brushes, bowls, cooking pots, food bowls, washing 
buckets, a pestle and mortar for pounding grains, wash cloths and soap.  
The kayan gara consists of food items, mostly those which are described as abin 
marmari – treats or luxuries – for the bride’s personal consumption, such as soft drinks, 
biscuits, milo, and chocolate. Sometimes items considered staples such as rice, milk 
and tinned or packaged foods are included. The husband also provides a kayan gara 
consisting of foodstuffs, but his is differentiated from that of the bride’s mother as 
staples for household rather than personal consumption. 
The kayan daki also includes some simple clothes usually made from inexpensive 
'work cloth' as opposed to the kayan ado – ‘best clothes’ – which are bought by the 
husband as part of the lefe (see below). The kayan daki frequently includes a cabinet 
for the bride to store her belongings in, and a bed. Though the bride’s mother may 
purchase many of the items herself, many of them are sourced via her social networks 
derived from kin, friends and those women with which she participates in important 
social events or biki (see below). These contributions may take the form of cash to buy 
them or the items themselves. 
The kayan daki is taken to the bride’s home between four days and two weeks after 
the wedding ceremony. Though four days is the ideal, there is often a delay while the 
kayan daki is prepared. Several days after the wedding ceremony, these items are 
presented at the budan kay – literally 'opening of the head' – in which friends, family 
and well-wishers are invited to visit and inspect the kayan daki at the marital home.  
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Elsewhere in Hausaland, the budan kay is the culmination of a lively and noisy 
procession, known as the kan kaya – the carrying of the load – in which the mother 
and kin of the bride as well as female friends deliver the kayan daki ready for the budan 
kay (Cooper 1995, Masquelier 2004, Manvell 2005). However, in Zongo, the kan kaya 
is a much more understated affair: the kayan daki arrives in dribs and drabs prior to 
the budan kay. On the day of a budan kay, the mother and close female kin usually 
arrive by taxi143 to the marital home, dressed in their finest clothes carrying a small, 
perhaps symbolic portion, of the kayan daki, usually in decorative plastic bags. Visitors 
arrive sporadically throughout the afternoon and evening to inspect the bride’s new 
home and the items of the kayan daki.  
The items of the kayan daki are displayed either inside the marital home or outside on 
a plastic table. Key soap is organised into neat pyramids, bags of washing powder in 
rows and soft drinks arranged in triangles separated by brand. Cooking utensils such 
as pots and pans (kwano), electric food processors and rice cookers (often more than 
one), are displayed in a glass-fronted cabinet. In the bedroom a bed might be piled 
high with several mattresses and further items displayed on top. The kayan daki is not 
the only gift displayed at the budan kay. The lefe or gift from the groom will also be 
presented.  
Lefe 
Elsewhere in Hausaland, the lefe is ordinarily given to a bride by her groom several 
days before their wedding and is comprised of the fine clothes, jewellery and 
cosmetics that she will dress herself in for the occasion (Hill 1972, Wall 1988, Clough 
2009). Although this is also the case in Zongo, a groom generally gives an additional 
gift of similar items to his bride upon her arrival in the marital home, which is also 
                                                          
143  Only the closest kin travelled in taxis and often small children had to be dragged 
kicking and screaming from them so as to make room for more senior friends and kin. Men 
and women travelled in separate taxis. Sometimes the taxi journey involved a long drive simply 
because the quickest routes through Zongo on foot are impenetrable in a vehicle. Finding the 
taxi, waiting for the people and loading the taxi could take more than an hour and yet the 
journey itself could be little more than two minutes. This also meant that those who were 
travelling on foot would arrive at the marital home before the bride’s mother and be able to 
witness the arrival of the mother’s party. At one budan kay for a woman marrying a man in 
Nima (another Zongo, perhaps 20 minutes away by car), the mother and her companions took 
the tro-tro to Nima and then changed into a taxi for the last stretch. A taxi to Nima would be 
expensive relative to the tro-tro, but arriving in a car would seem near enough a necessity. 
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described as lefe. Based on the variable responses of informants I remain uncertain 
whether lefe can be thought of as one gift given in two parts or two separate gifts 
altogether. However, what is consistent in the definitions provided by people in Zongo 
is that the items are principally intended for the bride’s personal consumption. The lefe 
is described as consisting of non-essential items that indicate that a husband is willing 
and able to provide for his bride. It is also regarded as a demonstration of a groom’s 
love. The lefe is presented to the bride in a suitcase and later displayed at the budan 
kay. Husseini’s lefe can be considered typical. I met Husseini in a house that he was 
preparing for his marriage. He brought a large red suitcase into the hall, opened the 
lock with a small key and flipped the lid open to reveal the contents. The contents of 
the case included a Quran, prayer mat (sadada), beads (nastazbi), scarf 
(mufti/mayafi), shampoo, perfume, jewellery, underwear, makeup, cloth (around 12 
pieces), sandals, three handbags, shampoo, perfume, jewellery, underwear, makeup 
and nine rolls of cloth. Husseini explained that these items were the ‘lefe’ that he would 
give to his bride, Fatima, on the day of his wedding. He explained that this was the 
costliest and most important gift that the bride would receive as it demonstrates that 
he is both committed to and capable of providing for his wife, as well as being a sign 
of his love. 
Though the lefe is notionally intended for the bride’s consumption, men also assert 
that it is necessary if he is to find his wife desirable. Men describe these items as the 
things a bride needs so as to appear beautiful to her husband. Ibrahim explains how 
if a bride is left to buy her own cloth and jewellery she will just wear rags as she has 
no money to buy nice clothes herself. It was important for his bride to have a variety 
of cloth, cosmetics, perfume and jewellery such that she would be able to remain 
attractive to him. 
We can thus see that in dominant discourses each set of prestations are defined in 
discrete terms based upon the items that constitute them, the moment in which they 
are exchanged, those who participate in them and the direction in which goods flow 
as summarized in the table below. 
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Table 6. Dominant Discourses of Prestation Form and Function in Zongo 
 
Prestation Name Giver Recipient Items involved Reported function 
Sadaki Groom’s senior male 
kin 
Bride’s father Money. Compensates bride’s kin for 
investment made in raising her. 
Gaysua/goro Groom’s father Bride’s father Money, kola, sweets. Establishes acceptance of and 
commitment to marriage. 
Kayan daki Bride’s mother Bride Foodstuffs, furniture, basic 
clothing, cooking and cleaning 
products and utensils. Some 
‘luxury’ items for the bride’s 
personal consumption. 
Ensures bride has all that is needed 
for her to carry out her domestic 
responsibilities. 
Lefe Groom Bride Quran, prayer mat and beads, 
clothing, toiletries, cosmetics, 
accessories. 
Demonstrates groom’s 
commitment and ability to provide 
for his wife; demonstrates groom’s 
love. 
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7.3 Unpacking Dominant Narratives: What’s the Point of Prestation? 
By definition, marriage prestations involve the transfer of goods and services from one 
party to another. It is thus not surprising that analyses have sometimes drawn upon 
economic theory, in particular concepts of the market. In their crudest form these 
approaches have reduced prestations to a variation on the functioning of market forces 
and, as such, a demonstration of supply and demand, with the relative scarcity of 
brides and grooms informing prestationary form and value (see Becker 1974, Bell and 
Song 1994). 
A related and somewhat overlapping approach has argued for prestations as reflecting 
the value of women’s labour144, the argument being that in dowry societies women are 
considered an economic liability. A payment is made to the groom or his kin for 
accepting the burden of a dependent bride. In contrast, where women are considered 
a productive asset, as making a positive contribution to her husband’s household, it is 
the bride’s kin who are compensated for the loss of her labour (Caldwell et al 1983).  
This idea would seem to resonate with prevailing accounts in Zongo, where people 
say the principle objective of prestationary transfers is the acquisition of goods and 
services themselves. From this point of view, sadaki could be considered a 'rational' 
economic exchange, in which acquisition of the goods and services themselves is the 
primary function of the interaction in which they are transferred: the groom’s kin seek 
to procure a bride and her labour, whilst the bride’s kin seek monetary recompense. 
This is evident in accounts such as Ibrahim’s that describe sadaki as a payment 
intended to compensate the bride’s kin for the investment made in her upbringing as 
well as the account of Husseini’s wedding above, where the same rationale was 
deployed by the bride’s kin as justification for demanding a larger sadaki. 
However, puzzled by the prevalence of bargaining on wedding days and the apparent 
discomfort it caused young grooms such as Husseini, I asked several young men why 
the sadaki was not agreed in advance. They typically responded by claiming that the 
sadaki was agreed prior to the exchange itself, but that the bride’s kin would often roll 
back on the agreement and try to take advantage of the relatively public context of the 
                                                          
144  Opinions differ regarding the extent to which notions of value are culturally or 
materially defined as informed by the particular epistemological orientation underpinning the 
analysis. 
Emil Dauncey 3750701 
 
209 
 
wedding ceremony to make a profit. Bargaining, they claimed was a result of the 
bride’s kin seeking to maximise the material benefit to be derived from the sadaki 
exchange, whilst the groom’s kin sought to minimise their expenditure. 
This would seem to be consistent with the description of Husseini’s wedding provided 
above, where thinly veiled accusations of greed are leveraged in attempts to shame 
either side of the bargain into submitting to their demands. In Chapters Four and Five 
we observed how generosity, charity and providing for others are so highly regarded 
as masculine traits that the accumulation of material wealth is not infrequently 
regarded with a degree of suspicion. This notion is invoked by the bride’s uncle when 
he alludes to a lack of generosity on the part of the groom’s kin. He asserts that the 
sum that they have offered does not adequately reflect the investment made by her 
kin in raising the bride. Hence the material demands made by the bride’s kin are 
articulated in such a manner as to invoke the notion of generosity and a potential loss 
of face should they fail to meet their demands. 
However, in making this demand for a greater sadaki, the bride’s kin themselves risk 
appearing greedy or mean.  In order to deflect such accusations, they draw attention 
to the contributions that they have made towards the expense of establishing a marital 
home so as to lessen this burden for her new kin. The groom’s kin seek to mitigate the 
effects of this strategy in several ways. First of all, the groom’s uncle provides a veiled 
warning to those of the groom. He asserts the prestige of his own household in Zongo, 
implying that its status is widely accepted, and so not easily diminished by the efforts 
of the bride’s kin. He follows up by describing the prior ‘feats and favours’ performed 
by the groom and his kin for the benefit of the bride’s household and playing down the 
significance of the monetary value of the sadaki by referring to it as a mere ‘token’, 
thus suggesting that the extent of their generosity cannot be evaluated on the basis of 
the sadaki alone. 
Though it is seldom the case that the bride and groom’s kin fail to agree upon the 
sadaki, the bargaining process is nevertheless a source of anxiety for men as they 
navigate the marital process. In many conversations with young men, they expressed 
considerable resentment for the elder men responsible for sadaki, claiming that senior 
men’s efforts at profiteering put their marital ambitions at risk. 
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However, the extent to which the pursuit of material gain can be accorded primacy in 
shaping the sadaki exchange is questionable when situated within the frame of 
masculine personhoods and statuses as have been elaborated in the preceding 
chapters of this thesis and the ways in which they are articulated through normative 
discourses of material wealth. In Chapter Five, I described how the notion of wealth in 
people is fundamental to masculine prestige and status to the extent that men often 
forego material wealth in pursuit of wealth in people. This idea points to a need to 
reconsider the sadaki bargain, and indeed any other prestation in terms of the 
relationships that are at stake in them.  
7.4 Making Relationships 
As described in Chapter Three, a consistent observation in the anthropology of 
marriage has been how marriage operates to establish, reconfigure and reinforce 
particular social relationships. In the following section I argue that in Zongo 
prestationary exchanges play an important mediating role in these processes in three 
important respects. First of all, prestations can be seen to initiate the processes 
through which particular social relationships are established. Secondly, because 
prestationary exchanges require an audience, they serve to make these relationships 
and their normative entailments visible to others. Finally, this visibility opens up the 
relationships established in the prestationary process to public scrutiny, which in turn 
serves as a disciplinary mechanism, encouraging conformity to normative rights, 
obligations and conduct within them. 
Throughout this thesis I have shown how marriage reconfigures men’s relationships 
with others. This is perhaps most apparent with respect to the relations of kinship and 
affinity that mediate men’s statuses. In Chapter Five, I described how marriage, as an 
articulation of kinship, often forms the basis of economic and political entitlements, 
such as access to accommodation and political support. I demonstrated how marriage 
involves a reorganisation of relations of production and consumption relative to the 
iyali and gida and the positions of individual men within them.  
For example, as can be seen in the account of Husseini’s wedding above, where the 
relationships between the bride and groom’s kin are a recurrent theme in the 
negotiations. The groom’s uncle asserts the depth of the relationship between the two 
households by making reference to a previous marriage between them and the various 
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things that his household has done on the other’s behalf. Given that narratives of 
relatedness are a pervasive feature of the social interactions in which prestations are 
transferred, it is hard to dispute that inter-household relationships are at stake in the 
prestationary process. However, the question that I want to address here is: What 
other relationships might be at stake in the prestationary process, and how and why 
do prestations come to be a site in which these relations are articulated? 
Within social anthropology, scholars have sought to understand how prestations 
reflect the relationships realized through marriage. Structuralist accounts have 
examined how exchanges of women between men could be seen to structure relations 
between social groups (see for example Levi-Strauss 1969, Leach 1970, Needham 
1971, Goody and Tambiah 1973). To take just one of these examples, Goody and 
Tambiah (ibid) argue that prestationary processes tell us a lot about the kinds of social 
relationships that are given emphasis in a society. They argue that variations in 
prestationary structure and form, as either bridewealth or dowry, correspond to 
whether it is the relation of alliance or descent that is accorded social primacy. 
One critique levied at these analyses is that they tended to emphasise relations 
between groups of men, precluding an account of the full range of relationships that 
might be at stake in prestationary processes (Collier and Yanagisako 1987). This 
critique can be illustrated through Masquelier’s (2004) elaboration of the kayan daki in 
Nigerien Hausaland. Masquelier describes how the bride’s mother provides a bed for 
her daughter upon marriage. The resources to buy such a bed are derived from her 
participation in biki – a socio-economic network grounded in reciprocal gifting of goods 
and labour145. Whilst these are important means through which ceremonial expenses 
                                                          
145  Biki has often been observed as an important social and economic resource for Hausa 
women (Smith 1957, Cohen 1969, Hill 1972, Jackson 1978, Cooper 1997, Gaudio 2011). 
Analyses of the circulation of enamel pots, or kwano, in biki have served as particularly 
interesting illustrations of this point (see Cohen 1969, Douglas 1979 (2002). However, Kwano 
is a less prominent feature of biki in Zongo; certainly one is less likely to find the great stacks 
of carefully arranged pots that can be seen in a Nigerian Hausa household. It would seem that 
small electrical appliances such as blenders, food processors, rice cookers and sometimes 
even larger white goods such as refrigerators and gas stoves have come to serve a not 
dissimilar function. Indeed, my neighbour devoted considerable time to cleaning an upright 
gas stove that was not connected to a fuel supply. As would be consistent with kwano, I never 
once saw the stove being used for food preparation. Nevertheless, the point remains that 
women can be seen to invest heavily in a range of biki goods and the networks and public 
ceremonies through which they are realised as both livelihood strategies as well as assertions 
of status. 
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– such as those incurred at naming days, funerals and weddings – can be met, they 
also form the basis of relationships between women, which may or may not be defined 
in terms of kinship. 
As described above, the kayan daki is a much less conspicuous affair in Zongo than 
it might be elsewhere in Hausaland. Nevertheless, one only has to take a weekend 
walk through Zongo to observe the crowds of women assembled at the innumerable 
budan kay to realise that the kayan daki is an important focus for women’s biki 
activities and the relationships that are mediated by them. 
The key point here is that prestationary processes ought not to be reduced to the 
acquisition of goods and services, but must be examined in terms of their broader 
social entanglements – in particular, the ways in which they can be seen to mediate 
specific sets of social relationships not limited to those of kinship. Indeed, a number of 
anthropologists have argued that prestationary processes are not only informed by, 
but necessary to, a variety of social relationships (Comaroff 1980). 
One line of argument is that prestations play an important role in initiating a marriage 
and the relationships that emerge from it. Through his comparative analysis of 
prestations, Van Baal (1975) makes the case for marriage as part of a cycle of 
reciprocal exchanges that establishes political ties between households. He argues 
that the ‘gifting’ of prestations initiates these exchanges. Much like in Malinowski’s 
(1963) analysis of the Kula trade, this gifting puts the receiver in the giver’s debt and 
thus obliges him to reciprocate in the form of a bride at a later date. 
This idea can be brought to an interpretation of gaysua, in which the groom’s senior 
kin give a ‘gift’ to the bride’s father. As the first formal prestation in the marital process, 
gaysua can be seen as the moment in which a hitherto tentative courtship becomes 
formal marital process. Acceptance of the gift by the bride’s father obliges him to 
commit his daughter to the marriage. As is akin to Van Baal’s (1975) analysis, gaysua 
is invested with normative obligations which bring into being a series of reciprocal 
exchanges and transfers, ultimately resulting in marriage. Thus it can be argued that 
the significance of the gaysua is in initiating a relationship between the bride and 
groom’s kin. 
Prestations do not only initiate relationships, but also make them visible to others. In 
Zongo, goods may be exchanged at various points leading up to a marriage which 
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may or may not be subject to public knowledge; for example, in the case of gifts 
exchanged during courtship. However, unlike the exchanges that take place in 
courtship, gaysua, lefe, sadaki and kayan daki involve at least some degree of public 
ritual. In this sense they can be seen as means of expressing these relationships to 
others. 
In the context of the sadaki, that it is the groom’s father that performs the ceremonial 
exchange of sadaki serves as an expression of his position as mai gida within his own 
household. A son’s position as his dependant and subordinate is made evident in the 
fact that a groom is seldom present at his own sadaki. An interesting variation on this 
dynamic can be found in the not unusual incidence of landlords assuming 
responsibility for their tenants’ sadaki. When a tenant’s own senior male kin are 
deceased or otherwise absent, his landlord may make a substantial contribution to the 
sadaki and perform the ceremonial exchange. In this event, sadaki operates to extend 
the landlord’s position as his tenant’s mai gida to encompass a form of fictive kinship 
in which the landlord becomes his tenant’s adoptive father. This is reflected in the 
nomenclature ubankinta146, a term literally translated as 'stepfather', but used to imply 
an adoptive father147. 
However, this relationship is not merely nominal, but involves a strengthening of rights 
and obligations such as those of political and economic loyalty and protection that are 
more stable and enduring than those between landlord and tenant alone148. A key 
                                                          
146  Ubankinta is not generally used to describe a man who adopts a child, but is reserved 
for the senior male in fictive kinship between adult males, or a man’s relationship to his wife’s 
children from a previous marriage. 
147  Typically, this dynamic is realised between political elites in Zongo and younger Hausa 
men, who have recently migrated to Zongo from Niger or Nigeria and whose senior kin are 
geographically distant.  
148  Though this practice is perhaps less common today, there is evidence to suggest that 
these ties endure over time and may be inherited by subsequent generations. Take for 
example the case of Alhaji Danzaki the barber surgeon. His father, Mallam Zaki had been 
invited to Zongo from Nigeria by Ibrahim Mai Giwa, the head of an important Zongo lineage. 
Mallam Zaki was provided with a plot of land on which to build a shop to practice in and in 
return circumcised all the Giwa lineage boys without charge. Mallam Zaki’s father remained 
living in Nigeria and was unable to travel to Zongo and so his marriage was arranged by 
Ibrahim Mai Giwa, including the payment of sadaki and the provision of a marital home. Alhaji 
Danzaki inherited his father’s profession, but also many elements of the relationship between 
his father and the Giwa household. Though both Ibrahim Mai Giwa and Mallam Zaki are both 
deceased, the continuation of this tie can be seen in Alhaji Danzaki’s relationship with 
Mamadou Giwa, the eldest son of Ibrahim, to whom he expresses notable deference and 
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point that emerges here is that prestationary processes do not only express 
relationships, but expose them to the disciplinary effects of the public gaze. 
Take for example the gaysua, in which the groom’s senior kin give a ‘gift’ to the bride’s 
father. As the first formal prestation in the marital process gaysua can be seen as the 
moment in which a hitherto tentative courtship becomes formal marital process, 
bringing about a shift in normative rights and obligations. Acceptance of the gift by the 
bride’s father obliges him to commit his daughter to the marriage. Once a gaysua has 
been transacted it is ill-thought of for a groom to court other women until he has 
married. On the bride’s part, she ought not to receive gifts from other suitors and is 
expected to avoid social situations in which she might encounter men who are not her 
immediate kin. It is not insignificant that the items that constitute the gaysua include 
large quantities of smaller items such as sweets and kola, subsequently gifted to 
friends and visitors. By distributing these gifts others become aware of the forthcoming 
marriage and evaluate the behaviours of participants in light of the normative 
obligations entailed in the gaysua. 
In the event that a bride’s father fails to fulfil his obligations by later rejecting a marriage 
or marrying his daughter to an alternative suitor, his moral character may be called 
into question by accusations of cheating or lying in pursuit of profit.  If a groom is seen 
courting other women he may be accused of being a “womaniser”, of lacking respect 
for or trust in his bride’s kin, or being too immature or ill-prepared to fully commit to his 
marriage. A bride seen to be, or even suspected of, receiving gifts or spending too 
much time in the company of other men is subject to speculation that she is weak-
willed, dishonest and immoral. She may be labelled as sexually promiscuous or 
accused of being a prostitute. It is not uncommon for gaysua to be paid and yet the 
marriage never to be realised. There are often competing accounts of how and why it 
never came about, reflecting the loyalties of the person providing them. On one 
occasion when a gaysua had been accepted and yet the bride married another man, 
I asked one of my informants what had happened. He explained that the bride was 
“sex mad” and that her father was too weak to control her. He had accepted the gaysua 
hoping to marry her off quickly before the first groom’s father found out that she was 
                                                          
describes as being not only his “landlord” and “mai gida”, but also as his “abbani” – his father’s 
elder brother. Indeed, Alhaji Danzaki goes so far as to claim that he himself is a Giwa, despite 
an absence of consanguinal ties. 
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having sex with lots of men. However, another man had come along who had said that 
he would marry her immediately and so rather than be patient and wait for a good 
marriage he accepted the marriage to the other man. What this example demonstrates 
is that the prestationary process operates as a means of harnessing public scrutiny as 
a disciplinary mechanism149. 
Fathers generally prefer that their sons marry a bride from a household that is known 
to them. Her kin’s trustworthiness is more easily established, normative rights and 
obligations are more easily enforced, and the social, political and economic benefits 
more certain than they would be when the bride’s kin are unknown to them. Gaysua 
is often made several times over as a means to reaffirm the agreement into which the 
bride’s father has entered. This is particularly the case when several months or more 
have elapsed since the initial gaysua, the bride and groom’s kin have little or no 
relationship beyond the marital process itself, and the mechanisms for enforcing the 
agreement in the form of pressure from others more limited. Making repeated gifts of 
gaysua reiterates the recipient’s obligation to reciprocate, enhances public awareness, 
increases the associated social costs should the bride’s father fail to live up to his side 
of the agreement. Thus the gaysua can be seen as a means through which a 
relationship between a bride and groom’s kin and the normative rights and obligations 
that frame it are established or reinforced. The point here is that prestationary 
processes bring changes in social relationships into public view. The potential costs 
of transgression are no longer limited to the opprobrium or disapproval of a single 
individual or household, but are extended to the wider social sphere. 
7.5 Making Personhoods 
As was argued in Chapter Three the kind of personhood accorded to an individual is 
a function of their relations with others. In standing to represent these relationships, 
prestationary objects can be seen as inherently interwoven with the processes through 
which particular personhoods are constituted. Take for example the case of how Bilal’s 
bride is accorded a particular personhood as a ‘big’ woman on the basis of the goods 
presented at her budan kay. 
                                                          
149  This chimes with Foucault’s (1977) notion of the ‘gaze’; a pervasive system of 
surveillance that produces disciplinary effects. Individuals regulate their behaviour in the belief 
that they are being observed by an Other. 
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Early in the morning I had been sat on a bench next to the open door of Bilal’s house 
waiting for him to return with soft drinks for the impending visitors. A passer-by, seeing 
a canopy assembled outside the house and curious as to what was going on, asked 
as to the nature of the occasion. I told him that my friend Bilal had married and today 
was the budan kay. The man peered inside the open door. When he withdrew his head 
he turned to me and said: ”Your friend, the ango – bridegroom -, has done well. Look 
at all the gifts. He has married a ‘big’ woman”. I assume from the man’s necessity to 
ask that he knew neither Bilal nor his wife personally. Yet, that she could be described 
as 'big' on the basis of the items displayed inside illustrates how prestations may often 
come to symbolically represent the qualities and characteristics of specific individuals. 
The important observation to be drawn out from this example – as well as from the 
above accounts of sadaki and gaysua – is that prestations not only establish and 
represent relationships between groups and individuals, but inform how their 
personhoods are defined, understood and hierarchically ordered. This interpretation is 
informed by several key approaches already encountered in this thesis. First of all, 
throughout this thesis I have argued that marriage is central to notions of accepted 
and valued forms of masculinity in Zongo. Whether a man is married, who to, and how 
he goes about achieving it, informs how he is socially evaluated by others.  
Second, objects derive their meanings from social relationships (Appadurai 1988, 
Strathern 1988). As objects circulate through prestationary processes, they operate to 
establish, reinforce and represent social relationships.  
As discussed in Chapters One and Three, relationships and the norms and values that 
pertain to them are not arbitrary, but located in broader cosmologies: beliefs about the 
nature of reality, how it is organised, and what its inhabitants should be or do (Ortner 
1972). In Chapter Three I discussed how a number of scholars have argued that 
marriage is part of the ideological apparatus that not only makes ideas of gender 
sameness and difference meaningful, but operates to naturalise relations of 
subordination and domination (MacCormack 1980, Ortner and Whitehead 1981). 
From this point of view, personhoods become symbolic categories, themselves 
constituted in social relations. 
When these three positions are brought together the question emerges as to how the 
prestationary process might operate as a site in which the social order is symbolically 
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reproduced. A useful jumping off point in addressing this question is the work of 
Douglas and Isherwood (2002), who make the case for consumption as a site of 
cultural (re)production. The essence of their argument is that goods are not only made 
meaningful by social relationships, but that consumption makes possible the very 
cultural categories from which meaning is derived. 
“…goods are most definitely not mere messages; they constitute the very system itself. 
Take them out of human intercourse and you have dismantled the whole thing. In 
being offered, accepted, or refused, they either reinforce or undermine existing 
boundaries. The goods are both the hardware and the software, so to speak, of an 
information system whose principal concern is to monitor its own performance” 
(Douglas and Isherwood 2002. p.49). 
This approach has implications for my own analysis of how prestationary processes 
mediate personhoods in that prestations and the processes through which they are 
consumed can be argued for as mechanisms through which categories of the person 
are constituted and made visible. However, Bourdieu (1984) argues that goods and 
the cultural categories that they imply have regulatory and disciplinary effects. They 
assert boundaries, not only of what can be articulated, but also what can be thought. 
Thus it is not just individuals that are disciplined, but the very premises through which 
reality is apprehended. 
As was argued in Chapters Four and Five, lafiya can be seen as an articulation of a 
gendered and gerontocratic social order. This hierarchical ordering is naturalised and 
legitimated by the moral connotations of dependency articulated through a discourse 
of Islam. The various prestations that comprise the marital process can be seen to 
mark out and make concrete these ideas. For example, as described in Chapter Six, 
there is a prevailing narrative that if left to her own devices a wife would be unable to 
meet her own subsistence needs – materially, in terms of food, clothes and shelter; 
but also spiritually, in the form of Islamic knowledge and guidance. Thus the Quran, 
prayer mat and prayer beads, gifted as part of the lefe, are an expression of a 
husband’s responsibility for the moral conduct of his wife. However, moral orders 
operate metonymically as social orders (Douglas 1995, 2010, 2013, Bourdieu 1984, 
Rawls 2010) such that the idea of men’s inherent moral authority can be seen as both 
producing and being produced by a social order in which notions of masculine status 
Emil Dauncey 3750701 
 
218 
 
and authority rely upon the deference and subordination of women. This brings us 
back to the prestationary process as a site of social evaluation. Prestations give 
expression to social orders, constituting and organising personhoods within them. 
They therefore serve as an ideological frame against which the things that individual 
men say and do can be interpreted, defined, evaluated and regulated. Hence, if an 
abundant lefe represents responsible manhood, then an inadequate lefe can be seen 
to undermine it. This can be seen in the following extract from a conversation with 
Abdullah: 
 “He [the groom] know that the women like gossips. The women will show the items to 
her friends. Her friends will tell their husbands and even start complaining. Did you 
see her cloth? Did you see the necklace? Why don’t you buy me this thing? His friends 
will hear about the items and think, Oh he is a big man”. 
As we can see above, the prestationary process is a means to register interest or 
demonstrate affection, but also becomes a model or indicator of the kinds of 
exchanges that are likely to take place within a marriage, which in turn may come to 
signify the success of a marriage. 
7.6 Conclusions 
This thesis has been concerned with how marriage mediates manhoods. In this 
chapter I described how in Zongo the marital process is formally defined by a series 
of prestations. It is through the realisation of these prestations that a man becomes 
married and attains the status of manhood. I elaborated how the significances of 
prestations are embedded in normative discourses, structures and relationships, such 
that the fulfilment of prestationary processes and the achievement of accepted and 
valued forms of masculine personhood are interwoven.  
I began the analyses by examining accepted accounts of the prestationary process as 
foregrounded in the acquisition of goods and services. I described how, despite its 
prevalence in popular narrative, this explanation was unsatisfactory for making sense 
of prestationary processes, given the ways in which the accumulation of personal 
material wealth informs masculine status.  
Drawing on the wider anthropological literature, I began a reconsideration of 
prestationary processes in terms of their broader social entanglements. I described 
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how prestations in Zongo operate to establish, reconfigure and reinforce particular 
social relationships. I argued that the public nature of prestationary exchanges makes 
these relationships and their normative entailments visible to others, exposing them to 
the disciplinary effects of public scrutiny and encouraging conformity to normative 
rights, obligations and conduct. However, through the lens of anthropological analyses 
of consumption, prestations can be seen to not only organise and regulate 
relationships, but inform how individual personhoods are defined, understood and 
hierarchically ordered. Prestationary processes and the goods which circulate through 
them inform how the personhoods and statuses of individuals are defined and 
evaluated by others. The key point here is that marriage is not merely a rite of passage 
transforming youth into men; nor is it solely a mechanism through which the notion of 
manhood is made meaningful. It is, by way of the prestationary process, a system 
through which men are evaluated, differentiated and ranked. It is thus not surprising 
that the marital process is a source of such tremendous anxiety for young men like 
Abu and others. It is after all their very personhoods which are at stake in it. 
However, whilst prestations might formally confirm a marriage, situate individuals and 
groups in genealogical structures and establish rights and obligations, they cannot be 
seen as fixed, transcendent, self-contained systems, in some way alienable from the 
interpretations and interests of individuals inhabiting the specific contexts in which they 
take place. In Chapter Two I touched upon the enduring debate in anthropology 
concerning the inter-play of structure and agency in social practice. I drew upon De 
Certeau (1984) to argue against the idea that social practice can be reduced to 
normative discourses derived from totalising structures and questioned the extent to 
which the wants and needs of individual actors correspond to them. The implication 
here is that the meanings of prestationary goods and the personhoods that they come 
to represent must be situated in the practices of social agents, including the ways in 
which collective public evaluations of male status are secured, which I explore in the 
following chapter. 
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Chapter Eight: Curating a Wedding 
“Lafiya ya fi gara – Peaceful living is worth more than wedding comodities” (Hausa 
Proverb)150. 
 
8.1 Bilal buys a Blender 
Bilal and I went to Zongo Junction together. He wanted to buy a food processor for 
Bintu, who he is planning to marry. Bintu is the daughter of a relatively poor Dagomba 
migrant from Northern Ghana, with no land or property of his own and of no formal 
political or religious title. Her mother sells charcoal outside the doorway of the small 
two-bedroom residence that they rent in Nima. Bintu has previously been married and 
divorced and has children from her former husband. She is in many ways far from the 
high status amarya bride most young men claim to desire.  
Bilal and I arrive at one of the shops at Zongo junction where various household 
electricals are lined up neatly in rows in front of the open store front. As we survey the 
items on sale, Bilal explains that he wants to buy a blender for Bintu to help her with 
her work when they are married. It is important to buy such things for one's wife, he 
explains, to show her your love. I probe him as to what Bintu will do with the food 
processor. He says that she will use it to prepare food. The man at the store is a 
Kotokoli from Togo, but converses with Bilal in Hausa. After a period of negotiation 
Bilal settles upon a 'Tefal' branded food processor costing 12 Cedis. He pulls five 
Cedis from his pocket and looks over to me. Though remaining unsaid, I know that he 
expects me to make a contribution. Indeed, it is partly by virtue of this expectation that 
he has invited me to accompany him. I give him the seven Cedis that make up the 
difference. He thanks me and tells me that Bintu will be happy.  
I ask him why he chose that particular blender when there were others that looked 
almost the same for a lower price. He explains that he wanted to buy the "correct one", 
one from America. The other food processors were "China ones" and not good quality. 
He explains that if you buy a China one it would likely break, but the American ones 
                                                          
150 From Aminu (2003 p.17). 
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are better quality. He says that when his wife sees it she will be happy and she will 
know that even though he doesn't have money he has tried his best for her.  
Several months after our shopping trip, about two weeks after Bilal had married Bintu, 
I attended his budan kay. A white plastic table has been set up in the compound with 
the various items that constitute the kayan daki on display. There are stacks of Sunlight 
laundry soap, packets of biscuits, and neat rows of soft drinks, labels facing forward 
and separated by brand. Inside the house the curtain that normally separates the 
sleeping quarters from the living room has been drawn to one side. A glass-fronted 
cabinet full of cloth, pillows, cooking pots and utensils rests against one wall. A wooden 
bed fills the centre of the room. Arranged on the bed are more pillows and fresh bed 
linen, still wrapped in plastic, like new. A brown sofa, also covered in clear plastic, 
dominates the chamber. To one side of the sofa is a small refrigerator, on top of which 
is a rice cooker, kettle, and three electric blenders, including the Tefal-branded blender 
we had bought at Zongo Junction. 
 
8.2 Framing Bilal’s Blenders and the Budan Kay 
In and of itself the presence of the blenders at the budan kay may not seem 
remarkable; but it is rather irregular, and raises questions around why Bilal placed it 
there, and how the blender at the budan kay is framed. With Goffman (1973, 1974) in 
mind, I begin this chapter by analysing what is going on at the budan kay, and how 
Bilal seeks to manage the performance and reception of the budan kay, particularly in 
the enlistment of others in the co-production of a positive social evaluation. I then turn 
back to sadaki, to analyse how in making a marriage the groom has to juggle social 
relations with male kin within his lineage. I also address the burden of personal 
provision of sadaki, and the public perception of Bilal's status and worth. 
As has been argued throughout this thesis, social interactions are framed by official 
scripts which assert a set of norms and rules through which people understand what 
is going on and how they ought to conduct themselves (Goffman 1974, 1980). People 
know that they are attending a sadaki, a budan kay or any other ceremonial occasion 
by virtue of the fact that the structure of the interaction is ritualised. Indeed, many 
aspects of the social interactions that take place in the marital process are formally 
defined and explicitly stated in terms of being proper Islamic practice. As at Husseini’s 
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sadaki, people know when to stand and sit, when and what to eat and drink in the 
mosque, when their attention ought to be directed to Mallam Danjuma, and when talk 
among themselves is acceptable. As described above, dominant accounts of the 
budan kay define it as a ritual event in which well-wishers are invited to the newly 
established marital home to inspect the kayan daki and lefe. 
The meanings of marriage goods are similarly framed. In the preceding chapter we 
have seen how marriage goods articulate social relationships, personhoods and their 
hierarchical ordering. The meanings of marriage goods are not transcendent or 
immutable, but socially derived and thus may have multiple meanings. Yet some 
meanings come to be more widely accepted than others. They achieve a status of a 
dominance – of being the significance that is assumed in the absence of a credible 
alternative.  
The key point here is that when an object is introduced into a social situation people 
make use of dominant narratives to interpret their meanings. Unless presented with 
information suggesting otherwise, they will assume that the meaning of the prestation 
and its social connotations are consistent with those of accepted accounts. In the case 
of sadaki, the money exchanged between a bride and groom’s kin is defined as sadaki 
by virtue of the specific context in which the transaction takes place. However, once 
so defined the sadaki also implies a set of relationships and transactional histories 
through which the sadaki has been realised. For example, it is assumed that a groom’s 
senior kin have provided the money for the sadaki unless they are provided with 
information to the contrary. 
 
8.3 What Reputations are at Stake in the Budan Kay? 
People in Zongo are explicit in describing the budan kay as a context of social 
evaluation. Indeed, the very meaning of budan kay as ‘open head’ is a not so subtle 
allusion to this idea. In the words of one informant, the budan was an opportunity to 
“look inside their head and know their character”; to examine and evaluate what is 
ordinarily concealed. Furthermore, the conjugal living space is generally off limits to 
most casual observers. The budan kay provides a rare glimpse into the domestic 
arrangements that occur within the household. Thus, as will be demonstrated below, 
the budan kay is generally accepted as a moment of social evaluation.  
Emil Dauncey 3750701 
 
223 
 
Observers of the budan kay are provided with an opportunity to inspect the kayan daki 
– the gifts given to a bride by her mother and sourced through her biki networks. An 
abundant kayan daki and elaborate budan kay implies that a bride and her mother 
have well-resourced and extensive social networks. Thus the budan kay can be seen 
as a reflection of both the bride and her mother’s social value as described in Chapter 
Seven.  
This is not without consequence for men. In Chapter Six, I described how the social 
value of a groom’s bride informs the judgements made by others concerning his own 
social status. A well-connected woman with an extensive and well-resourced biki 
network is generally assumed to be related to well-connected men. Thus the kayan 
daki operates as a reflection of a bride’s social standing, but also implies that of a 
groom. 
However, as was shown in Masquelier’s (2004) example of the bed, when it comes to 
representations of status, not all goods have the same effect. Different goods inform 
social evaluations in different ways. While there is considerable variation in the specific 
items that are exchanged in each set of prestations, a prestationary repertoire is far 
from arbitrary. The norms and definitions as to what makes an appropriate prestation 
are culturally defined; for example, where the gifting of a cow is an appropriate and 
rational form of prestation amongst Kgalagari (Kuper 1970), and indeed amongst 
some rural Hausa in Niger (Cooper 1995), the same gift would be regarded with 
bafflement in an urban Zongo. These differences are not limited to cross-cultural 
comparison, but may also occur within a given cultural group's prestationary inventory, 
contingent upon the specific category of prestation being made and the social 
objective it has as its end. Crucially, as we shall see below, a blender gifted by a 
mother as part of the kayan daki is likely well-received as a symbol of status and 
prestige. However, when gifted by a groom as part of a lefe, its status effects are more 
uncertain. 
 
8.4 Spinning the Blender: How is the Blender Read?  
A blender is not an uncommon feature of kayan daki, but is less frequently gifted than 
relatively inexpensive and easily obtained items such as soap, soft drinks or biscuits. 
Though the lefe may be displayed at the budan kay, and whilst it is within the bounds 
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of reason that a husband might buy his wife a blender, for a blender to be gifted as 
lefe would be regarded inappropriate, given that the lefe normatively consists of items 
intended for the bride’s personal consumption rather than the fulfilment of her domestic 
duties within the household151. 
However, a blender is regarded as a prestige good, requiring generous contributions 
from wealthy or numerous benefactors who hold the bride and her mother in high 
regard. That Bilal presents three blenders can be seen as a display of profusion 
beyond the usual. It thus follows that the presence of a blender at the budan kay serves 
to assert that both the bride and her groom are of relatively high social standing. 
Bilal’s blenders constitute a departure from conventional accounts of how and why a 
blender ends up on display at a budan kay, perhaps most obviously in that it is Bilal 
who has bought and gifted the blenders and inserted them into the budan kay rather 
than Bintu’s mother. Whilst it might not be unthinkable for a groom to buy his bride a 
blender, there is much about the specific context and circumstances of Bilal’s gifting 
that makes it unusual, such that it could not be considered a default course of action 
or normative imposition. His deviance suggests intention. The question then is: What 
does Bilal hope might be achieved by presenting the blenders at the budan kay? 
As has been described above, the budan kay, like any social situation, is a context of 
social evaluation in which participants would hope to create a favourable impression 
of themselves. Bilal’s insertion of the blenders into the budan kay can be seen as an 
impression management strategy (Goffman 1973), an effort to present himself 
favourably to others. 
The kayan daki reflects a bride’s status, and by proxy that of her groom. As part of the 
kayan daki, a blender implies that the bride is of considerable social and moral 
standing. It thus follows that if Bilal’s blenders are construed as being part of the kayan 
daki then he stands to be positively evaluated by others. Indeed, as we saw above, 
the abundance of Bintu’s kayan daki led one stranger to conclude that she must be a 
‘big’ woman. The blenders function as a smokescreen, obscuring characteristics of his 
                                                          
151  This is not to say that a blender can necessarily be defined in terms of function. Take 
for example the example of enamel cooking pots – kwano - a feature of the kayan daki across 
Hausaland, which serve a variety of social functions quite apart from cooking (Tipilida et al 
2008). 
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bride that might lead others to think less of him; for example, Bintu’s unremarkable 
ancestry, material poverty and less than respectable marital history. Of course it takes 
more than a blender to definitively establish a bride’s social value. Nobody in Zongo 
would suggest that Bilal’s blenders provide incontrovertible evidence of his bride’s 
social and moral standing. However, the presence of the blenders does imply certain 
assumptions about the route taken by a blender before it arrives at a budan kay, which 
might be drawn upon by observers in socially evaluating the bride and her groom. 
These assumptions are what Bilal seeks to engage. 
As is the case in many cultures, lying is ill-thought of in Zongo, such that if Bilal were 
to make explicit claims about his wife that were found to be false, his status would no 
doubt suffer. However, Bilal does not explicitly lie, but instead alludes to a set of 
expectations and allows observers to draw their own conclusions. 
The idea that in seeking to be positively evaluated by others, men cultivate 
presentations of self that may be at odds with their social realities is not in and of itself 
all that remarkable. However, if an audience is to be convinced by a performance, then 
they must remain unaware of potentially discrediting information (Goffman 1974). For 
Bilal to derive status from the display of the blenders his audience must be unaware 
of Bintu’s less respectable background. If others have knowledge to the contrary, then 
Bilal’s placement of the blenders at a budan kay is unlikely to have a status-
augmenting effect. The fact remains that marriage marks Bilal’s transition into 
manhood, and so an improvement on his former status as youth. Nevertheless, he 
stands to enjoy greater prestige if others are convinced by his curation of the budan 
kay and regard his bride more favourably. Thus the success of a particular 
representation relies upon a groom’s ability to manage information about both his bride 
and the transactional histories of prestations available to others. Perhaps the most 
important part of a convincing performance is that the audience do not realise it is a 
performance at all. 
 
8.5 Representing a Marriage: A Social Endeavour 
In the following section I take a step back from the performance to examine the 
processes involved in bringing it into being. I observe that creating a favourable 
impression of oneself and making it stick may not be quite as straightforward as buying 
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a blender and introducing it into the budan kay. Marriage is never a solo endeavour, 
organised and funded by the groom in isolation, but involves negotiating relations with 
others that may or may not be conducive to a groom’s efforts to create a positive 
impression of himself. For a performance to be successful a groom requires the 
cooperation and collusion of others, particularly those who may be in possession of 
discrediting information. In the case of Bilal’s blenders, Bintu and her mother likely 
know that it is Bilal who has procured the blenders, or at the very least that they are 
not part of the kayan daki. However, there is a clear incentive for Bintu and her mother 
to cooperate in his performance, as they also stand to gain from the status-augmenting 
effects of the blender. However, securing such cooperation may not always be 
straightforward.  
As was alluded to in the examples from Kirk-Greene (1974), Barkow (1974) and 
Salamone (1976) in the opening passage of this thesis, it is often notional dependants 
and subordinates who possess discrediting information with the potential to unsettle 
fragile representations. Securing others’ cooperation, even of one’s social inferiors, is 
seldom a question of outright domination, but requires negotiation and compromise. 
First I will discuss how public knowledge is managed, and then the social collusion 
demanded to make a representation stick. 
 
8.6 Information Control for Impression Management 
Managing the information that others have of a groom and his bride is no simple 
matter. As described in Chapters Four and Five people in Zongo care deeply about 
the rights, obligations and entitlements that are articulated through relatedness. 
Moreover, in Zongo secrets seldom remain secrets for long, but spread like wildfire 
through the frail partitions of ostensibly private dwellings152. 
The data presented in Chapter Six are as I have argued questionable in terms of the 
extent to which it provides a valid account of marital practices over time. Nevertheless, 
that there seems to be a shift towards extra-local marriages might feasibly be 
                                                          
152  Indeed, within only a few days of my being in Zongo I discovered that one of my 
neighbours had discretely placed a mobile phone atop the wall that divided our chambers so 
as to record my conversations. 
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explained by the relative ease with which information regarding a bride’s background 
can be concealed. As we saw in the case of the gaysua, people can and do maintain 
relationships that extend beyond Zongo, but information concerning these 
relationships is often less complete and behaviours less easily monitored. This is 
evident in the case of several women in Zongo, who visit children from previous 
marriages in other neighbourhoods. In most cases their current husbands were 
unaware or at the very least pretended to be unaware that such children existed. Few 
men would openly acknowledge to others that their wife had children by another man; 
fewer still would permit these children to reside in Zongo where it would be nigh on 
impossible to conceal their existence and avoid the diminished status that arises from 
marrying a bazawara bride. 
Returning to Bilal and his blenders, it is easy to see how his curation of the budan kay 
serves an effective strategy for impression management. That Bintu’s premarital 
residence was in Nima and her ancestry is in Northern Ghana makes it less likely that 
others will be in possession of information that discredits his efforts at cultivating a 
particular representation. Nevertheless, it requires something of a leap of faith to 
assume that Bilal’s control over this information is absolute; not least because 
marriage is never a solo endeavour, organised and funded by the groom in isolation, 
but necessarily involves relations with others through which discrediting information 
might leak. 
 
8.7 Social Collusion for Impression Management 
As discussed in Chapter Six, there are a number of possible reasons why young men 
seemed willing to share potentially compromising information with me. Perhaps there 
was something about my identity as an outsider that meant people believed I was less 
likely to share it with others. Maybe people thought that if I were to disclose anything, 
it would not be received as credible or its effects might be less damaging. However, I 
suspect that Bilal’s willingness to allow me to bear witness to his buying of the blender 
was likely underpinned by the hope that I would contribute to its purchase. The key 
point here is that getting married necessarily involves the support of others. Gaining 
such support often requires sharing potentially compromising information. To share 
information with others is to surrender a degree of control over it. Thus deciding to 
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share information represents a risk. This section is concerned with how young men 
can be seen to make efforts to minimise disclosure risks, principally by managing 
incentives that foster collusion. 
Putting Bilal and his blenders to one side for a moment, this idea is well illustrated by 
the case of Ibrahim and the processes through which he raises his sadaki and secures 
his elder brother’s support for his marriage. 
Men’s social status is implicated by the social value of their brides. In the previous 
chapter I described the social value of a bride (in the eyes of men) as being a function 
of her status as either amarya or bazawara. Men reported that the sadaki amount is 
subject to the status of the bride as amarya or bazarawa; but as identified above, it is 
often difficult to verify the status of a bride. A key factor in this is that there is an 
incentive to (re)produce a certain representation of one’s bride. Hence men actively 
seek to represent their wives in ways that conform to the notion of a high status bride. 
In the event that a man is to marry a bazawara bride, he may seek to misrepresent or 
evade such status definition altogether so as provide a representation more favourable 
to his own pursuit of status. I argue that sadaki and the sadaki bargain is one of several 
methods through which such representations can be achieved. However, the groom 
faces a number of trade-offs in the pursuit of public status, as he confronts questions 
of the degree of material assistance provided by male kin in acquiring sadaki. 
Relations with lineage men are also part of the dilemma of sadaki, and I turn to this 
next. 
 
8.8 Obtaining Sadaki: The Representational Consequences of Lineage Support 
Versus Personal Provision 
In the accounts provided by men in Zongo, sadaki was described as being given by 
the elder males who form the groom's family to the father of the bride at the mosque. 
This would appear to be the case at Husseini’s wedding, or at the very least the 
performance of the sadaki bargain seemed to allude to it. However, in practice this 
money may not be directly contributed by the groom’s male elders. It may be raised 
by the groom independently of his male elders or kin, through work or borrowing. He 
may put small amounts of money that he receives from kin for other purposes aside 
(in the manner of 'keeping the change' from other transactions). Many young men such 
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as Ibrahim place a lot of emphasis on getting the sadaki money together themselves 
in response to a perceived need to prove their ability to generate income and provide 
independently of their fathers. Some young men may even have sadaki money put to 
one side before having settled on a bride. This was usually something done secretly. 
One young man showed me a small stack of notes approaching 50 Cedis in small 
denominations that he kept hidden in a shoe. He said that the money was for his 
wedding. If he met a suitable bride, he explained, he wouldn’t have to wait to for his 
father to get the money, nor worry that a rival would beat him to securing her hand in 
marriage. He could just “move”. 
That men attempt to find the money for their own sadaki is not insignificant. First of all, 
it is a means to assert their independence. To demonstrate a productive responsible 
manhood to the senior male kin who will judge their readiness to marry. Some young 
men reported that even if your senior kin were to contribute to the sadaki, you risked 
being perceived by them as remaining dependent. These points are well illustrated by 
Ibrahim’s case. When Ibrahim was struggling to raise money for the sadaki I suggested 
he ask his elder brothers and uncles for help. Ibrahim rejected this idea outright, 
arguing that his kin would surely use his request as a means to assert their authority 
over him. He claimed that if there were ever a disagreement or if they wanted to shame 
him they would say “You couldn’t even marry your own wife”, thus undermining the 
productive ability that defines his masculine status. Thus raising their own sadaki is 
one strategy by which a man is able to assert his status. By proving their ability to 
independently generate income they demonstrate their capacity as providers, 
asserting a productive and responsible masculinity associated with manhood that 
creates distance between themselves and that of the youth as dependant and 
consumer.  
Secondly, providing one’s own sadaki is a means to influence how a bride is to be 
evaluated. As described in Chapter Six, the social value of one’s wife informs a 
groom’s status. Hence it is logical for men to try and manage representations of their 
brides. By providing his own sadaki, a man exerts greater influence on the 
representation of his bride’s social value than if the sadaki is left to others. In providing 
the sadaki himself, he expresses the social value of the bride to his senior kin; whereas 
if left to senior kin, it is they who decide upon the sadaki and thus determine the social 
value of the bride. In deciding upon the sadaki, the senior kin will investigate the bride 
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and her kin, their ancestry, wealth, social and moral standing, decide whether a bride 
is suitable, and determine the level of sadaki that is appropriate. This presents the 
possibility that a bride is evaluated less favourably than might be hoped for by the 
groom. This may result in a lower sadaki and so diminish the status that a groom 
derives from its public exchange. 
Again Ibrahim’s case is illustrative. Ibrahim worries that should his elder brother Aminu 
discover his bride is bazawara he may not sanction the marriage. His decision to marry 
Murna, a bride from outside Zongo, presents a clear advantage, if not indeed acting 
as a central motivation in the first place in that nobody in Zongo seems to know much 
about her. Murna and her family have no connections to Zongo. They live in another 
neighbourhood, and her children and former husband live in Madina. This means that 
the likelihood of anyone in Zongo accidentally coming across Murna's family and 
children is greatly diminished. Ibrahim and Murna agreed that it would be best for her 
children to stay with their father and that if Murna were to see her children it was best 
done at her father's house. They claimed that this was for the benefit of the children 
as it was good for them to be around their grandmother and that Ibrahim would not be 
able to support another man's children as well as his own anyway. However, Ibrahim 
did express a concern with others knowing that she had children when one day he 
asked that I not mention Murna's children to anyone, especially his elder brother, else 
they should "think bad of her". Whatever the actual motives might be, that his 
prospective bride is from outside Zongo makes it considerably easier to conceal her 
previous marriages and children. 
It is difficult to gauge the extent to which such efforts at concealment motivate men to 
find brides outside of Zongo; not least because marriage to a bride from outside Zongo 
implies spatial, though not necessarily social, exogamy. For instance, one man in 
Zongo married a bride from Lome, to whom he had been introduced to by an uncle 
resident in Togo who frequently made trips to Zongo. 
Nonetheless, the accounts provided by men in Zongo suggest that spatial exogamy is 
not infrequent and is at least in some cases underpinned by an effort at concealment, 
as can be seen in the following extract from a discussion with young men at one of 
Zongo’s ‘bases’. 
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“If they know the bride’s story then they can find a way to laugh at you or maybe they 
will try and destroy the marriage. They can even say that they fuck your wife before 
you”. 
When a bride is from Zongo her status as amarya or bazarawa is contested by her 
groom's peers. Some men will ‘secretly’ boast that the bride is not amarya as they 
have already had sexual relations with her. When marriage is within Zongo, to conceal 
that one’s bride is bazarawa is more difficult as it is likely the bride and grooms are 
well known to everybody.  
By marrying extra-locally and providing the sadaki himself, Ibrahim has greater 
influence over the amount that will be paid; but he also curtails the need for an 
investigation of the bride’s background if his senior kin are left to decide upon the 
suitability of the bride and determine the sadaki for themselves. 
It is perhaps not surprising that young men tend to express a preference for extra-local 
marriages and paying their own sadaki. These tactics serve to control the availability 
of discrediting information and thus lay the ground for an inflation of the bride’s social 
value and the status a groom stands to gain from it. 
This idea is illuminating when reflecting on the bargaining that frequently occurs at 
sadaki. A bride’s kin never suggest that a sadaki is too high. To do so would not only 
be irrational from the point of view of diminishing material gain, but would serve to 
decrease the bride’s social value and the status that they derive from it. Similarly, a 
groom’s kin would not want a sadaki to be too low as this would be to diminish how 
the social value of the bride is perceived by the observing audience. Furthermore, a 
groom’s kin stand to gain little from bartering too hard for a lower sadaki. They might 
well reduce their costs, but they also risk appearing miserly, unwilling or unable to fulfil 
their obligations to the dependent samari whose marriage is at stake. In concrete 
terms, Ibrahim’s wife fetches a relatively high sadaki even though she has already 
been married. This is because from her kin’s point of view they do not wish to 
jeopardise the marriage by her bazawara status being disclosed and risk the shame 
of having a bazawara daughter remain in the household. Equally Ibrahim’s kin, though 
unaware of her bazawara status, derive status themselves from the high sadaki as 
they appear as men of means to the assembled audience. If the amount of sadaki 
exchanged reflects the social value of the bride, then it can also be argued to reflect 
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the groom’s social status. It thus follows that in terms of men’s pursuit of prestige and 
status there is a powerful incentive for both sides to push for higher rather than lower 
sums to be transferred in sadaki. 
However, the amounts exchanged in sadaki can hardly be seen as solely subject to 
the groom’s preference for a high sadaki. Securing the money for sadaki is seldom 
easy in a context of pervasive underemployment and the diminishing returns of 
inherited landholdings as they are subdivided into ever smaller shares. Even when the 
money for sadaki has been raised, ensuring a successful sadaki exchange relies upon 
a complex set of negotiations between numerous stakeholders whose interests and 
investments in a particular marriage may be compatible or competing. This can be 
seen by the contrasting successes of Aliyu and Salihu as revealed in the following 
portraits. 
 
8.9 Bargaining with Gerontocracy? 
Baki kan yanka wuya – It is the mouth that cuts the neck (Hausa Proverb).  
As a means to get to know Accra I had asked a Zongo taxi driver whether I might 
spend the morning with him as he went about his work. One of his first jobs was to 
take a Zongo scrap dealer and an old photocopier down to the Lagoon where he hoped 
to sell it. When we arrived the car was quickly surrounded by bare chested young men. 
It was a chaotic, brawling environment that heaved with an aggressive physicality. 
Arms were flexed and voices raised as the men pushed and shoved one another trying 
to get to the old photocopier strapped into the boot of the car. Their skin burnished 
with sweat and ash, drawn tightly over muscles toned by hard labour. They wore dark 
glasses and reversed baseball caps smudged sooty black; their mouths were hidden 
behind bandanas cut from old t-shirts. The men were far too focused and frenzied to 
talk, but I was able to catch up with one of the young men, Salihu, later on in Zongo 
away from the chaos of the lagoon and arrange for him to take me back to the lagoon 
and show me around. 
Salihu is in his late twenties. His face is red and blotchy. Dry cracked skin encircles 
nostrils that run in perpetuity. Sometimes a rasping cough grinds its way up through 
his throat and out between lips that are red and sore like his nose. Salihu’s condition 
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is not unusual amongst the men who work in the scrap metal trade down by the lagoon. 
It is the more profitable yet hazardous end of the business, where old tyres and ‘e-
waste’ are burnt in order to extract their metal components. Salihu advised that I wear 
sunglasses and cover my mouth and nose so as to enter the clouds of black smoke 
billowing from burning tyres and domestic appliances within which young men 
laboured.  
At times I was unsettled by the way that Salihu would revel in talk about “fucking 
bitches” and “motherfuckers” and his not infrequent threats to beat somebody he felt 
had wronged him153. Nevertheless, I enjoyed my time with Salihu as I felt more able 
to discuss our different points of view than with many of those who couched similarly 
misogynistic and violent perspectives within the acceptable discourse of Hausa 
tradition and Islam. Though I liked Salihu, he was not particularly popular in Zongo. 
Many people claimed that he had become greedy, impatient and envious – that he 
had too much ‘swagger’ under the influence of his somewhat rough and ready co-
workers at the lagoon. Some even suggested that he was an area boy and had 
become involved in ‘rituals’. When I asked Salihu why he persisted in such work, he 
explained that though the work was hard the money was good such that he was able 
to save money. He hoped to marry soon and was trying to get something together for 
the sadaki. 
Despite his unpopularity, many people sympathised with his plight, saying that though 
it was his work and colleagues that had ‘spoiled’ him, it was the cruelty and negligence 
of his father that had made such work necessary. When I went with Salihu to buy 
medicine from Hajiya Hansatu, she despaired at his father’s irresponsibility. How could 
he allow his own son to endure such suffering for the sake of sadaki? she wondered. 
Others such as the women at ‘Coffee Club'154 gossiped about whether his father might 
be too poor or too mean to pay the sadaki himself.  
I had met Salihu’s father independently; and though I didn’t come to know him as well 
as Salihu, I knew him well enough to see that he was not a rich man. As with many 
                                                          
153  Almost every ethnic designation is represented amongst Salihu’s colleagues such that 
it was Pidgin English that was the lingua franca down at the lagoon. 
154  Coffee Club refers to a group of elder women from Zongo who regularly meet in a 
compound in Kan Tudu. Ironically, they never drink coffee. 
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people I met in Zongo, he claimed that he was struggling to make ends meet. It is of 
course hard to evaluate the true extent of his wealth, but his claim seems reasonable 
given the little work that he had as a tailor, and that he did not own land. His 
accommodation consisted of a single rented room that had been fastened onto the 
outside wall of a larger compound. Though somewhat cramped, the room was large 
enough to be divided in two by a curtain, which concealed the sleeping quarters at the 
back from the view of visitors. When he had tailoring work to do he set up his sewing 
machine outside the front door under the shade of a tarpaulin sheet. At the end of 
each day he moved the machine back into the room which he shared with his wife. 
Salihu rented a smaller room with two friends, Aliyu and Rabiu. 
Aliyu is also in his late twenties, but casts a far less bruised and battered figure than 
his friend Salihu. He is larger, but lacks the muscular frame. Unlike Salihu, it is his long 
traditional jalobia that sways as he walks rather than his shoulders. He has the careful 
and considered demeanour of mutumin kirkii. He speaks softly and slowly, his English 
clearly pronounced and formal. Though like Salihu he sometimes slips into pidgin 
amongst his friends, it seems out of place, forced even, without the swagger so easily 
embodied by Salihu. Aliyu also works at the lagoon, but away from the fumes and fires 
tending to the cows of wealthier men in Zongo; a profession he had entered via his 
maternal uncle. Though I had met Aliyu’s father, I did not know him well. Aliyu told me 
that his father was from Niger and had met his mother, a Fulani woman, when he had 
settled in Zongo. His father was older than Salihu’s; and, whilst he no longer worked, 
he appeared to be somewhat better off. In the past he had been a night watchman at 
a hospital and lived in a relatively comfortable chamber and hall. 
Aliyu and Salihu had met at primary school as children.  Although neither of them had 
managed to complete more than a couple of years, they remained friends. Aliyu 
sometimes complained that Salihu was too loud and bossy, prone to boasting and 
arrogance. I often observed Salihu make fun of Aliyu and his occupation; for example, 
saying that he was a “dan kauye ban azanci”, a villager without sense, “mumu” or 
“bumbaclot”, meaning fool. Though such chiding often seemed to be light-hearted and 
was met with laughter, including that of Aliyu, I was never quite sure he was unhurt by 
it. 
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After I had been in Zongo for some time, Salihu told me that he had managed to save 
500 Cedis. I accompanied Salihu to his father’s room155, where he presented him with 
200 Cedis, declared the money was for sadaki and asked for his permission to marry; 
a request that his father refused, asserting as he did so that his son was not ready, 
and that he needed to find a more suitable bride than the Dagomba girl that he had 
hoped to marry. He told Salihu that he needed to learn patience, rather than rushing 
into marriage. After a brief but fiery exchange,156 Salihu stormed out of the room. It 
didn’t take long for word to get around that Salihu had fallen out with his father, not 
least because Salihu seemed keen to tell all of his misery and anger at his father’s 
failure to support him. 
Aliyu also had marital ambitions. However, unlike Salihu, Aliyu was more guarded 
about his income and the ends to which he planned to put it. One day when I was 
sitting with Aliyu and the cows discussing Salihu’s plight he revealed that he had 
managed to make 250 Cedis from selling a cow that he had raised. He explained that 
he wanted to use the money for marriage and so would give it to his father in the hope 
that he would use it to pay sadaki. Aliyu would not tell me who it was that he was 
hoping to marry and urged that I not share this information with others, not least Salihu, 
until more concrete arrangements had been made. As was often expressed by people 
in Zongo, he feared ‘jan ido’, the evil eye of envy. Should others catch wind of his 
plans, he asserted, then he risked being sabotaged by envious others. I accompanied 
Aliyu when he went to present the money to his father and asked his permission to 
marry. Unlike his friend Salihu, his father accepted the money and assured him that 
he would make the appropriate preparations. These contrasting portraits open up 
discussion of what makes for a ‘successful’ negotiation by a son of a father’s 
contribution to sadaki? 
 
 
                                                          
155  Having a baturi friend is a sign of prestige and wealth, so young men often invited me 
to accompany them when they were hoping to make a good impression. An important part of 
this is to create the sense of being a baturi’s equal or superior. 
156  Little of which I could understand; but the ferocity of Salihu’s anger was palpable in 
the tone and volume of his speech. 
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8.10 What Makes for a ‘Successful’ Negotiation? 
“Da muguwar rawa gara kin tashi - Better sit still than dance a bad dance” (Hausa 
Proverb157). 
Normatively speaking the sadaki is paid by the groom’s father to that of the bride. 
Though the extent to which fathers contribute to their sons’ sadaki is variable, without 
the formal approval and participation of the bride and groom’s senior kin, marriage 
cannot take place. Hence inter-generational relationships are pivotal to the marital 
process. Tensions may arise between fathers and sons when a father is unable or 
unwilling to meet marital expenses or sanction a marriage; for example, when a father 
remains unconvinced his son is ready to marry, disagrees with a son’s choice of bride 
or is simply too poor to meet marital expenses. Young men often provide their own 
sadaki in an effort to gain paternal support for a wedding. This diminishes the resource 
burden on senior kin and strengthens their bargaining positions when it comes to 
choice of spouse. Furthermore, as an assertion of independence, of responsible 
manhood, it is more difficult for a father to dispute his son’s readiness to marry. 
A groom’s senior kin might welcome not having to meet sadaki costs from their own 
incomes. However, if the knowledge that they had not done so were to become public 
then their own status might be put at risk by speculation that they were either unwilling 
or unable to fulfil their own responsibilities to their sons. This can be seen in the 
contrasting successes of Aliyu and Salihu. 
Aliyu was much more guarded about his marital ambitions and his attempts to raise 
money for sadaki. Aliyu had at times been explicit that he intended the money for 
sadaki158, but generally held his cards close to his chest. When he gave the money to 
his father his language was much more ambiguous than that of Salihu. Rather than 
state that the money was for the sadaki he presented the money as a contribution 
towards kayan aure159 – general wedding expenses. This subtle modification of 
language from the specific ‘sadaki’ to general ‘kayan aure’ shifts the ‘frame’ (Goffman 
1974) within which both the meaning of the money and its transfer from son to father 
                                                          
157 From Aminu (2003). 
158  Including when I had formally interviewed Aliyu in the earlier stages of research. 
159  Literally 'things for the wedding'. 
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are constituted. It creates a fuzziness around the source of the money and its purpose, 
and thereby the social and moral connotations implied by a son providing his own 
sadaki are obscured. Aliyu successfully secures his father’s support not only because 
he provides the sadaki, but because he does so in a manner that does not threaten to 
undermine his father’s status. 
Of course the comparative wealth of Aliyu’s father means that he is better able to fulfil 
his paternal responsibilities and support his son’s marriage, something that Salihu’s 
father is likely less able to do. However, that many young men provide their own sadaki 
and yet secure parental support suggests that who actually provides the sadaki may 
not be the principle determinant of success. From the point of view of Goffman (1956, 
1967, 1974, 1980, 2005) we can argue that the manner in which sadaki is transferred 
from son to father and later to the bride’s kin is not without significance, principally in 
terms of how the representation of a specific transaction might be perceived by others 
and the social evaluations that can be made as a result. 
This can be seen in Salihu’s efforts to provide his own sadaki. The fact that his efforts 
have become public knowledge plays a significant role in his failure to secure his 
father’s support on the basis that they negatively influence the extent to which his 
father’s responsible manhood is positively evaluated by others. Salihu actively framed 
his visibly poor health within a narrative of his struggle to raise sadaki. Each splutter 
and cough became a reason for others to speculate as to why his father has not 
provided the sadaki, an embodied allusion to his father’s inadequacy. Upon entering 
the public domain, Salihu’s ability to influence how his sadaki transactions are framed 
is diminished, subject as it is to the perceptions and accounts of others, over which he 
exerts little control. 
Consequently, when Salihu attempts to give the money to his father, the transfer is 
already framed by a narrative of parental neglect and irresponsibility that impinges 
upon how it is received by his father. Salihu’s money has become a poisoned chalice 
for his father. To accept the money is admitting that he is unable to financially support 
his son’s marital ambitions; at the same time, to refuse it has the potential of reinforcing 
narratives of his parental cruelty and neglect. Whether or not he accepts the money, 
he confirms the perceptions of others that he is either unwilling or unable to carry out 
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his paternal obligations. Of course this dilemma could have been avoided had Salihu 
been less willing to share such matters and the transfer been undertaken discretely.  
Clearly there may be many other factors at play in his father’s refusal, including his 
expressed uncertainty of Salihu’s readiness to marry. Nevertheless, his refusal can be 
seen as at least in part a response to the speculation that has come to surround his 
masculine status as a result of Salihu’s perilously public efforts to raise his own sadaki. 
The refusal of Salihu’s request on the basis of his lack of readiness to marry is an 
effort to assert that it is neither lack of money nor willing that prevents him from 
supporting his son; but it also buys space and time in which to construct an alternative 
narrative and enable a more discrete transfer of sadaki from father to son that does 
not challenge his masculine status. 
What differentiates Aliyu’s success from Salihu’s failure are the distinct ways in which 
they frame deviant transactional practices relative to the notions of accepted and 
valued forms of manhood that are contained within normative discourses of sadaki. At 
this point one might question the extent to which Aliyu’s particular framings can be 
seen as intentional. Indeed, when I asked Aliyu whether his father would use the 
money for sadaki160, he said that he didn’t know and it was up to his father to decide 
how to use the money, but that he thought it important to make a “contribution” as a 
means to demonstrate to his father that he was capable and responsible enough to 
marry.  
8.11 Conclusions: You Couldn’t Even Marry Your wife. 
In Chapter Three I set out DeCerteau’s (1984) notion of tactics as the subversive 
practices concealed within dominant discourses. In line with this position it is the 
evasiveness of Aliyu’s response, the very ambiguity he cultivates around the intentions 
and meanings of the transfer of money, that enables him to conceal the deviant act of 
providing his own sadaki. Salihu and Aliyu’s divergent positionings of these transfers 
in the dominant discourse of sadaki inform the outcome of their marital efforts.  
                                                          
160  When I had asked this question I was thinking about trust between fathers and sons. 
Many young men who claimed that they had given their fathers sadaki complained that their 
fathers had simply taken the money and used it for personal consumption; I wanted to know 
whether Aliyu felt that he could rely on his father to put the money towards its intended 
purpose. It is only upon later analysis of the data that the implications for the present argument 
became clear. 
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As this example demonstrates, there may be people quite apart from the bride and 
groom whose reputations are also at stake in the marital process; not least their 
fathers, whose own responsible personhoods hinge upon their ability and willingness 
to provide for their sons as notionally dependent subordinates. The manner in which 
Aliyu and Salihu attempt to pay their own sadaki can be seen to present different 
opportunities for those involved to emerge from the marital process with their 
reputations enhanced or at the very least unscathed. Because it is assumed that the 
sadaki money is raised via senior male kin, sadaki serves as a reflection of the groom 
and his kin’s social relationships in the same way as the kayan daki does for the bride. 
A larger sadaki alludes to greater contributions and a wider social network than a lower 
sadaki. Aliyu’s father stands to gain status from the higher sadaki that serves as a 
reflection of his wealth, even though he may not have obtained the wealth himself. 
Conversely, Salihu’s father stands to be discredited by the public knowledge that he 
has not, for whatever reason, fulfilled his obligations to his dependent son. He would 
gain little from accepting Salihu’s contribution to sadaki. Indeed, acceptance could 
come to undermine his own status as mai gida which relies upon Salihu giving an 
appropriate performance of dependency. 
At this point it is important to highlight that it is not only the relationship between father 
and son in which the status effects of relations of dependency are at stake. Let us 
return to the case of Ibrahim, who like Salihu is also desperate to marry. Unlike Salihu, 
however, Ibrahim is finding it hard to find the money to meet his wedding expenses. 
As described above, though it is normatively his elder brother’s obligation to provide 
the bridewealth, Ibrahim wants to provide it himself. Ibrahim suspects that his brother 
will not sanction his marriage on the basis that he is not sufficiently mature. He wants 
to provide the sadaki as a means to assert his independence. However, Murna, his 
prospective bride, is frustrated by Ibrahim’s lack of progress. Aware of Ibrahim’s 
irregular employment and income, she doubts his ability to raise the necessary funds 
by himself.  
Murna has her own chop bar near to the bus station which provides a reasonable 
income, and so as a means to make things move faster has been contributing to the 
wedding expenses. She has bought rolls of cloth, perfume and underwear for the lefe, 
and given Ibrahim money to prepare a room, and even towards the sadaki. Ibrahim 
was happy to accept contributions to the lefe, especially as he explained that it was 
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difficult to know which items would be to Murna’s taste. However, as time passed he 
became increasingly ambivalent about Murna’s contributions. Ibrahim told Murna to 
stop trying to give him money, to leave him to deal with the lefe and the house. 
Nevertheless, Murna would sneak items into the large suitcase in which the lefe goods 
were contained. This angered Ibrahim greatly. He began to question Murna’s suitability 
as a wife. He was concerned that her disobedience would persist into their marriage 
and that it was only now that he was starting to see her true ‘character’.  
Ibrahim’s concerns are clearly grounded in the fact that Murna’s contributions 
threatened to undermine his efforts to assert a responsible manhood. They ran counter 
to the narrative of masculine responsibility and feminine dependency foregrounding 
male status. Indeed, in conversation with Ibrahim he was explicit about his concern 
that Murna might make use of the difficulty he had had funding their wedding and the 
support that she had provided to undermine his status. He worried that in the event of 
an argument Murna might tell others of her contributions as a means to shame him. 
Ibrahim anticipated, in what had become a familiar phrase: “They will say you couldn’t 
even marry your wife”. 
Ibrahim’s case is not unique. Though often underplayed by men, women in Zongo 
have access to a range of economic opportunities whilst many young men struggle to 
find reliable sources of income; often relying on upon others, such as senior kin, to 
meet their daily needs. Nevertheless, women’s normative entitlement to men’s wealth 
seems to endure. Consequently, many young men, in their pursuit of responsible 
manhood, find themselves facing a trade-off between remaining unmarried or 
receiving assistance from others. Often such support is congruous with normative 
relations of dependency, such as those between fathers and sons. However, in many 
cases men rely upon women, in particular brides, to bring about the marriages which 
are pivotal to public assertions of responsible manhood. What we have here is a story 
about how men’s statuses rely upon women’s position as dependants and 
subordinates; and yet the story also reveals the paradox of dependency, in that 
asserting such a status is dependent upon the cooperation of others. Such cooperation 
is not only difficult to secure, but may involve compromises that undermine the very 
notion of responsible manhood. 
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Chapter Nine: Conclusions 
‘Duniya ba ta auren rago’ – The world does not marry the indolent (Hausa proverb). 
9.1 The Drama of Everyday Life. 
“Hausa psychology is under no illusion that an outward display of goodness is ever 
sufficient to cover up an evil disposition: ‘if the inner character is sound’, a tongue-
twisting aphorism assures us, ‘the exterior will be pleasing; but if it is not then the 
pleasing exterior is nothing but a sham” (Kirk-Greene 1974 p3). 
“In conjugal conflict situations the traditional matter is male/female hostility and each 
combatant is seeking to prove that his or her behaviour conforms to the norm while 
the other deviates from it. Neither questions the norm but only attempts to gain the 
audience’s approval. Needless to say, the audience represents society and is the 
intended recipient of the message”. (Salamone 1976 p.366). 
This thesis has been about getting married and the meaning of manhood in Sabon 
Zongo. I began this thesis with a discussion of two essays: Kirk-Greene’s (1974) ‘The 
Concept of the Good Man in Hausa’ and Salamone’s (1976) 'The Arrow and the Bird: 
Proverbs in the Solution of Hausa Conjugal-Conflicts'. Kirk-Greene’s (1974) essay was 
concerned with an elaboration of mutumin kirki – the terms against which a man is 
adjudged to be a man of social and moral standing. My analysis chimes with Kirk-
Greene’s in that I have been similarly interested in describing accepted and valued 
notions of manhood in Zongo. 
In his account of the linguistic elements of conjugal conflicts, Salamone (1976) 
described how husbands and wives do battle through the medium of proverbs. 
“Combatants” vie for the support of an audience through wit and repartee, attempting 
to define the social situation in ways that discredit their opponent’s version of events 
and enhance their own reputations. My analysis has not been so different from 
Salamone’s in the sense that I too have focused on marriage as a territory of 
representation. However, my analysis differs from Salamone’s in emphasising a 
slightly different cast of characters, whose relations are not always hostile and may 
collaborate in performances intended to win over an audience. Whilst Salamone tours 
the battlefields and shows us the weapons of “symbolic warfare” (Salamone 1976 
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p368), I have examined marital processes as representations, as both battlefield and 
site of cooperation, in which treaties are negotiated and alliances forged. I have also 
examined such engagements with a wider repertoire of tools in mind. By drawing on 
Goffman (1956, 1974, 1980) and DeCerteau (1984), I have sought to interrogate the 
‘strategies and tactics’ of ‘impression management’ and how the play out in young 
men’s efforts to marry.  
The adage quoted from Kirk-Greene (1974) above, conveys the idea that for the 
Hausa the impressions a person gives of himself might not always be indicative of his 
‘true’ character, but instead a veil behind which something altogether more malign may 
be concealed. Whilst most people in Zongo would subscribe to a similar idea, this 
thesis has drawn on Goffman’s (1956) ‘dramaturgical self’ to take a broader view of 
the “sham” (Kirk-Greene 1974 p.3), not only as socially advantageous, but as a matter 
of the deepest personal significance.  
 
9.2 Synopsis: Idealised Manhoods in Zongo 
I began this thesis with Abu. Abu was eager to marry and yet struggling to secure the 
support he needed from his father to realise his ambitions. We met some of Abu’s 
friends at Oakville Town Hall. Through the viewing of Maid in Manhattan and the 
conversations that followed we saw that getting married was a prominent concern for 
many young men in Zongo, and began to learn something of the challenges they faced 
in pursuit of this goal. Whilst it became clear that neither Abu’s ambitions nor his 
predicament were unusual, I was intrigued as to why getting married should matter so 
much in the first place. Following an introduction to Sabon Zongo in Chapter Two, the 
next four chapters were concerned with unravelling the significance of marriage to 
manhood. 
In the first instance these chapters were concerned with elaborating manhoods as sets 
of social expectations, providing an account of what people in Zongo think a man ought 
to be and do. Chapter Three, briefly surveyed the anthropological literature, which has 
often seen marriage as a rite of passage through which adult manhoods and the status 
and prestige associated with them are realised. Drawing on this literature and with 
Kirk-Greene’s (1976) Mutumin Kirkii in mind, I sought to examine the ways in which 
marriage might be similarly invoked in notions of manhood in Zongo.  
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The importance of marriage to manhood was revealed in Chapters Four and Five, 
where I set out the qualities and characteristics that form the basis of accepted and 
valued notions of manhood in Zongo. 
Chapter Four began with Mallam Hassan’s account of Zongo’s moral decline. At the 
vanguard of this worrying trend were young men, whose moral transgressions and 
anti-social behaviours threatened to destabilise lafiya, the social and moral order. 
According to popular discourse, young men were anything but the embodiment of 
socially accepted and valued manhood. Nevertheless, I drew upon Douglas (2010) to 
suggest this discourse of youth as morally threatening was important, operating as a 
constituent referent against which the man of social and moral standing could be 
defined. Indeed, this was shown to be the case in the example of Abdulahi, who was 
keen to assert that as husband and father he could by definition not be considered a 
youth.  
I drew on Goffman (1956), to argue that Abu and his friends viewing of Maid in 
Manhattan could be seen as a stage for impression management in which the social 
evaluations made of them by others were at stake. The young men’s public 
discussions about the show and its characters served as a performance, 
“incorporating and exemplifying the officially accredited values of society” (Goffman 
1956 p.60), distancing themselves from the category youth and asserting a moral 
virtue congruent with accepted and valued forms of adult manhood. For example, this 
could be seen in Abu and his friend’s disdain for Victor, one of the central characters 
in Maid in Manhattan. The young men asserted that Victor was to blame for many of 
Marisa’s troubles. Victor was selfish and irresponsible. He neglected his duties, as 
husband and parent, in pursuit of his own immoral desires, leaving Marisa alone to 
carry the burden of providing for their son. For the Men at Town Hall, Victor was the 
antithesis of the kind of responsible manhood accepted and valued in Zongo. 
Abdulahi’s narrative not only introduced marriage into the frame distinguishing the men 
from the youth, but brought into relief the ways in which the differential statuses of 
married and unmarried men were grounded in distinct sets of rights and 
responsibilities within the domestic space. In Chapter Five I sought to explore this idea 
further by examining men’s domestic relations and how they were implicated in 
manhoods.  
Emil Dauncey 3750701 
 
244 
 
I began by elaborating the physical structure of the Hausa compound and the domestic 
relationships which could be seen to pattern its form. I drew out the gida and iyali as 
distinct levels of kinship grouping. The different rights, responsibilities and statuses of 
men within domestic relations of consumption, production and exchange were 
revealed by plotting the course of kinship and compound morphology. I described how 
the status and authority enjoyed by married men was derived from their position as 
normative providers for notional dependants. Irrespective of their actual productive 
activities, women, children and unmarried 'youth' were said to be profligate 
consumers, incapable of meeting their own needs, and so dependent on male 
household heads, who produce and provide on their behalf. According to men in 
Zongo, it was these dependencies which justified the authority of husbands and 
fathers over wives, children and unmarried youth. If it weren’t for the firm hand and 
honourable character of responsible men, who put food on the table, then disorder 
would surely prevail. 
This idea of authority as being derived from the dependency of others was embodied 
in the notion of arzikin mutane, or 'wealth in people' – the power, prestige and status 
which is achieved through the recruitment of and control over dependants and 
followers (Miers and Kopytoff 1977, Bledsoe 1980, Guyer 1993 and 1995, Jordan 
Smith 2005). Marriage could be seen as a mechanism through which a man accrues 
wealth-in-people, by establishing a household unit comprised of notionally dependent 
women and children over which he exerts control. Thus marriage was central to the 
attainment of responsible manhoods from which male prestige was derived. 
However, marriage is seldom easily realised. Though for the best part defunct in the 
present day, the practice of gandu in Hausaland provided a lens onto the inter-
generational relationships through which young men realised their marital ambitions. I 
described how young men, like Abu and Dauda, often relied heavily upon contributions 
from senior men to meet their wedding expenses; not least the relatively high cost of 
providing a room for a bride and the various prestationary payments which formally 
constitute the marital process. Within the extended kinship unit, the mai iyali and mai 
gida enjoy privileged access to resources, and control how they are distributed 
between the household’s various constituents. For unmarried men, accessing such 
resources meant subordinating themselves to the authority of the senior kinsmen who 
controlled them. 
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A similar dynamic could also be seen to play out in relationships between men beyond 
the extended kinship unit. I revisited Pellow’s (2002) account of Sabon Zongo’s 
founding, set out in Chapter Two. I described how in a context in which incomes are 
low and housing is scarce or difficult to access, control over allocations of housing can 
be converted into wealth in people. It is for this reason that Zongo’s Chieftaincy has 
historically been dominated by landholders, as it is they who have been most able to 
recruit followers; the political loyalties of junior men are rewarded with social, economic 
and political assistance, including access to housing and other resources necessary 
for marriage. 
Thus marriage is important to men in Zongo because it is the means through which 
the prestige of arzikin mutane is realised, and whereby socially valued, productive and 
responsible manhood is established. Moreover, elite men who enjoy the greatest 
prestige are those whose networks of dependants reach beyond the conjugal unit, 
even the extended kinship unit of the gida, to the formal political hierarchies of the 
Chieftaincy. An interesting and important observation here was that it is control over 
reproduction, rather than production and productive resources, which underpins male 
authority. 
9.3 Ideals and Actualities 
The progression from youth, to manhood, to elite seemed to resemble a linear process 
and so when I first started writing, I thought it made sense to structure the thesis 
accordingly: describing the various steps taken by men on their pathways through 
marriage to manhood and wider political influence. However, my efforts were 
constantly brought into tension with the messiness of social reality. A degree of 
abstraction is necessary, perhaps even inevitable, when seeking to describe complex 
social phenomena within the confines of a thesis; but when it came to normative 
manhoods, actual marital pathways simply did not want to tow the line. Idealised 
accounts of manhood, and the marital process through which it was achieved, were 
often contradicted by what actually happened in practice. Thus a parallel, but no less 
important, thread in my thesis has been the tensions between ideals and actualities, 
and the efforts men made to reconcile them. 
Much like the proverbial duelling of Salamone’s (1973) husbands and wives, men in 
Zongo seemed to be engaged in a perpetual battle to redefine and represent social 
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situations in terms that were favourable to them. This was apparent from the outset in 
Chapter One. I drew on Goffman (1956, 1974, 1980) to argue that the viewing of Maid 
in Manhattan at Oakville Town Hall could be seen as a stage for impression 
management in which Abu and his friends sought not only to present themselves 
favourably to others, but cultivate a sense of self-worth. Through the act of viewing 
and discussing the show, the young men imagined and made a common moral 
universe, such that their account of the show could be seen as an iteration of their own 
social and moral realities, the challenges they encountered and how they might be 
overcome. Given the idea that marriage matters to young men because it brings about 
an improvement in how they are socially evaluated by others, I argued that Abu and 
his friends’ preoccupation with marriage reflected their anxieties about the difficulties 
of achieving a sense of personal self-worth and the ways in which remaining unmarried 
comes to impinge on it. 
A similar set of anxieties can be seen to pervade the notion of the ideal bride as set 
out in Chapter Six. The relative desirability of amarya and bazawara brides was 
described as a function of the moral statuses implied by their contrasting marital 
histories. However, these ‘moral’ narratives could read as commentaries on female 
autonomy and the problems it posed for men in a world where masculine prestige and 
men’s sense of self-worth relies on the dependency of others, not least women. It is 
perhaps not witchcraft or sorcery, infidelity or sexually transmitted diseases that men 
fear, but that their own inadequacies might be revealed by disgruntled or disobedient 
wives. If men are to establish and sustain an image of themselves aligned with the 
normative ideal of productive and responsible manhood, then they need women who 
do as they’re told; or, at the very least, women who give the impression of doing so. 
How a bride is perceived by others clearly matters to men. Indeed, this was evident in 
the difficulties I encountered trying to find out whom men actually married. Just about 
every man claimed to have married rather well, even when there was evidence to the 
contrary. This was apparent in the example of Nasir, who seemed to actively foster an 
evasive ambiguity as to his prospective bride as bazawara, despite my having met her 
children from a previous marriage.  
Men’s efforts to manage how their brides were perceived by others were clearly visible 
in the prestationary exchanges that formally demarcate the marital process. In Chapter 
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Seven I set out the formal structure and significance of the exchange of marriage 
goods as described by men, and asked what they might say about accepted and 
valued notions of manhood. As one might expect, these accounts tended to 
emphasise normative ideals of gender and intergenerational relations within the 
household. For example, sadaki was described as a compensatory payment made by 
a groom’s senior kinsmen to those of the bride. Compensation was regarded as 
necessary because the men who had provided for a bride throughout her upbringing 
were not those who would benefit from her reproductive labour. The value of the sadaki 
was said to reflect the relative value of a bride as derived from her marital history and 
prestige of her lineage. 
In Chapter Eight I elaborated how these prestationary processes played out in 
practice. Despite often deviating significantly from normative accounts, individuals 
attempted to represent the prestationary processes in which they themselves had 
participated in ways that were congruous with official scripts. I argued that this was an 
effect of the ways in which material costs and reputational consequences were 
negotiated throughout the marital process. 
This could be seen in the contrasting cases of Aliyu and Salihu’s efforts to marry. Both 
men attempted to secure the support of their fathers necessary for marriage by 
providing their own sadaki, but only Aliyua was successful. Aliyu was successful 
because he made his contribution discretely and framed it in ways that did not 
undermine the intergenerational dependencies upon which his father’s status relied. 
In contrast, Salihu’s contribution was framed in such a way as to imply his father’s 
failure to live up to social expectations. I argued that dominant meanings could be 
made use of to influence how a social situation is read by an audience. This was well 
illustrated in the way Bilal made use of a blender as a tool for impression management. 
A blender when gifted a bride by her mother is considered a prestige good; by inserting 
a blender in to the budan kay, Bilal appeals to the significances that a blender at a 
budan kay is assumed to imply. 
9.4 Scratching the Structuralist Itch  
As discussed in Chapter Three, within the gender and development literature, there 
has been a tendency to emphasise the ways in which structural constraints impinge 
upon the agency of individuals. This perhaps explains why the men and masculinities 
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literature has tended to focus on the experiences of men unable or unwilling to conform 
to hegemonic or idealised forms of masculinity and how established gender orders 
come to work against them. These analyses have been invaluable in bringing men 
and masculinities to the gender agenda and drawing attention to many of the well-
being challenges faced by men. However, it can be argued that the experiences and 
agency of ostensibly ‘non-deviant’ men have been left under-examined. For example, 
as we saw in Chapter Three, a recurrent concern within the masculinities literature has 
been the idea of a ‘crisis of masculinity’ – that in contexts where normative 
masculinities are difficult to achieve, men pursue a sense of self-worth through anti-
social behaviours, such as violence, risky sexual practices or substance abuse.  
My analysis resonates with this literature, in that young men’s concerns about getting 
married reflect wider anxieties about achieving a socially recognised manhood. 
However, as is evident in my account, the pursuit of ‘alternative’ masculinities may not 
be the only way in which men respond to this difficulty. 
A focus on the ways in which established gender orders impinge upon the lives of men 
has helped alert us to the ways in which power produces inequality and ill-being. This 
is clearly important. However, there is another side to this coin that merits exploration; 
how individuals might adapt and make use of these structures as agents. 
Without denying the power, injustice and inequality vested in structural arrangements, 
DeCerteau (1984 p.xiv-xv) urges us to see agents as active “users”, who “…make 
innumerable and infinitesimal transformations of and within the dominant cultural 
economy in order to adapt it to their own interests and their own rules”. 
In line with DeCerteau, I have attempted to identify the ‘deviances’ occurring within the 
normalised and normalising discourses of manhood in Zongo, to demonstrate how 
agency is expressed not only as overt resistance, but in micro acts of evasion and 
subversion concealed within and making use of the norm. 
One of the puzzles that emerged in this thesis was why young men would continue to 
reproduce the very ideals that seemed to be working against them. Why did young 
men continue to reproduce the notion of marriage as central to accepted notions of 
manhood when it is apparently so difficult to achieve and the source of such 
tremendous anxiety? 
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In Chapters Four, Five and Six we saw how men’s efforts at impression management 
tended to be directed towards established social expectations, reinforcing rather than 
rejecting normative masculinities. This might be read as a triumph of sovereign power: 
normative discourses propping up the authority of senior men, who derive power from 
their control over subordinate men’s pursuit of personal significance.  
My argument was, and to some extent remains, that marriage serves to demarcate 
socially valued forms of masculinity. However, over the course of Chapter Seven and 
Eight, I argued that the apparent obstinacy of certain notions of manhood, not only 
belies the ‘tactical manoeuvres’ taking place within them, but are indeed necessary 
conditions for such manoeuvres to take place. In concrete terms I argued that many 
individual men have an interest in sustaining a particular discourse of how things are 
and ought to be, even when such ideals are difficult to realise in practice, as they 
provide a veil of assumptions behind which can be concealed the uncertainties and 
fragilities of their own status and authority, not least their dependencies on junior men 
and women.  
In Chapter Seven I described how idealised notions of manhood were implicated in 
accounts of the marital process. Chapter Eight asked how men go about navigating 
these discourses in practice. Once again I drew upon Goffman (1956, 1974, 1980) to 
examine the marital process as a stage for impression management. My analysis 
revealed how individuals manoeuvre within normative discourses as agents, putting 
them to work to evade and subvert authority: notional dependants hold their social 
superiors to ransom by threatening to withdraw their cooperation from the 
performances of dependency upon which male prestige relies. 
From this point of view, the moral commentaries which accompany relations of 
consumption and production – such as Mallam Hassan’s, which emphasises the 
profligacy and indiscipline of young men; and that of Abu and his friends, whose ideal 
bride is set against a backdrop of the immoral proclivities of women – might be seen 
not as mechanisms of social control – as a way of legitimating and naturalising the 
authority of men over women and senior men over their juniors – but as expressions 
of anxiety about the fragility of this order. 
I have shown how in Zongo norms of intergenerational exchange are often 
transgressed; but I have also shown how considerable effort is made to conceal such 
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transgressions or frame them in terms aligned with dominant narratives. It is hard to 
imagine that people in Zongo are entirely unaware of the extent to which these 
transgressions occur and the efforts that are made to conceal them. In a context in 
which the reputational costs of confessing one’s own failings are high, a 
depersonalised discourse of young men’s production and consumption as inherently 
immoral, might serve to discourage young men from revealing transgressions which 
stand to discredit the authority claimed by their seniors. A dividend that young men will 
also reap when they themselves come to occupy positions of notional authority. It is 
for this reason that Abu keeps the money he has saved for his wedding hidden beneath 
his mattress.  
 
9.5 Epilogue: A Whatsapp Chat with Abu. 
Abu: Hey man! How r u? You in UK? 
Me: Hey Abu! Yeah. I’m in UK. Still studying. How ru? 
Abu: I hav news flash from zongo. 
Me:? 
Abu: Am getting married. 
Me: Congratulations! Mungodiya Allah. When is the big day? 
Abu: Soon insha Allah. 
Whatsapp Chat with Abu. June 2014. 
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